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I. INTRODUCTION
It is truly uncommon when a tax statute casts off from its financial,
economic, and accounting moorings in the Internal Revenue Code and sets
sail in the murky waters and confusing undercurrents of American society’s
shifting social attitudes.1 Section 104(a)(2), an octogenarian veteran of the
Internal Revenue Code (Code),2 is like such a seafaring vessel— heading
upwind toward an emerging public policy that seeks to regulate private and
public behavior in interpersonal relationships.
In its original form, this statutory provision excluded from income
taxation all monetary damage awards for certain “personal injuries.”3 For
approximately eighty years, the tax code afforded damages awarded on
account of nonphysical personal injuries the same tax treatment as awards on
1. See Bertram Harnett, Torts and Taxes, 27 N.Y.U. L. REV. 614, 624 (1952) (“Personal injury
claims are sui generis in the tax law for they have no customary commercial or investment
connotations.”). The Internal Revenue Code (IRC or Code) has previously tread the waters of social
policy in order to encourage action benefiting the public sector. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 23 (1998) (allowing
personal credit for adoption expenses); I.R.C. § 117 (1998) (excluding qualified scholarships); I.R.C.
§ 127 (1998) (excluding educational assistance programs); I.R.C. § 131 (1998) (excluding certain
foster care payments); I.R.C. § 170 (1998) (allowing deduction for charitable contributions and gifts to
an organization); I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (1998) (allowing exemptions for charitable organizations,
including “[c]orporations, and any community chest, fund, or foundation, organized and operated
exclusively for religious, charitable, scientific, testing for public safety, literary, or educational
purposes”); and I.R.C. § 501(i) (1998) (prohibiting racial and religious discrimination by certain social
clubs by not allowing exemption to clubs that would otherwise qualify for exemption under § 501 but
for their discriminatory policies). With one possible exception, Congress has not regulated
relationships of a personal nature. See I.R.C. § 1041 (1998) (allowing for the nonrecognition of gain or
loss in transfers of property between spouses).
2. I.R.C. § 104(a)(2) (1998) (codified as amended at 26 U.S.C. § 104(a)(2) (1998)). The section
was originally codified as I.R.C. § 213(b)(6) in 1918. Revenue Act of 1918, § 213(b)(6), 40 Stat. 1057,
1065-66 (1919) (current version at 26 U.S.C. § 104(a)(2) (1998)).
3. Revenue Act of 1918, § 213(b)(6), 40 Stat. 1057, 1065-66 (1919) (current version at 26
U.S.C. § 104(a)(2) (1998)). The pertinent portion of this statute read as follows:
That for purposes of this title . . . the term “gross income”—
. . .
(b) Does not include the following items, which shall be exempt from taxation under this title:
. . .
(6) Amounts received, through accident or health insurance or under workmen’s compensation
acts, as compensation for personal injuries or sickness, plus the amount of any damages received
whether by suit or agreement on account of such injuries or sickness . . . .
Id.
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account of personal physical injury.4 A brief hiatus between the enactment of
§ 213(b)(6), the precursor of § 104(a)(2), in the Revenue Act of 1918 and the
Solicitor’s Opinion 132 in 1922 serves as the one exception.5 Only with the
adoption of the Small Business Job Protection Act of 1996,6 did Congress
limit the income tax exclusion to damages received from personal “physical”
injuries or “physical” sickness.7
Nevertheless, today physicians, lawyers, and social scientists
acknowledge that nonphysical injuries resulting from racial discrimination
cause enduring intergenerational scars and may be more enduring and more
severe than physical injuries caused by the loss of an arm or leg in a traffic
accident.8 Additionally, both empirical studies and congressional policies
now recognize the insidiousness of sexual harassment, age, and disability
discrimination, as well as the long-term and sometimes permanently
debilitating effects inflicted upon their victims.9
As the statute continues its rough passage through the rising swells of
statutory, regulatory, and judicial interpretation, § 104(a)(2) could lose its
bearings and wander off of its intended nondiscriminatory course. Society’s
4. See 31 Op. Att’y Gen. 304, 308 (1918); I.R.C. § 104(a)(2) (1997); I.R.C. § 104(a)(2) (1996).
5. Sol. Op. 132, I-1 C.B. 92, 93, 94 (1922) (revoking Sol. Mem. 957, 1 C.B. 65, 65 (1919)
(holding that amounts received in libel suit for damage were not within the statutory exemption
without giving any guidance or analysis as to the holding) and Sol. Mem. 1384, 2 C.B. 71, 72 (1920)
(holding that “the alienation of a wife’s affections is not such a personal injury as to entitle the
recipient of damages therefor to exemption [from income tax to the amoung received]”)).
6. Pub. L. No. 104-188, 110 Stat. 1755 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.).
7. Small Business Jobs Protection Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-188, § 1605, 110 Stat. 1755,
1838 (codified as amended at 26 U.S.C. § 104 (Supp. II 1996)). The pertinent revised part reads:
Except in the case of amounts attributable to (and not in excess of) deductions allowed under
section 213 (relating to medical, etc., expenses) for any prior taxable year, gross income does not
include—
. . .
(2) the amount of any damages (other than punitive damages) received (whether by suit or
agreement and whether as lump sums or as periodic payments) on account of personal physical
injuries or physical sickness.
26 U.S.C. § 104 (Supp. II 1996).
8. See infra Part VI for more information on the medical and social scientific elements of
nonphysical injuries. See also Louis E. Swanson et al., African Americans in Southern Rural Regions:
The Importance of Legacy, 22 REV. BLACK POL. ECON. 109 (1994) (proposing that once
discrimination negatively impacts the individual, the effects can spill over generationally).
9. See, e.g., H.R REP. NO. 102-40, pt. 1, at 65-69 (1991), reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 549,
603-07 (stating that as a result of sexual harassment and discrimination, women suffer from terrible
humiliation, pain and suffering, psychological harm, sleeplessness, nausea, neck pains, nervousness,
blotches and welts on legs and back, breathing difficulties, debilitating depression, gastro-intestinal
disorder, weight loss, and may even encounter problems with pregnancy); S. REP. NO. 101-249, pt. 1,
at 101 (1990) (stating that as a result of discrimination, older workers suffer from “psychological
stress, including hopelessness, depression, . . . frustration,” and “physical, emotional, and
psychological” problems that can shorten life span).
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weakest groups are frequently the victims of nonphysical personal injuries
and should possess the same inalienable rights to redress personal injury as
historically enjoyed by dominant white males. Inequitable tax treatment
based on the nonphysical nature of a victim’s injuries is irrational, arbitrary,
and without constitutional justification.
While the ‘50s provided a calm before the storm,10 the ‘60s cast our
society into the turbulent seas of social and economic revolution, embracing
both race and gender.11 Spearheaded by the Warren Court12 and the Civil
Rights Act of 1964,13 the tempest of the sixties cleared the air and set the
scene for major changes in the law.14 In the ‘70s American social
10. See William E. Nelson, The Changing Meaning of Equality in Twentieth-Century
Constitutional Law, 52 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 3, 100 (1995) (concluding that Brown v. Board of
Education sparked “goal-orientated” judgment and that not until the mid-60s did “rights-centered”
adjudication became prevalent in the courtroom).
11. See, e.g., Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369, 370-73, 381 (1967) (ruling that an article within
the California Constitution prohibiting the State from interfering with the absolute discretion of
persons selling, leasing, or renting their home was unconstitutional because it involved the State in
private racial discrimination); McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 184, 196 (1964) (determining that
a Florida statute making it criminal for a black man and a white woman or a white man and a black
woman to cohabit the same room at night if they were not married was invalid under the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment).
12. See L. BRENT BOZELL, THE WARREN REVOLUTION 340 (1966) (concluding that “the Warren
Era inaugurated a revolution in American jurisprudence”); JOHN D. WEAVER, WARREN: THE MAN
THE COURT THE ERA 5 (1967) (stating that Warren’s was the first, since the Marshall Court, to ring in
“bold changes” affecting social, legal, and political structure). For a comprehensive historical
background of the justices that presided on the Warren Court, see generally JOHN P. FRANK, THE
WARREN COURT (1964).
13. Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
14. Before the 1964 Act came into existence, Congress sought to protect women financially with
the passage of the Equal Pay Act of 1963 (EPA). 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (1994). The Act was passed, in
part, because of women’s lower wage earnings, increasing employment, and rising divorce rate at the
time, that made women, and sometimes their children, dependent on only one woman’s earnings). See
WALTER FOGEL, THE EQUAL PAY ACT: IMPLICATIONS FOR COMPARABLE WORTH 6 (1984). Civil
rights protection, after the enactment of the 1964 Act, was next extended to the elderly. See Age
Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-202, 81 Stat. 602 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 29 U.S.C.). The Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) was a natural
succession of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the EPA. See JOSEPH E. KALET, AGE DISCRIMINATION
IN EMPLOYMENT LAW 1-2 (2d ed. 1990). The Rehabilitation Act of 1973 finally allowed the disabled a
means with which to redress discriminatory treatment at the national level. See Rehabilitation Act of
1973, Pub. L. No. 93-112, 87 Stat. 355 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 29 U.S.C.).
Although the passage of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 extended civil rights legislation to the disabled,
its application was narrow because the scope of the statute only applied when government financed
employers’ perpetrated discrimination. See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1994). The Americans with
Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA) made the Rehabilitation Act more comprehensive by further extending
protection to disabled individuals who were victimized by privately funded employers. See Americans
with Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§§ 12101-213 (1994)); 42 U.S.C. § 12112 (1994). Finally, with the enactment of the Civil Rights Act
of 1991, victims of discrimination who brought their respective claims under Title VII, ADEA, or
ADA were allowed to receive compensatory and punitive damages for wrongs suffered. See Civil
Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (codified as amended in scattered sections of
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consciousness became increasingly sensitive to economic disparity between
races and genders, propelling these issues to the forefront of congressional
policy and judicial action.15 Next, the self-interested ‘80s, 16 known as the
Decade of Greed, revealed the stress fractures caused by the social revolution
of the ‘60s17 and by the progressiveness of the ‘70s.18 Indeed, the call for tort
reform first emerged in the ‘80s,19 and it continues today to be an issue high
on the agenda of many political groups.
Against the background of the civil rights struggle, this Article examines
the eighty-year history of § 104(a)(2). The congressional purpose for the
changes to § 104(a)(2) was to raise revenues needed to fund tax incentives
created by the Small Business Job Protection Act of 1996. This Article
attempts to uncover and elucidate the underlying reasons for the judicial
interpretations and subsequent discriminatory amendments.20
These conflicting claims set the debate over § 104(a)(2) against the
background of society’s emerging respect for the value and dignity of the
person. Furthermore, it underscores the lack of legislative and judicial regard
for the rights of the groups historically treated as barnacles on the hull of
society: minorities, women, the elderly, and the disabled.21 More importantly,
42 U.S.C.).
15. See generally MYRA MARX FERREE & BETH B. HESS, CONTROVERSY AND COALITION: THE
NEW FEMINIST MOVEMENT ACROSS THREE DECADES OF CHANGE (1994); ETHEL KLEIN, GENDER
POLITICS: FROM CONSCIOUSNESS TO MASS POLITICS (1984).
16. See Robert G. Day, Note, Administrative Watchdogs or Zealous Advocates? Implications for
Legal Ethics in the Face of Expanded Attorney Liability, 45 STAN. L. REV. 645, 669 (1993)
(discussing the “decade of greed” as producing “the savings and loan debacle, the market crash of
1987, and financial scandals such as those involving Michael Milken and Ivan Boesky” and discussing
how Congress passed the Securities Law Enforcement Remedies Act of 1990 in order to help “restore
investor confidence in the integrity, fairness, and efficiency of the securities markets” which had been
destroyed due to these financial scandals).
17. See generally Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic, The Social Construction of Brown v. Board
Of Education: Law Reform and the Reconstructive Paradox, 36 WM. & MARY L. REV. 547 (1995);
Michael J. Klarman, Brown, Racial Change, and the Civil Rights Movement, 80 VA. L. REV. 7 (1994).
18. See generally ALBERT G. MOSLEY & NICHOLAS CAPALDI, AFFIRMATIVE ACTION: SOCIAL
JUSTICE OR UNFAIR PREFERENCE? 4-12 (1996) (discussing the birth of the affirmative action
revolution from the 1972 amendments to the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and Supreme Court decisions
related to civil rights in the 1970s).
19. See James A. Henderson, Jr. & Theodore Eisenberg, The Quiet Revolution in Products
Liability: An Empirical Study of Legal Change, 37 UCLA L. REV. 479 (1990).
20. For an alternate point of view on IRC history and discrimination, see J. Martin Burke &
Michael K. Friel, Getting Physical: Excluding Personal Injury Awards Under The New Section
104(a)(2), 58 MONT. L. REV. 167, 167 (1997) (“The 1996 amendments to § 104(a)(2) of the Internal
Revenue Code are an understandable, but fundamentally incorrect, reaction to a statutory rule that was
seen to have careened out of control with respect to nonphysical personal injuries.”).
21. Although protection for these individuals has been established by passage of civil rights
legislation, practices contrary to the spirit of these acts arguably persist. See, e.g., J. M. Balkin, The
Constitution of Status, 106 YALE L.J. 2313, 2374 (1997) (concluding that “because law is a part of
social structure, legal doctrines will usually be complicit in preserving status hierarchies even when
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it uncovers preconceived false notions of nonphysical injuries— notions
firmly attached to the seabed of a largely male, Caucasian, masculine-
dominated judiciary and legislature. It dredges up the potent yet frequently
unconscious prejudices that have conditioned the incongruous treatment of
victims of personal injuries. Overall, this Article supports deliberate
congressional action to ameliorate this discourdant state of affairs.
This Article first provides the traditional scholarly survey of legislative
history, statutory analysis, and governmental and judicial interpretations. Part
II reviews the history of § 104(a)(2) and offers a substantive inquiry into the
Supreme Court opinions in United States v. Burke,22 Commissioner v.
Schleier,23 and in the major cases leading up to these decisions. Part III then
reviews the tax policy assumptions supporting § 104(a)(2) from a perspective
of both before and after the 1996 amendments. Part IV chronicles the history
and current status of various federally enacted civil rights statutes. This part
then presents a historical overview of the emergence of tort reform at the
federal and state levels— a reform in many ways diametrically opposed to
that of civil rights legislation evolving and expanding the scope of
protections and remedies. These two movements— civil rights and tort
reform— elucidate the current status of § 104(a)(2). With respect to
§ 104(a)(2), tort reform takes place not in the traditional sense, Congress
passing federal tort reform, but rather through the “back door”— tort reform
in a taxing statute. Part V criticizes the judicial craftsmanship used in United
States v. Burke and Commissioner v. Schleier.
Next, this Article departs from traditional legal analysis by examining the
psychological, sociological, and economical consequences of the
discrimination and arbitrary double standard that § 104(a)(2) imposes on the
victims of nonphysical harm. In doing so, this Article studies socio-economic
factors causing the evolution of § 104(a)(2) and employs relevant
psychoanalytic and cognitive psychological theories. Part VI archives the
well-documented negative psychological, physical, social, economical, and
societal consequences that result from various forms of discrimination. Part
VII applies psychoanalytic and cognitive theories of psychology to support
the thesis that the 1996 amendment to § 104(a)(2) is a product of
unconscious judicial and legislative discrimination. This Part also contains a
they claim to be dismantling them”); Reva Siegel, Why Equal Protection No Longer Protects: The
Evolving Forms Of Status-Enforcing State Action, 49 STAN. L. REV. 1111, 1147-48 (1997) (“Once we
appreciate that forms of status-enforcing state action we now deem morally reprehensible were once
understood as morally defensible, it would seem to follow that we should evaluate the justifications for
our current practices with a certain skepticism.”).
22. 504 U.S. 229 (1992).
23. 515 U.S. 323 (1995).
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historic overview of the law of emotional distress that pertains to the current
status of § 104(a)(2), especially when viewed under the psychoanalytic and
cognitive theories of unconscious discrimination.
Finally, Part VIII concludes the Article, recommending that Congress
take immediate action to remedy the tax discrimination leveled against
victims of dignatory torts and raise revenues to support the exclusion by
disallowing deductions for amounts paid to victims of discrimination by the
tortfeasors.
In an effort to effectively influence the drafting of appropriate legislation,
this Article will conclusively demonstrate that in the context of § 104(a)(2)
there are no sustainable or well-founded tax or social policy justifications for
treating victims of nonphysical injuries differently from those of physical
injuries. Rather, broad social and congressional policy requires that victims
of discrimination, in all its forms, be treated equally for tax purposes.
II. THE HISTORY OF § 104(a)(2)
The history of § 104(a)(2) presents an unusual account of a tax statute
dealing not with familiar economic transactions but with interpersonal
relations resulting in economic consequences. For the past eight decades,
§ 104(a)(2) has been the subject of inconsistent interpretation. Influenced by
prevailing income definitions, public policy, accounting principles, and
statutory interpretation, the Legislative, Judicial, and Executive (Treasury
Department) Branches have fashioned various conflicting rationales
justifying the general application and intent of § 104(a)(2). Sections A-L
review the history of § 104(a)(2) offering a substantive examination of the
major cases that played a role in shaping the current § 104(a)(2) exclusion for
personal injury damages.
Section A lays out the events that lead to the enactment of § 213(b)(6),
the predecessor of § 104(a)(2). Shortly before the enactment of § 213(b)(6)
personal injury damage awards were purportedly excluded from income
under a return of capital theory; the personal injury damage awards merely
returned lost capital to the taxpayer. A mere return of lost capital could not be
income under the prevailing definition at the time of these decisions because
income was defined as derived from labor, capital, or a combination of
both.24 Moreover, Section A sets out two administrative opinions that
narrowly interpret § 213(b)(6) as not providing an exclusion for damages
from nonphysical personal injuries. The first decision, handed down in 1919,
24. Stratton’s Independence v. Howbert, 231 U.S. 399, 415 (1913).
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol78/iss4/4
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provides only the most general guidance.25 The second decision, decided in
1920, applies the return of capital theory to disallow the exclusion for
nonphysical personal injury damage awards.26
Section B introduces two decisions, one from 1922,27 and another from
1927,28 which conclude that § 213(b)(6) allows the exclusion of damages for
nonphysical injuries. Although these decisions favored plaintiffs who had
received damages for nonphysical injuries, the decisions did not apply
§ 213(b)(6) and greatly misapplied, confused, and entangled the concept of
income and human capital in reaching their respective conclusions.
Section C tracks the major § 104(a)(2) decisions from 1928 up until the
Supreme Court’s decision in Glenshaw Glass v. Commissioner.29 Generally,
these decisions dealt with injury to business rather than injury to an
individual. Taxpayers could exclude damages as outside the concept of
income under various theories— the return of capital theory, injury to
personal rights theory, or the windfall theory. However, the courts once again
failed to focus on the statutory language of § 213(b)(6). A 1944 decision
articulated a new test for determining the taxability of business recoveries,
phrased by the court as the “in lieu of what” test.”30 Under this test, if the
damages took the place of lost capital, they were excluded from income.
Courts continued to apply this test into the ‘80s.
Section D introduces Glenshaw Glass in which the Supreme Court
redefined the concept of income.31 Income ceased to be narrowly defined as
derived from labor, capital, or a combination of both. Rather, income became
any “undeniable accessions to wealth, clearly realized, and over which the
taxpayer [had] complete dominion [and control].”32 Thus, Glenshaw Glass
broadly defined “income,” requiring taxpayers to qualify under a specific
statutory exemption in order to exclude accessions to wealth. Finally, the
decision in Glenshaw Glass compelled courts to analyze, interpret, and apply
the § 104(a)(2) statutory exclusion in the personal injury context. Thereafter,
because of the favorable tax treatment of damages for personal injuries,
taxpayers sought to frame causes of action in tort law, even if those causes of
action were also grounded in contract law. As a result, for the next forty-
seven years, the Tax Court and the circuit courts of appeals would develop
25. Solicitor’s Memorandum 957, 1 C.B. 65 (1919).
26. Solicitor’s Memorandum 1384, 2 C.B. 71 (1920).
27. Solicitor’s Opinion 132, I-1 C.B. 92 (1922).
28. Hawkins v. Comm’r, 6 B.T.A.M (P-H) 1023 (1927).
29. 348 U.S. 426 (1955).
30. Raytheon Prod. Corp. v. Comm’r, 144 F.2d 110, 113 (1st Cir. 1944).
31. Comm’r v. Glenshaw Glass, 348 U.S. 426, 431 (1955).
32. Id. at 431.
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four innovative tests to filter out claims purportedly undeserving of the
§ 104(a)(2) exclusion. Sections E through H examine each one of these four
tests.
Section E presents the first test used, beginning in 1961, to filter out
undeserving claims under § 104(a)(2)— the “intent of the payor” test.33 In
applying this test courts looked to the complaint and the defendant’s
statements made in the underlying case to determine whether the defendant
transferred money to the plaintiff to redress contractual breaches or tortious
injuries. If evidence indicated that the defendant intended the award to
remedy a breach of contract, the taxpayer could not exclude the damages
from income. If the evidence proved that the defendant intended the award to
account for tortious injury, the taxpayer could exclude the damages from
income.
Section F describes the test that the courts began using in 1972 to weed
out meritless claims under § 104(a)(2)— the “nature of the claim” test.34
Under this test, if the damages claimed were of a personal nature, the
taxpayer could properly exclude the damage award from income.
Section G introduces the “tort or tort-type” test,35 first used in 1980.
Under this inquiry, the taxpayer could exclude awards under § 104(a)(2) only
if the damage award redressed a tort or tort-type injury. The tort or tort-type
test originated from the language of Treasury Regulation 1.104-1(c) which
states that “damages received . . . means an amount received . . . [from an]
action based on tort or tort-type rights.”36 The tort or tort-type test would gain
prominence in future § 104(a)(2) decisions. In fact, the first § 104(a)(2)
Supreme Court decision, United States v. Burke, applied this test and denied
the § 104(a)(2) exemption to a plaintiff seeking to exclude back pay received
under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII) from income.37
Section H presents “predominant nature of the claim” test, first emerging
in 1982.38 Under this test, income did not include an award based upon a
claim whose predominant nature redressed personal injuries. This test
notably diminished the influence of the intent of the payor test.
Section I discusses the historical underpinnings of the courts’ decisions to
begin setting concrete principles with respect to § 104(a)(2). Section I first
tracks the resurgence of the “nature of the claim” test in the 1983 Court of
33. Agar v. Comm’r, 290 F.2d 283 (2d Cir. 1961).
34. Seay v. Comm’r, 58 T.C. 32 (1972), acquiesced, 1972-2 C.B. 3 (1972).
35. Whitehead v. Comm’r, 41 T.C.M. (CCH) 365 (1980).
36. Treas. Reg. § 1.104-1(c) (1998).
37. 504 U.S. 229 (1992).
38. Nussbaum v. Comm’r, 45 T.C.M. (CCH) 346 (1982).
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Appeals for the Ninth Circuit case, Roemer v. Commissioner.39 The Ninth
Circuit stressed that the nature of the injury must not be defined by the effect
of the injury. Section I then discusses the 1986 Tax Court decision, Threlkeld
v. Commissioner.40 In Threlkeld, the judiciary accepted four major points as
settled law. First, the excludability of the award is dependant upon the nature
of the claim and not upon the validity of the claim.41 Second, no distinction is
to be made between physical and nonphysical injury.42 Third, no distinction
should be made between damages received for injury to professional
reputation and damages received for injury to personal reputation.43 Finally,
the determination of “whether the damages received are paid on account of
‘personal injuries’ should be the beginning and the end of the inquiry.”44
Section J establishes the 1989-1991 case law foundation for § 104(a)(2),
where all major cases dealt with awards in connection with Title VII45 and
the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA) claims.46 Here,
the decisions sharply depart from the concrete principles set out in Roemer
and Threlkeld for determining whether damages could be excluded under
§ 102(a)(2).47
Section K contains the § 104(a)(2) Supreme Court decisions of United
States v. Burke,48 decided in 1992, and Schleier v. Commissioner,49 decided
in 1995. This Section shows how these cases dramatically departed from
prior Tax Court and court of appeals’ case analyses.50
39. 716 F.2d 693 (9th Cir. 1983).
40. 848 F.2d 81 (6th Cir. 1988).
41. See Threlkeld v. Comm’r, 87 T.C. 1294, 1297 (1986) (citing Bent v. Comm’r, 87 T.C. 236
(1986); Glynn v. Comm’r, 76 T.C. 116, 119 (1981); Seay v. Comm’r, 58 T.C. 32, 37 (1972)).
42. See Threlkeld, 87 T.C. at 1297 (citing Seay, 58 T.C. at 40). The regulations stated that an
“[a]mount received as the result of a suit or compromise for personal injury, being similar to the
proceeds of accident insurance, is to be accounted for as income.” Id.
43. See id. at 1298.
44. Id. at 1299.
45. Civil Rights Act of 1964, §§ 701-716 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e–2000e-15
(1994 & Supp. II 1996)).
46. Pub. L. No. 90-202, 81 Stat. 602 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 29 U.S.C.).
47. For more information on the effect of the Civil Rights Act and the ADEA on the Roemer and
Threlkeld decisions, see infra Part IV. The judiciary decided these cases during a period when
Congress was in the process of enacting the ADA and the Civil Rights Act of 1991. Tort reform was
high on federal and state political agendas, and evidence shows that judicial tort reform caused
departure from the § 104(a)(2) principles articulated in Roemer and Threlkeld. More importantly, these
taxpayers in these decisions are the very same individuals to whom Congress attempts to extend
further civil rights protections.
48. 504 U.S. 229 (1992).
49. 515 U.S. 323 (1995).
50. For an in-depth critique of the Burke and Schleier decisions, see infra Part V, that shows how
the Supreme Court in Burke twisted, and in Schleier trivialized, the tort or tort-type test to come to
decisions that denigrated victims of dignitary torts.
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Section L first discusses the 1989 attempt to amend § 104(a)(2) to
disallow the exclusion of punitive damage awards from income if the injury
in the underlying case was nonphysical. Next, this Section discusses the 1995
congressional attempt to limit the § 104(a)(2) exclusion to damages on
account of physical injury or sickness.
Finally, Section M concludes by discussing the passage of the 1996
amendments to § 104(a)(2) that limited the exclusion to damages on account
of physical injury or sickness. As will be demonstrated in Part III, no tax
policy supports the current distinction made in § 104(a)(2).
A. Section 213(b)(6): The Early Years
1. The Income Tax Act of 1913 and the Enactment of § 213(b)(6)
Ratified in 1913, the Sixteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution
provided the foundation for imposing federal income tax upon individuals
and corporations.51 When Congress enacted the Income Tax Act of 1913, it
did not provide an exclusion from income for damage awards resulting from
personal injuries.52 In 1915, the Treasury issued Treasury Decision 2135
which indicated that “an amount received as a result of a suit or compromise
for ‘pain and suffering’ is held to be such income as would be taxable under
the provision of law that includes ‘gains or profits and income derived from
any source whatsoever.’”53 Although Treasury Decision 2135 did not deal
generally with damage awards, it did foreshadow what would become the
Treasury’s early position on such receipts. Treasury Regulation 33, issued
under the Revenue Acts of 1916 and 1917, specifically required taxation of
such damage awards.54
51. U.S CONST. amend. XVI (“The Congress shall have power to lay and collect taxes on
incomes, from whatever source derived, without apportionment among the several States, and without
regard to any census or enumeration.”). The sixty-first Congress proposed to the state legislatures the
Sixteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution on July 12, 1909, and it was ratified by thirty-
six states by February 25, 1913. See BORIS I. BITTKER & LAWRENCE LOKKEN, FEDERAL TAXATION
OF INCOME, ESTATES, AND GIFTS § 1.1.3 (3d ed. 1999). Income taxes had been levied previously
during the Civil War, both by the Union and the Confederacy. Id. § 1.1.2. However, the federal
government relied primarily on customs receipts, excise taxes, and the sale of land for revenues. See
id. § 1.1.2. See also Pollock v. Farmers’ Loan & Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429, 580-81, 583 (1895) (holding
income tax of 1894 unconstitutional); Springer v. United States, 102 U.S. 586, 602 (1880) (upholding
a civil war income tax).
52. Law of October 3, 1913, ch. 16, 38 Stat. 114, 166-81 (1915). The federal income tax
produced $35 million in revenues in its first fiscal year. See BITTKER & LOKKEN, supra note 51,
§ 1.1.1. See also Brushaber v. Union Pacific R.R., 240 U.S. 1, 17-18 (1916) (upholding the
constitutionality of the Income Tax Law of 1913).
53. T.D. 2135, 17 Treas. Dec. Int. Rev. 39, 42 (1915).
54. Treas. Reg. No. 33, revised, pt. I (1918). See also T.D. 2690, 20 Treas. Dec. Int. Rev. 126
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In 1918, the Attorney General opined that individuals could exclude from
taxation accident insurance proceeds received on account of personal
injury.55 In reaching this decision, the Attorney General first looked to the
language of the Revenue Act of 1916, as amended by the Revenue Act of
1917, and concluded that no explicit exemptions or deductions applied to
insurance proceeds from accidents.56 The question therefore became whether
“the proceeds of an accident insurance policy [are] ‘gains or profits and
income’ according to the principles . . . laid down by the Supreme Court?”57
In order to resolve the issue, the Attorney General58 initially looked to the
Supreme Court decisions in Stratton’s Independence v. Howbert,59 which
held that income was “gain derived from capital, from labor, or from both
combined,”60 and in Doyle v. Mitchell Brothers Company,61 which held that
income was “something entirely distinct from principal or capital.”62 Next,
the Attorney General examined the Supreme Court decisions of Lynch v.
Hornby,63 Lynch v. Turrish,64 and Southern Pacific Company v. Lowe65 for
further interpretive direction on the issue.66 The Attorney General found that
these cases stood for the proposition that stock dividends are income except
where the “final dividend [is] paid from the proceeds of sale of the entire
capital assets of a corporation, and . . . [where the final dividend is] a mere
readjustment of a capital indebtedness.”67
In light of these Supreme Court opinions, the Attorney General contended
that under general tax principles, amounts which restore capital must be
withdrawn from gross receipts when figuring tax liabilities.68 To further
support this contention, the Attorney General looked beyond the Supreme
Court’s language to dicta in the decision of the Court of Appeals for the Sixth
(1918). The regulations stated that an “[a]mount received as the result of a suit or compromise for
personal injury, being similar to the proceeds of accident insurance, is to be accounted for as income.”
Treas. Reg. No. 33, supra, at 130.
55. 31 Op. Att’y Gen. 304 (1918).
56. See id. at 304-05.
57. Id. at 307 (citing Lynch v. Hornby, 247 U.S. 339, 344 (1918); S. Pac. Co. v. Lowe, 247 U.S.
330, 335-39 (1918); Lynch v. Turrish, 247 U.S. 221, 230-31 (1918); Stratton’s Independence v.
Howbert, 231 U.S. 399, 415 (1913)).
58. 31 Op. Att’y Gen. 304, 305 (1918).
59. 231 U.S. 399 (1913).
60. Id. at 415.
61. 247 U.S. 179 (1918).
62. Id. at 185.
63. 247 U.S. 339 (1918).
64. 247 U.S. 221 (1918).
65. 247 U.S. 330 (1918).
66. 31 Op. Att’y Gen. 304, 306-07 (1918).
67. Id. at 307.
68. Id. at 306.
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Circuit in Doyle v. Mitchell Brothers Company.69 In that case, the Sixth
Circuit discussed the characterization of fire insurance money and found that
the characteristics of these proceeds substituted for destroyed capital.70
Finding no difference between fire insurance and casualty insurance, the
Attorney General compared the burned house to destroyed human ability and
concluded that “[w]ithout affirming that the human body is in a technical
sense the ‘capital’ invested in an accident policy,” accident insurance
proceeds were not taxable income but “merely take the place of capital in
human ability . . . destroyed by the accident.”71 Because the damages are
deemed to equal the lost capital, the damage award was excludable from
income.72
This line of reasoning excluding damages from income became known as
the “human capital” or “return of capital” theory.73 The Attorney General
could have surpassed the finding in Stratton’s Independence— that income is
“derived from capital, from labor, or from both combined”74— to hold that
the human body is not, even in the technical sense, the “capital” invested in
an accident policy. Such a holding would insure no derivation of income
from either capital or labor present upon receipt of accident proceeds. Under
this alternative line of reasoning, insurance awards would be excluded from
income in accordance with Stratton’s Independence.
Within a month of 31 Opinion Attorney General 304, the Treasury in
Treasury Decision 2747,75 revised its initial position on Regulation 33.
Treasury Decision 2747 held that money received from either a personal
injury, judgment, or settlement is sufficiently similar to accident insurance
proceeds to be considered income.76 This decision also supported Stratton’s
Independence.77 Like the Attorney General’s opinion, the Treasury decision
acknowledges four Supreme Court decisions including Doyle v. Mitchell
Bros. Co., Lynch v. Hornby, Lynch v. Turish, and Southern Pacific Co. v.
Lowe. The Treasury decision even went so far as to revoke any ”provisions
of treasury decisions and of regulations No. 33, revised, as are inconsistent
herewith.”78 The Treasury decision mentions neither the Sixth Circuit’s dicta
69. 235 F. 686 (6th Cir. 1916).
70. See id. See also 31 Op. Att’y Gen. 304, 307-08 (1918).
71. Doyle, 235 F. at 308.
72. See id.
73. For more information on these theories, see infra Part III.H.
74. 231 U.S. 399, 415 (1913).
75. T.D. 2747, 20 Treas. Dec. Int. Rev. 457 (1918).
76. See Treas. Reg. No. 33, pt. I (as amended in 1918).
77. See T.D. 2747, 20 Treas. Dec. Int. Rev. 457 (1918).
78. Id.
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in Doyle nor the human capital theory.79 Arguably, one cannot determine
from this decision whether the Treasury bought into the Attorney General’s
human capital argument or whether it only agreed with the Attorney
General’s result, and instead, based its conclusion on Stratton’s
Independence.
Later that same year, upon request of the Treasury, Congress enacted
§ 213(b)(6) when it passed the Revenue Act of 1918.80 Section 213(b)(6)
excluded from gross income “[a]mounts received, through accident or health
insurance or under workmen’s compensation acts, as compensation for
personal injuries or sickness, plus the amount of any damages received
whether by suit or agreement on account of such injuries or sickness.”81 The
Treasury hoped that the codification of this exclusion would earmark a
clearer rule for taxpayer liability on amounts received related to personal
damages.82 However, early interpretations of § 213(b)(6) wavered on what
exact amount taxpayers could exclude from physical and nonphysical
personal injury awards.
2. Early Interpretation of § 213(b)(6)
Without providing any guidance,83 Solicitor’s Memorandum 957, handed
down in 1919, narrowly interpreted § 213(b)(6) as not providing an exclusion
from income damage awards received in liable proceedings.84 Then a 1920
79. Id.
80. Revenue Act of 1918, ch. 18, 40 Stat. 1057 (1919).
81. Id. at 1065-66.
82. Under the plain language of § 213(b)(6), “any damages received . . . on account of such
injuries” were excludable.
83. See Douglas K. Chapman, No Pain— No Gain? Should Personal Injury Damages Keep Their
Tax Exempt Status?, 9 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L.J. 407, 413-14 (1987) (stating that “[u]nfortunately, on
the actual expression of intent, the silence of Congress is deafening”). The only reference to I.R.C.
§ 213 (b)(6) is contained in H.R. REP. NO. 65-767, at 9-10. See Patrick E. Hobbs, The Personal Injury
Exclusion: Congress Gets Physical but Leaves the Exclusion Emotionally Distressed, 76 NEB. L. REV.
51, 65 (1997). The House Report states:
Under the present law it is doubtful whether amounts received through accident or health
insurance, or under workman’s compensation acts, as compensation for personal injury or
sickness, and damages received on account of such injuries or sickness, are required to be
included in gross income. The proposed bill provides that such amounts shall not be included in
gross income.
H.R. REP. NO. 65-767, at 9-10. See Burke & Friel, supra note 20, at 168 (stating that the legislative
history did not articulate any policy towards providing an exclusion from income damages received as
a result of nonphysical injuries). But see Daniel Candee Knickerbocker, Jr., The Income Tax Treatment
of Damages: A Study in the Difficulties of the Income Concept, 47 CORNELL L.Q. 429, 431 (1962)
(stating that the committee reports that accompanied the statute led one to believe that damages as a
result of physical injuries were solely to be exempt under the statute).
84. See Sol. Mem. 957, 1 C.B. 65, 65 (1919). According to Knickerbocker, since the committee
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opinion, Solicitor’s Memorandum 1384, held that “[t]he alienation of a
wife’s affections is not such a personal injury as to entitle the recipient of
damages therefor to exemption” from income tax for the amount received.85
The Solicitor acknowledged that legally the alienation of a wife’s affections
constitutes a personal injury.86 Notwithstanding this statement, the Solicitor
determined that the legislative history of § 213(b)(6) makes “it appear[] more
probable” that the term personal injuries meant physical injuries.87
Solicitor’s Memorandum 1384 then completely abandoned the personal
injury analysis used in Solicitor’s Memorandum 957 and applied the human
capital (conversion of capital) theory.88 While the Solicitor recognized that
insurance policy proceeds may represent a conversion of capital lost through
injury, the Solicitor also found that “[f]rom no ordinary conception of the
term can a wife’s affections be regarded as constituting capital.”89 As a result
of both the Solicitor’s resort to the human capital analysis and belief that
personal injuries include only physical injuries, the taxpayer could only claim
an exclusion if the alienation manifested itself as a physical sickness under
§ 213(b)(6).90 This distinction provided the earliest criterion for the physical
and nonphysical dichotomy.
B. The Confusion Sets In: Solicitor’s Opinion 132 and Hawkins
The executive interpretations limiting the gross income exclusion to
physical, personal injuries was short-lived. Subsequent executive opinions
soon thereafter reincorporated the exclusion for nonphysical damage awards,
albeit in a confusing and inconsistent manner. In the 1922 decision of
Solicitor’s Opinion 132, the Solicitor faced the issue of whether damages for
alienation of affection, slander or libel of a personal character, and surrender
of a minor child’s custody were excludable from income.91 Interestingly,
report accompanying § 213 (b)(6) led one to believe that the exclusion applied to damages on account
of physical injuries, the Solicitor must have based his decision on the committee reports.
Knickerbocker, supra note 83, at 431. See I.T. 1852, II-2 C.B. 66, 66 (1923) (stating that money
received in action for annulment of marriage based upon fraud and deceit was not taxable); Sol. Mem.
1384, 2 C.B. 71, 72 (1920) (referencing § 213(b)(6) of the Revenue Act of 1918 as being “declarative
of the conclusions” stated in Treasury Decision 2747).
85. Sol. Mem. 1384, 2 C.B. 71, 72 (1920).
86. Id. at 71 (citing Leicester v. Hoadley, 71 P. 318 (Kan. 1903)). See also Tinker v. Colwell,
193 U.S. 473, 487 (1904).
87. Sol. Mem. 1384, 2 C.B. at 71.
88. See id. at 71-72.
89. Id. at 72.
90. See id. at 71-72.
91. Sol. Op. 132, I-1 C.B. 92, 92-93 (1922) (modifying Solicitor’s Memorandum 957 and
revoking Solicitor’s Memorandum 1384).
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Solicitor’s Opinion 132 did not base its holding on the newly enacted
§ 213(b)(6) exclusion but rather, focused on the definition of income as
articulated by the Supreme Court in Eisner v. Macomber92 and Stratton’s
Independence.93 Thus, Solicitor’s Opinion 132 found that income is “derived
from capital, from labor, or from both combined.”94
The Solicitor concluded that “no gain, and therefore no income, derived
from the receipt of damages for alienation of affections or defamation of
personal character . . . [or] money received in consideration of the surrender
of the custody of a minor child” falls under the Eisner and Stratton’s
Independence definition of income.95 According to the Solicitor, an
individual derives neither gain nor profit from damages received for injury to
personal, intangible, nonassignable, and nonappraisable rights.96 The
Solicitor believed that an invasion of a nontrasferable personal right exists in
the cases of alienation of affection, defamation of personal character, and
surrender of a minor child’s custody.97 Invaded rights of this type cannot be
accurately reduced to a monetary value because the violated rights and the
monetary awards “can not be placed on opposite sides of an equation.”98
Therefore, damages received for alienation of affection, defamation of
personal character, or surrender of a minor child’s custody cannot be
included as income under Eisner and Stratton’s Independence.99
Under closer inspection, the Solicitor’s line of reasoning trancended
Eisner and Stratton’s Independence concept of gross income to include a
new group of noneconomic personal rights, the damage or invasion of which
cannot result in either gain or profit. To this end, Solicitor’s Opinion 132
92. 252 U.S. 189 (1920).
93. Sol. Op. 132, I-1 C.B. at 93 (1922); Eisner, 252 U.S. at 207; Stratton’s Independence v.
Howbert, 231 U.S. 399, 415 (1913).
94. Sol. Op. 132, I-1 C.B. at 93.
95. Id. at 93-94 (superseded by Rev. Rul. 74-77, 1974-1 C.B. 33) (reiterating that damages
received for alienation of wife’s affections and custody of a minor child were non taxable). The
Solicitor could have simply concluded that such damages were not derived from either capital or labor,
or both combined. Instead, the Solicitor justified his conclusion under Eisner and Stratton’s
Independence.
Before applying the case facts, under Eisner and Stratton’s Independence, the Solicitor noted that
the end result in Solicitor’s Memorandum 1384 is correct. Moreover, the end result in Solicitors
Memorandum 957 may have been correct in a situation where a libel action is brought to redress
defamation of personal character. See id. at 93. The Solicitor also stated that the Solicitor’s
Memorandum 957 holding was not confined to the specific case facts “but apparently applied to libel
generally . . . [though] Slander or Libel affecting business reputation or property rights . . . [were] not
considered in this opinion.” Id. at 93-94.
96. Sol. Op. 132, I-1 C.B. at 93.
97. Id. at 93-94.
98. Id. at 93.
99. See id. at 93-94.
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implicitly discussed the return of capital theory, initially considered in 31
Opinion Attorney General 304. The Solicitor characterized damages for
alienation of affection, defamation of personal character, and surrender of a
minor child’s custody as monetary awards that attempt to replace a loss that
is nontransferable and not susceptible of any appraisal. At the same time,
therefore, the Solicitor concluded that damages for nontransferable personal
rights violations could not be included as income under Eisner and Stratton’s
Independence, the Solicitor also applied the human capital theory, which
included such damages as capital gains and therefore income under Eisner
and Stratton’s Independence but would ultimately exclude such damages
because the total receipts were equivalent to the loss of capital incurred by
the nontransferable, personal rights violations. Thus, at first glance,
Solicitor’s Opinion 132 seems to move away from the human capital theory,
but upon closer investigation it augments the initial human capital theory in
31 Opinion Attorney General 304.
Following Solicitor’s Opinion 132, the Board of Tax Appeals (BTA), in
Hawkins v. Commissioner endorsed Solicitor’s Opinion 132’s inconsistent
analysis.100 In Hawkins, the board of directors voted to remove the company
president and published statements defaming him.101 The ex-president then
sued both the company and the individual board members for libel and
slander.102 The case settled prior to trial.103 The IRS declared the ex-
president’s award to be gross income and assessed a deficiency for the full
amount of the settlement.104 The BTA reversed and held that character and
reputation, as personal attributes, could not be “capital or otherwise
measurable,”105 and therefore could not fall within the definition of income
articulated by the Eisner Court. Nevertheless, the BTA needlessly and
inconsistently applied the return of capital theory, reasoning that “[s]uch
compensation as general damages adds nothing to the individual, . . . [and] is
an attempt to make the plaintiff whole as before the injury.”106 The BTA thus
100. 6 B.T.A.M. (P-H) 1023, 1024 (1927).
101. Id. at 1023.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. See id.
105. 6 B.T.A.M. (P-H) at 1025.
106. Id. See also Knickerbocker, supra note 83, at 434 (stating that “Hawkins also stands for the
proposition that only compensatory damages do not represent income”). Interestingly, the Board of
Tax Appeals failed to mention or rule upon the taxpayer’s allegations of damage to his business
reputation. The Board and the Solicitor chose to side step the issue, perhaps leaving the matter to a
congressional resolution, which never occurred. For related decisions following Hawkins, see I.T.
2420, VII-2 C.B. 123 (1928) (holding insurance payment to widow on account of death of husband
was compensation for loss of life not encompassed by the concept of income); McDonald v. Comm’r,
9 B.T.A.M. (P-H) 1340 (1928) (finding payments based upon breach of contract to marry are not
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perpetuated the confusion concerning the application of the human capital
rationale— first evident in Solicitor’s Opinion 132— in addition to making no
reference to § 213(b)(6) and departing from the confines of Eisner.
In 1928, the Treasury acquiesced to Hawkin’s107 analysis. Subsequently,
numerous decisions allowed the exclusion of damages received for physical
and nonphysical personal injuries under different theories: awards as a
combination of either return of capital or injury to personal rights or awards
as a windfall consequently outside the concept of income.108 These
income). Professor Dodge puts a different spin on the early conception of income, stating that “the
original concept of gross income excluded nonregular receipts, such as windfalls.” Joseph M. Dodge,
Taxes and Torts, 77 CORNELL L.R. 143, 150 (1992). See Douglas A. Kahn, Compensatory and
Punitive Damages for a Personal Injury: To Tax or Not to Tax, 2 FLA. TAX REV. 327 (1994). Khan
states:
The exclusion of damages for nonphysical injuries thus was initially grounded on construction of
the term ‘income’ (as employed in the Revenue Acts) rather than on the statutory antecedent to
section 104(a)(2) . . . . Indeed, it was some 45 years later that the courts and the Service held that
the statutory exclusion of damages for personal injuries applied equally to physical and
nonphysical injuries.
Id. at 332.
107. See VII-1 C.B. 14 (1928).
108. See Raytheon Prod. Corp. v. Comm’r, 144 F.2d 110, 114 (1st Cir. 1944) (finding damages
not taxable according to the return of capital theory); Cent. R. Co. of N.J. v. Comm’r, 79 F.2d 697, 699
(3d Cir. 1935) (finding value of property received in settlement of an action in equity was not income
because “what . . . [the taxpayer] received was in the nature of a windfall”); Farmers’ & Merchants’
Bank v. Comm’r, 59 F.2d 912, 913-14 (6th Cir. 1932) (allowing an exclusion under an injury to
business and return of capital theory); Highland Farms Corp. v. Comm’r, 42 B.T.A.M. (P-H) 1314,
1322 (1940) (finding punitive damages held not taxable under Central R. Co. windfall theory); Clark
v. Comm’r, 40 B.T.A.M. (P-H) 333, 335 (1939) (relying on a return of capital theory to exclude from
income damages received from settlement); Theodate Pope Riddle v. Comm’r, 27 B.T.A.M. (P-H)
1339, 1339, 1341 (1933) (involving an amount received as damages for personal injuries sustained in
the 1915 sinking of the Lusitania, where the award of $15,000 was held not taxable but where the
interest paid on the award was held taxable). At least one commentator considers Raytheon to be the
“interpretive authority” in the area of taxability of damage receipts. See Harnett, supra note 1, at 624.
In the late 1920s, damages for wrongful death were brought into the exclusionary fold of
§ 213(b)(6). See I.T. 2420, VII-2 C.B. 123 (1928). I.T. 2420 decided the question of whether money
plus interest, paid by the Mixed Claims Commission of the United States and Germany as
compensation to a spouse for the death of her husband, was to be taxed as income. See id. The Income
Tax Unit determined that an award received for loss of life is not embraced in the general concept of
“income.” See id. at 124.
Revenue Ruling 54-19 followed I.T. 2420 and held that amounts received by settlement of a claim
under a state wrongful death act was not included in the decedent’s estate, nor was it taxable to
dependents who received the proceeds of the recovery. 1954-1 C.B. 179, 180. Revenue Ruling 55-132
held that amounts received by a prisoner of war from the United States do not qualify as
reimbursement for the loss of personal rights and are excludable from the gross income of such
individual. 1955-1 C.B. 213, 213. Revenue Ruling 56-462 held payments under the War Claims Act to
Korean prisoners were nontaxable as compensation to injury for personal rights. 1956-2 C.B. 20, 21.
Revenue Ruling 56-518 held as follows:
[C]ompensation paid by the Federal Republic of Germany to citizens or residents of the United
States pursuant to claims filed under its laws on account of such persecution which resulted in
damage to life, body, health, liberty, or to professional or economic advancement, are in the nature
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administrative and judicial interpretations of § 213(b)(6) charted the wrong
course for the statute as the cases that followed continued to emulate
Hawkin’s faulty reasoning.
Many courts applying a version of Hawkin’s looked to the framing of the
complaint and thus the taxpayer’s cause of action to determine whether
damages for injury to business reputation were taxable. In the 1932 case of
Farmers’ & Merchant’s Bank v. Commissioner, the Sixth Circuit reversed
the BTA and the Commissioner, holding that the full settlement award
arising out of tortious injury to business goodwill was excludable from gross
income under the return of capital theory.109 The court saw “no legal
distinction” between damage to intangible property like goodwill and
damage to tangible property.110 In deciding whether the settlement was
taxable, the court noted that the value of the money received “must be
considered in the light of the claim from which it was realized and which is
reflected in the complaint filed in its action.”111 Thus the taxpayer, by basing
of reimbursement for the deprivation of civil or personal rights and do not constitute taxable
income to the recipients.
1956-2 C.B. at 25. See also Revenue Ruling 58-500, 1958-2 C.B. 21, 21 (holding that “payments made
by the Federal Republic of Germany under the provisions of the Federal Restitution Law come within
the ambit of Revenue Ruling 56-518”). Similarly, in Revenue Ruling 58-370, payments to former
Austrian citizens persecuted by the Nazi regime were nontaxable. 1958-2 C.B. 14, 14. Significantly,
the policy behind these exclusions may originate in a compassion or humanitarian theory of tax policy
dealing with death. Perhaps, the Service thought that the taxpayers had been through enough and did
not want to pursue any further litigation. Cf. McDonald v. Comm’r, 9 B.T.A.M. (P-H) 1340, 1342
(1928) (stating that based on the principles laid down in Hawkins, the Tax Court held that damages
received from a breach of contract to marry would not be taxed as income). See Knickerbocker, supra
note 83, at 439-40 (discussing the various cases and Revenue Rulings mentioned in this footnote and
the theories behind excluding from income the respective damages in each case). But see Patricia T.
Morgan, Old Torts, New Torts and Taxes: The Still Uncertain Scope of Section 104 (a)(2), 48 LA. L.
REV. 875, 885 (1988) (stating that the return of capital theory is irrelevant and that the “first and only
inquiry is whether the recovery is for personal injury” when determining excludability of damages
from income).
109. 59 F.2d 912, 913-14 (6th Cir. 1932). The petitioner, not a member of the Federal Reserve
System, routinely charged customers for collection of checks on foreign banks. Id. at 913. The Federal
Reserve Bank (Bank) demanded the petitioner clear checks at par. Id. The Bank notified its members
that it would clear checks drawn on the petitioner bank at no charge. Id. For eighteen months, the Bank
daily sent agents, with checks, to the petitioner and demanded payment in cash. Id. The petitioner
thereupon received unfavorable publicity, as well as interference with operations and lost profits. Id.
The government sought to tax a portion of the settlement award as earnings. See id.
110. Id. at 913 (“[W]e can see no legal distinction between compensation for destruction of or
damage to incorporeal or intangible property, such as good will, and similar compensation for damage
to tangible property.”) (citing Harris & Co. v. Lucas, 48 F.2d 187, 188 (5th Cir. 1931) (stating that
“[g]ood will is an asset that adds to the value of a going business and may pass to a purchaser”)). This
inevitably leads one to the conclusion that the opinion is based on a return of capital theory. See
Knickerbocker, supra note 83, at 434 (stating that Farmers’ represents the first time the courts
struggled with the question of whether “recoveries in actions based on injuries to business reputation”
would be taxable).
111. Farmers’, 59 F.2d at 913.
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his claim on loss of goodwill, rather than lost profits, was able to exclude the
award from gross income under a return of capital theory.112
While the Sixth Circuit was willing to defer to the filed petition without
great reservation,113 future courts strictly scrutinized the taxpayer’s complaint
in the underlying case to assure that the damages sought to be excluded from
income were deserving of the § 213(b)(6) exclusion. For example, in Central
R.R. Co. v. Commissioner, the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit114
reversed both the BTA and the Commissioner and held that property
received pursuant to the settlement of a breach of fiduciary duty claim was
not taxable under the windfall theory.115 Central Railroad brought suit against
an executive officer who had organized separate corporations which engaged
“surreptitiously” in business dealings adverse to the railroad.116 The issue
was whether the property awarded to the Railroad reimbursed lost profits or
presented a windfall for a breach of fiduciary duty.117
First, the court mentioned that § 22 (defining gross income) applied to the
situation but “[d]amages recovered because of personal injuries or illness are
exempt” from taxation along with damages recovered “for alienation of
affections, breach of promise to marry, and libel and slander” because those
damages are “of a personal nature and . . . not . . . within the statutory
definition of income.”118 The court then moved away from the discussion of
the damages’ personal nature and distinguished the receipt of damages in its
case from the damages received in Farmers’ because no facts in the
taxpayer’s complaint indicated “with the certainty required in the statement
of a cause of action, that . . . [the taxpayer] sought reparation for profits
which petitioner’s misconduct prevented it from earning.”119 The court
refused to apply a return of capital theory where the taxpayer did not plead
that the cause of action was for damages to restore what was lost due to a
violation of rights. However, the court went on to agree with the taxpayer
that what he received in the settlement did not fall under the definition of
income articulated in Eisner but rather, was a windfall because “it was a
penalty imposed by the law on a faithless fiduciary.”120 The court found that
112. In effect, the court disregarded the petitioner’s receipt of the property and focused upon the
origin of the payment rather than the reason for the receipt of such payment. See id.
113. See id. at 912-13.
114. 79 F.2d 697 (3d Cir. 1935).
115. See id. at 699-700.
116. Id. at 697.
117. See id. at 699.
118. Id. at 698 (emphasis added).
119. Cent. R.R. Co., 79 F.2d at 698.
120. Id. at 699.
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“the settlement was not based on a suit by the taxpayer to recover profits”
and, thus, held that the Commissoner must exclude the award from income
under the windfall theory.121
C. Raytheon: The “In Lieu of What” Test
In the 1944 case of Raytheon Production Corp. v. Commissioner,122 the
Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed the Tax Court123 and
articulated a new test to determine the taxability of business injury
recoveries: “in lieu of what were the damages awarded?”124 Raytheon
Production Corporation had been one of the first manufacturers of a
rectifying tube, making radio reception possible through alternating current
rather than on batteries using direct current.125 The Radio Corporation of
America (RCA) had developed a competitive tube, and by 1928 most
manufacturers were under RCA licenses.126 In its licensing agreement, RCA
required its licensees to buy their tubes from RCA.127 By 1929, RCA
121. Id. at 699-700. While this taxpayer was successful in excluding his award under a windfall
theory, after the 1955 Supreme Court decision of Glenshaw Glass the windfall theory was no longer
available to taxpayers because the Supreme Court redefined the parameters of income to include any
“undeniable accessions to wealth, clearly realized, and over which the taxpayers [had] complete
dominion,” not specifically excluded by the Code. 348 U.S. 426, 431 (1955).
122. 144 F.2d 110 (1st Cir. 1944).
123. Raytheon Prod. Corp. v. Comm’r, 1 T.C. 952 (1943). Of the $410,000 in damages the
taxpayer received, the settlement agreement allocated $60,000 for the value of Raytheon’s patent
rights and the remaining $350,000 of those damages as a lump sum settlement to end Raytheon’s
antitrust violation suit. See id. at 958. The Tax Court asked “[f]or what did the petitioner receive the
$410,000?” and stated that for the amount to be excluded from taxation, Raytheon must show “that it
was received as replacement of capital lost.” Id. at 958. Although the Tax Court looked to the
settlement instrument for guidance in holding that the full amount was taxable, the Tax Court also
deferred to the commissioner’s finding of a lack of evidence demonstrating “what the amount was paid
for.” Id. at 958. The Tax Court based its holding on Armstrong Knitting Mills v. Comm’r, 19 B.T.A.M.
(P-H) 318 (1930). In Armstrong Knitting Mills, the court found that where the taxpayer had received
damages from a settlement of two claims— one for damages to business and one in contract— and
where the settlement agreement did not specify what the damages were awarded for, the
Commissioner’s determination controls. Armstrong Knitting Mills, 19 B.T.A.M. (P-H) at 322.
Moreover, the Armstrong court found that the taxpayer has the burden of establishing that any part of
the settlement was allocated as a return of capital. See id. at 322. The Tax Court dissent, however,
found that the “charge was based in the illegal injury to plaintiff’s business and property, specifically
its good will” and therefore, did not come within the line of cases that hold damages to be included as
income where the suit in question was based on lost profits. Raytheon, 1 T.C. at 962-63.
124. Raytheon, 144 F.2d at 113. This ties in with the conversion of capital theory. If damages are
awarded “in lieu of” lost profits, the damage award is taxable. Conversely, if damages are awarded “in
lieu of” lost goodwill, such award, as a return of capital, is not taxable.
125. See id. at 111.
126. See id. The companies under license agreement with RCA included General Electric
Company, Westinghouse, and American Telephone and Telegraph Company. See id.
127. Id.
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monopolized the rectifying tube market through its license agreements and
Raytheon was unable to compete.128 The successor to Raytheon, born from a
series of tax-free reorganizations, filed a federal antitrust claim against RCA
asserting that RCA “conspired to destroy the business” by creating a
monopoly.129
The court began its opinion by holding that the application of § 213(b)(6)
should not depend on whether the underlying claim is in tort or in contract.
Rather, the court must ask “[i]n lieu of what were the damages awarded?”130
Resting its decision on the framing of the complaint, the court found that the
suit was not for lost profits but for the destruction of business reputation and
for damage to “profitable interstate and foreign commerce.”131 Damages
received for injury to the goodwill of a business were a return of capital and
thus, not taxable. But where the recovery was greater than the recipient’s cost
basis in the goodwill, any excess was taxable as gain.132 Unfortunately for
Raytheon, because it could not establish a cost basis in the good will of the
business, the court found the entire award taxable.133
Ignoring what should have been the only inquiry under § 213(b)(6),
namely whether the damages awarded were for personal injury,134 courts
continued to apply the “in lieu of what” test into the ‘80s.135 While future
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Raytheon, 144 F.2d at 113.
131. Id.
132. See id. at 114.
133. See id. When computing gain, a taxpayer has the burden of establishing basis. If the basis is
wholly speculative it will be assigned a value of zero. As a result any amount received will be included
in computing taxable income. See infra notes 440-44 and accompanying text.
134. See Morgan, supra note 108, at 885 (stating that the proper analysis for excludability under
§ 104(a)(2) is not whether the monies received are a nonpersonal “return-of-capital” or whether the
monies received are “in lieu of” the damages).
135. See, e.g., Bagley v. Comm’r, 121 F.3d 393, 395 (8th Cir. 1997); Delaney v. Comm’r, 99 F.3d
20, 23-24 (1st Cir. 1996); Alexander v. I.R.S., 72 F.3d 938, 942 (1st Cir. 1995); Wolfson v. Comm’r,
651 F.2d 1228, 1230 (6th Cir. 1981), aff’g and remanding, 37 T.C.M. (CCH) 1847-14, 1847-22
(1978); Thompson v. Comm’r, 89 T.C. 632 (1987); Church v. Comm’r, 80 T.C. 1104, 1107 (1983);
Fono v. Comm’r, 79 T.C. 680 (1982); Roemer v. Comm’r 79 T.C. 398, 405 (1982), rev’d, 716 F.2d
693 (9th Cir. 1983); Entwicklungs & Finanzierungs A.G. v. Comm’r, 68 T.C. 749, 759 (1977); Yates
Indus., Inc. v. Comm’r, 58 T.C. 961, 972 (1972), aff’d without published opinion, 480 F.2d 920 (3d
Cir. 1973); State Fish Corp. v. Comm’r, 48 T.C. 465, 472 (1967), supp. opinion, 49 T.C. 13 (1967);
Young v. Comm’r, 16 T.C. 1424, 1429 (1951); Madson v. Comm’r, 49 T.C.M. (CCH) 425, 427
(1985); McKim v. Comm’r, 40 T.C.M. (CCH) 9, 12 (1980). See also Burke & Friel, supra note 20, at
167. Burke and Friel believe:
[I]n some respects, the standard adopted by the Schleier Court is identical to the historic “in lieu of
what” test of Raytheon Production Corp. v. Commissioner. That test arguably provides the
narrowest interpretation of the “on account of” language, ensuring that only those damages for
personal injury (damages in lieu of the human capital lost to the injury) are excludable.
Id. at 175.
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courts did not apply this test in conjunction with the return of capital theory,
they regularly focused on the nature of the recovery rather than on the nature
of the injury and consistently failed to invoke the statutory exemption.
D. Glenshaw Glass: Redefining Gross Income
Congress codified all the revenue acts that had been passed from 1913 to
1939 in the Internal Revenue Code of 1939. Then, in 1954 the Code was
recodified as the Internal Revenue Code of 1954.136 Without changing any
significant language Congress renumbered § 213(b)(6) as § 104(a)(2) in the
1954 Code.137 Curiously, with the renumbering, courts finally began to apply
§ 104(a)(2), previously codified at § 213(b)(6), in damage cases. However, in
1955 with a new Supreme Court opinion, the concept of income dramatically
changed and affected the application of § 104(a)(2).
For the first time since it defined income in Eisner, the Supreme Court
dramatically expanded the concept of income in the landmark decision of
Commissioner v. Glenshaw Glass.138 In Glenshaw Glass, one of two
consolidated opinions, the Court determined whether money received as
exemplary damages for fraud and as punitive damages for antitrust violations
constituted gross income.139
In the original action, Glenshaw Glass brought suit against a corporation
for antitrust violations.140 Ultimately, the parties settled the suit, with
Glenshaw Glass receiving approximately $800,000 of which $324,529.94
represented payment for punitive damages.141 Glenshaw Glass did not report
the latter amount as income, and the Commissioner issued a deficiency.142
Both the Tax Court143 and the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit upheld
the taxpayer’s position that the punitive damages were excluded from gross
136. I.R.C. §§ 1 et seq. (1954).
137. Compare I.R.C. § 213(b)(6) (1919) with I.R.C. § 104 (a)(2) (1954). For more information on
§ 213(b)(6), see supra note 3.
138. 348 U.S. 426 (1955).
139. Id. at 427.
140. See id. at 427-28. Glenshaw Glass based its claims on the Supreme Court decisions in
Shawkee Mfg. Co. v. Hartford-Empire Co., 322 U.S. 271 (1944), and Hazel-Atlas Glass Co. v.
Hartford-Empire Co., 322 U.S. 238 (1944). See Glenshaw Glass, 348 U.S. at 428 n.2.
141. Glenshaw Glass, 348 U.S. at 428.
142. Id.
143. Glenshaw Glass Co. v. Comm’r, 18 T.C. 860, 870-71 (1952) (holding that where money is
received in a lump sum to remedy various claims, an allocation of specific amounts to each of the
several claims “is necessary and proper; . . . sums received in settlement of punitive damages claims
do not constitute taxable income;. . . sums received in settlement of claims for anticipated profits are
taxable income”).
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income.144
In the other consolidated case, Commissioner v. William Goldman
Theatres, Goldman sued a corporation for antitrust violations and received
treble damages in the amount of $375,000.00 of which Goldman reported
$125,000 as income for lost profits.145 Again, the Tax Court upheld the
taxpayer’s position146 as did the Third Circuit.147
While the taxpayers in Glenshaw Glass and William Goldman relied on
the Eisner definition of gross income— “the gain derived from capital, from
labor, or from both combined”148— the government argued and the Court
agreed that Eisner’s definition “was not meant to provide a touchstone to all
future gross income questions.”149 Noting that the Eisner Court used the
definition only to determine whether the distribution of a corporate stock
dividend constituted a realized gain to the shareholder, the Court overturned
the Tax Court and the Third Circuit holding that punitive and exemplary
damages were taxable as “undeniable accessions to wealth, clearly realized,
and over which the taxpayers [had] complete dominion.”150
Most importantly, while the Glenshaw Glass Court, expanded the
definition of income to include punitive damages within the Eisner definition
of income, the Court did not need to interpret the language of § 104(a)(2),
which excluded from income “any damages received . . . on account of
personal injury.”151 In fact, in footnote eight, the Supreme Court left intact the
treatment of personal injury recoveries as nontaxable.152 Thus, given the new
144. Comm’r v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 211 F.2d 928, 933-34 (3d Cir. 1954) (finding windfalls are
not income and punitive damages paid under the Clayton Act are not income).
145. 348 U.S. 426, 428-29 (1955). For the case concerning the antitrust violation, see William
Goldman Theatres, Inc. v. Loew’s, 164 F.2d 1021 (3d Cir. 1948).
146. See William Goldman Theatres Inc. v. Comm’r, 19 T.C. 637, 641 (1953) (finding one-third
taxable and two-thirds not).
147. See Comm’r v. William Goldman Theatres, Inc., 211 F.2d 928 (3d Cir. 1954).
148. Glenshaw Glass, 348 U.S. at 430 (1955) (citing Doyle v. Mitchell Brothers Co. v. Comm’r,
247 U.S. 179, 185 (1918), and Stratton’s Independence v. Howbert, 231 U.S. 399, 415 (1913)).
149. Id. at 431 (citing Helvering v. Bruun, 309 U.S. 461, 468-69 (1940), and United States v.
Kirby Lumber Co., 284 U.S. 1, 3 (1931)).
150. See Glenshaw Glass, 348 U.S. at 430-31.
151. Id. at 427-29 (finding the facts of Glenshaw Glass related to fraud and antitrust violations not
involving personal injury).
152. Id. at 432 n.8.
The long history of departmental rulings holding personal injury recoveries nontaxable on the
theory that they roughly correspond to a return of capital cannot support exemption of punitive
damages following injury to property . . . . Damages for personal injury are by definition
compensatory only. Punitive damages, on the other hand, cannot be considered a restoration of
capital for taxation purposes.
Id. See, e.g., Lukhard v. Reed, 481 U.S. 368, 387 (1987) (Powell, J., dissenting); United States v.
Kaiser, 363 U.S. 299, 311 (1960); O’Gilvie v. United States, 66 F.3d 1550, 1558 (10th Cir. 1995);
Starrels v. Comm’r, 304 F.2d 574, 576 (9th Cir. 1962); Kemp v. Comm’r, 771 F. Supp 357, 358-59
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and broader Glenshaw Glass concept of income, taxpayers could only
achieve nontaxability for their recoveries by qualifying for the statutory
exemption under § 104(a)(2). After Glenshaw Glass, taxpayers sought to
frame causes of action in tort, even if also grounded in contract so that their
damages could be excluded under § 104(a)(2) as personal injury awards. As
a result the courts developed innovative tests to filter out claims purportedly
undeserving of the § 104(a)(2) exclusion.
E. Agar: The Intent of the Payor Test
Six years after Glenshaw Glass, in Agar v. Commissioner, the taxpayer
claimed that he received a settlement payment from his employer in
avoidance of a libel suit.153 The taxpayer excluded the full amount from
income under § 104(a)(2).154 The Tax Court affirmed the Commissioner’s
assessment of a deficiency on two grounds. First, the payments were extra or
severance pay and not damages received in avoidance of a libel suit.155
Second, the gravamen of the claim was for injury to the taxpayer’s business
reputation and therefore did not satisfy the statutory requirement of being on
account of “personal injuries.”156
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, affirming the determination
of the Tax Court that the payments were in the nature of severance pay rather
than damages in lieu of a libel suit, focused on the intent of the payor to
determine the tax treatment of the settlement.157 The Second Circuit reasoned
that “[t]hough petitioner may have believed that the company paid him to
avoid litigation, . . . his belief was only evidence of the character of the
payment; the ultimate inquiry is into the ‘basic reason’ for the company’s
payment.”158 The Second Circuit quoted from the testimony of the company
(N.D. Ga. 1991); Roosevelt v. Comm’r, 43 T.C. 77, 88 (1964).
153. See 290 F.2d 283 (2d Cir. 1961). Agar’s claim was technically a claim for slander not libel
because the statements made by the employees of the company were oral. See id. at 284 n.1.
154. See id. at 284.
155. Id.
156. Agar v. Comm’r, 19 T.C.M. (CCH) 116, 119-20 (1960). Before discussing its findings and
arriving at its decision, the Tax Court first reemphasized the broadness of the statutory definition of
income as articulated in Glenshaw Glass. See id. at 119. The Court then stated that “[i]n light of this
principle, . . . petitioner must bring himself squarely within the exemption from tax upon which he
bases his case; i.e. that the $45,000 was received in settlement of his claim for damages resulting from
injury to his personal reputation.” Id. This holding exemplifies how taxpayers after Glenshaw Glass
could no longer exclude their damage receipts based on an argument that such damages did not fall
within the definition of income. Taxpayers must now prove that the damages received fall within the
§ 104(a)(2) exclusion.
157. See Agar, 290 F.2d at 284.
158. Id. at 284 (citing Comm’r of Internal Revenue v. Duberstein, 363 U.S. 278, 286 (1960)
(stating that the most critical consideration in determining whether a gift is not taxable as income is the
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president in the Tax Court: “‘We felt we owed Mr. Agar something . . . . I
would say it is severance.’”159 After affirming the Tax Court on its first
ground, the Second Circuit stated that it was not necessary to decide the
second issue— whether a “dichotomy” existed for tax purposes between
personal and business reputation.160
In the 1962 case of Starrels v. Commissioner,161 taxpayers again
attempted to exclude money received under a contract as damages awarded
in lieu of a tort claim but the court looked to the intent of the payor to
determine the taxpayer’s tax liability. The daughters of a World War II naval
aviator entered into an agreement with Loew’s, Inc. for the production of a
film and the distribution, advertisment, promotion, exploitation, and
depiction of the life of their father.162 The agreement also required the
daughters to provide Loew’s with family documents, photographs, and other
information and material that could be helpful to the preparation of the
motion picture.163 In one provision, the sisters agreed to refrain from any
future claims against the producers should the film’s portrayal of them or
their father “constitute[] a violation of any of their rights, including their
rights of privacy.”164
In an attempt to fall within the § 104(a)(2) exemption, the taxpayers
sought to exclude the amounts paid pursuant to the agreement, under the
guise that the payments were received for their consent to and in lieu of
future invasions of their privacy.165 The Commissioner assessed a deficiency
for the entire amount.166 The Tax Court, relying on factually similar cases,
found no evidence whatsoever that the resulting motion picture in fact
invaded or damaged the payees rights to privacy and, therefore, upheld the
transferor’s intention)); Bogardus v. Comm’r, 302 U.S. 34, 44-45 (1937) (Brandeis, J., joined by
Stone, Cardozo, Black, J.J., dissenting) (“[C]ategories of ‘gift’ and ‘compensation’ are not always
mutually exclusive, but at times can overlap. What controls is not the presence or absence of
consideration. What controls is the intention with which payment, however voluntary, has been
made.”); Jackson v. Comm’r, 25 T.C. 1106, 1110 (1956) (“If the payment was made with the intention
of requiting past services or employment more generously or completely, it is taxable.”). These three
cases are unrelated to the subject of damage receipts in this type of inquiry.
159. Agar, 290 F.2d at 284.
160. Id. See Paul B. Stephan, III, Federal Income Taxation and Human Capital, 70 VA. L. REV.
1357, 1413-14 (1984) (“The efforts of some courts to separate personal and business defamation
recoveries illuminate the inadequacy of the distinction . . . . The paradox from which these decision
makers attempted to escape was that business income ordinarily is taxable, and that compensation for
injury to it seemingly should have the same status.”).
161. 35 T.C. 646 (1961), aff’d, 304 F.2d 574 (9th Cir. 1962).
162. Id. at 647.
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. See id. at 647-48.
166. See id. at 646.
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Commissioner’s decision.167
On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the Tax
Court’s decision stating that the court was “reasonably sure that the
exemption . . . was not intended to reach advance payments for consent
where no actual invasion of personal rights subsequently occurred.”168 Citing
Glenshaw Glass, the Ninth Circuit noted with favor footnote eight and the
departmental rulings referenced therein.169 In addition, it reiterated an old
rationale underlying the purpose of § 104(a)(2): “Damages paid for personal
injuries are excluded from gross income because they make the taxpayer
whole from a previous loss of personal rights— because, in effect, they
restore a loss to capital.”170
In 1965, the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit in Knuckles v.
Commissioner, repudiated a taxpayer for an extreme attempt to convert a
contract claim into a tort action to obtain a tax advantage under
§ 104(a)(2).171 The taxpayer entered into an employment contract with
Perpetual Life Insurance Company (Perpetual), was fired within two years,
and then commenced a suit for breach of employment contract.172 During
settlement negotiations, Knuckles’ attorney sought to couch the basis of the
167. See Starrels, 35 T.C. at 648. The Tax Court opined:
If the payments based on this agreement could be made tax exempt by merely referring to a right
of privacy which was never invaded and possibly never intended to be invaded, the narrowly
conceived statutory exclusion for damages on account of ‘personal injuries’ would be expanded
beyond its normal meaning. We think Congress intended no such result.
Id. (internal citations omitted). See generally Runyon v. United States, 281 F.2d 590 (5th Cir. 1960);
Meyer v. United States, 173 F. Supp. 920 (E.D. Tenn. 1959); Ehrlich v. Higgins, 52 F. Supp. 805
(S.D.N.Y. 1943).
168. Starrels, 304 F.2d at 576. Petitioner relied on Gill v. Curtis Publishing Co., 239 P.2d 630
(1952), in order to assert that each family member had a “legally protected right in the privacy of each
of the other members of the family.” Starrels, 304 F.2d at 576. The court held, however, that such a
right did not exist under this case. See id. The court reasoned that “the right of privacy is personal, and
the payments involved could constitute ‘damages received . . . on account of personal injuries’ of Mrs.
Starrels only if they compensated Mrs. Starrels for an invasion of her own privacy, rather than the
privacy of her father.” Id. The court felt that if it decided otherwise, the abuse under § 104(a)(2) would
be a result contrary to what Congress intended under this section. See id. at 577.
169. See Starrels, 304 F.2d at 576 (citing Comm’r v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. 426, 432 n.8
(1955)); Rev. Rul. 58-500, 1958-2 C.B. 21; Rev. Rul. 58-370, 1958-2 C.B. 14; Rev. Rul. 57-505,
1957-2 C.B. 50; Rev. Rul. 56-518, 1956-2 C.B. 25; Rev. Rul. 56-462, 1956-2 C.B. 20; Rev. Rul. 55-
132, 1955-1 C.B. 213.
170. Starrels, 304 F.2d at 576 (citations omitted) (emphasis added). See Paul C. Feinberg, Federal
Income Taxation of Punitive Damages Awarded in Personal Injury Action, 42 CASE W. RES. L. REV.
339, 374 (1992) (stating that Starrels and similar cases involving “consensual violations of personal
rights support[] the view that section 104(a)(2) encompass[es] only payments which compensate for
actual personal injury and, thus, restore a loss of capital”).
171. 349 F.2d 610, 613 (10th Cir. 1965).
172. Id. at 611.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol78/iss4/4
1341 Wolff.doc 04/24/01   5:02 PM
2000] DOUBLE DISCRIMINATION IN TORTS AND TAXES 1369
settlement in terms of a tort claim for personal injury.173 Although Perpetual
initially “refused to recognize any liability in tort,”174 it ultimately permitted
Knuckles to institute a civil suit based upon the employer’s liability for
personal injury, which the court subsequently dismissed with prejudice.175
Perpetual’s Board of Directors then rescinded its resolution terminating the
taxpayer on grounds of incompetence, substituting it with one merely
terminating Knuckles’ contract.176 The Tax Court found that the amounts
paid by the employer were for compensation under the employment contract
and for injury to his business reputation, such that the damages were not
within the exemption of § 104(a)(2).177
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the Tax Court and citing Agar stated that
“[t]he most important fact in making . . . [the § 104(a)(2)] determination, in
the absence of an express personal injury settlement agreement, is the intent
of the payor as to the purpose in making the payment.”178 The Tenth Circuit
found no mention of the claim for personal injury until late in the settlement
negotiations and found that Knuckles presented no proof of the existence of
any personal injury.179 Quoting the Tax Court, the Tenth Circuit concluded
that the tort claim for personal injuries “was an afterthought brought into
being by the possible tax advantage which might result.”180
F. Seay: The Nature of the Claim Test
Seven years after Knuckles in Seay v. Commissioner, the Commissioner
found an entire settlement taxable where a taxpayer received a lump sum of
$105,000 in a settlement of which $45,000 was explicitly allocated towards
personal injuries.181 The Tax Court examined prior cases dealing with the
question of what a taxpayer must prove in order to establish the nature of the
payments received182 and held that the “determination of whether a
173. See id. at 612.
174. Id. See Knuckles v. Comm’r, 23 T.C.M. (CCH) 182, 182-83 (1964).
175. See Knuckles, 349 F.2d at 612.
176. Id.
177. See id.
178. Id. at 613.
179. See id.
180. Id. (internal quotations omitted).
181. 58 T.C. 32, 35-36 (1972), acq. 1972-2 C.B. 3. Following a dispute with management, the
taxpayer who was the president of a corporation was let go because he could not be the president under
the corporate bylaws without being a director. Id. at 33. The media published stories that embarrassed
the taxpayer because they thought the taxpayer became the president of the corporation and was then
let go. Id. at 34. The $45,000 in question was determined by the settlement to be an award
compensating the taxpayer for the damaging news articles. Id.
182. See id. at 36-37. The court looked to § 104(a)(2) which provides that in a settlement
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settlement payment is exempt from taxation depends on the nature of the
claim settled and not on the validity of the claim.”183 The court found that the
taxpayer proved his claim was for “personal injuries” within the meaning of
§ 104(a)(2).”184 Primarily, the court based this conclusion on the testimony of
the chief settlement negotiator for each party whose testimony indicated that
the payment was for personal injuries and a letter between the parties
confirmed that settlement allocation.185
Once again drawing on the nature of the claim test, the Tax Court
determined that a taxpayer could not exclude back pay received in settlement
of a job discrimination suit under Title VII in the 1975 case of Hodge v.
Commissioner.186 Numerous factors influenced the court in reaching its
conclusion: the complaint did not allege personal injuries on account of
discrimination; the prayer for relief did not request damages for personal
agreement, damages received “on account of personal injuries” are not to be included in income tax.
However, the court did not find anything in the statute or regulations that would explain what the
taxpayer had to show in order to satisfy his burden of proving that the damages were in fact “on
account of personal injury.” Id. at 36. Therefore, the court applied the nature of the claim test
developed in previous cases. See id. at 36-37.
183. 58 T.C. at 37. Cf. Rev. Rul. 72-341, 1972-2 C.B. 32. In Revenue Ruling 72-341, the Service
considered a Title VII question where the United States Government sued a company based on alleged
discrimination. Id. A settlement agreement ensued, under which the corporation was to divide a sum
among the employees who had suffered economic loss as a result. Id. Here, the amount to be paid each
employee was based on a formula based on the difference between actual earnings and expected
earnings absent the discrimination. Id. The Service ruled that the amounts were wholly includable in
taxpayer’s gross income, looking to “the nature of the item for which the damages were a substitute.”
Id.
184. Seay, 58 T.C. at 37-38.
185. Id. at 38-39. The court distinguished both Knuckles and Agar. See id. at 37. In Agar, the Seay
court found that while the taxpayer may have made a claim for personal injuries, the company did not
make any settlement payment for that claim. See id. at 38. In Knuckles, the Seay court found that the
claim was not a part of a negotiated settlement but an “afterthought based on the tax consequences of
the claim.” Id. See also Rev. Rul. 75-45, 1975-1 C.B. 47 (addressing the question of whether an
amount received by the executor of an estate was excluded under § 104(a)(2) or whether it was
included as punitive damages under the regulations). In Knuckles, the insurance policy promised to
pay certain sums to persons who were injured as passengers in a corporation’s airplane providing that
the recipient release the company from any claims for damages, including claims under the state
wrongful death statute. See Seay, 58 T.C. at 37. A series of court decisions in that state had established
that payments under the wrongful death statute were punitive in nature. See id. The IRS gave a broad
reading to the language of § 104(a)(2), emphasizing that the section excluded “the amount of any
damages received . . . on account of personal injuries.” Id. In so reading the exclusion, the IRS found
the amount completely excludable. See id. at 47-48. Cf. Sandy Kasten & Brad Seligman, Tax
Considerations in Settling Employment Cases, CAL. LAW., Oct. 1985, 13, 16 (stating that the outcome
in Seay, as opposed to in Agar and Knuckles, indicates that a taxpayer may minimize taxes on
employment settlements if the taxpayer alleges “non-taxable damages in the complaint[,] . . .
maintain[s] a consistent position regarding the claim for such damages throughout the litigation and
settlement negotiations[,] . . . [and verifies that the] settlement agreement or judgment expressly
allocate[s] specific dollar amounts of the total settlement between taxable and non-taxable damages”).
186. 64 T.C. 616, 616-17 (1975).
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injuries; and the issue of personal injuries was not raised until three years
after the complaint had been filed.187 In addition, the court noted that the
attorney who represented the defendant in the discrimination suit testified
that the defendant’s primary concern was the back pay settlement and that
the formula used to determine the settlement amount was strictly based upon
theories of back pay.188 Noting that Title VII allows a court to order the
payment of back pay compensation for services normally included in gross
income, the court concluded that pursuant to Title VII, back pay was not
excludable under § 104(a)(2).189
Notably, the Tax Court clearly rejected the taxpayer’s argument that Title
VII redresses personal injury.190 If Title VII does not redress a personal
injury, then it logically follows that Congress passed Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act purely as a statute to promote economic equality for
disadvantaged groups in the employment market. Such reading of Title VII is
extremely questionable since other Titles of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
recognize that a personal right is injured when the statute is violated.191
Arguably, if Congress passed Title VII purely to redress contractual harms,
then it would not be within the spirit of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
However, the Tax Court in Hodge was not alone in believing that Title VII
does not redress a victim for personal harms. Such reasoning unfortunately
effected the outcome of several cases in the ‘80s and ‘90s.192
187. Id. at 617-18.
188. Id. at 620. The petitioner cited to numerous cases purporting to bolster his argument that
damages, while labeled back pay, were in reality a recovery for personal injuries when awarded under
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and therefore, would be excludable from income under
§ 104(a)(2). Id. at 619 n.7 (citing Kober v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 480 F.2d 240 (3d Cir. 1973);
United States v. N.L. Indus., Inc., 479 F.2d 354 (8th Cir. 1973); Robinson v. Lorillard Corp., 444 F.2d
791 (4th Cir. 1971); Bowe v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 416 F.2d 711 (7th Cir. 1969); United States v.
Hayes Int’l Corp., 415 F.2d 1038 (5th Cir. 1969)). The court refused to give weight to these cases
because they dealt with damages for discrimination that were not for back pay. See Hodge, 64 T.C. at
619-20. The court stated in footnote seven that “had we decided, as a matter of fact, that a portion of
the recovery constituted personal injury damages instead of back pay, we would have also had to
decide whether such recovery was excludable from gross income under section 104(a)(2).” Id. at 619-
20 n.7.
189. See Hodge, 64 T.C. at 619, 619 n.6, 620. See also Johnson v. Ga. Highway Express, Inc., 417
F.2d 1122, 1125 (5th Cir. 1969); Rev. Rul. 72-341, 1972-2 C.B. 32. It is clear that the element of back
pay is remunerative in nature and is expressly provided for by the Civil Rights Act itself. 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-5(g) (1994 & Supp. II 1996). Under that section, if the court finds illegal employment
practices, one available remedy is reinstatement with or without back pay. The demand for back pay is
not in the nature of a claim for damages, but rather is an integral part of the statutory equitable remedy,
to be determined through the exercise of the court’s discretion and not by a jury. Johnson, 417 F.2d at
1125.
190. See Hodge, 64 T.C. at 618-19.
191. For more information on these titles of the Civil Rights Act, see infra Part IV.
192. See id.
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G. Whitehead: Tort or Tort-Type Test
Five years after Hodge, in Whitehead v. Commissioner, a taxpayer,
terminated from a teaching position, filed a grievance which was settled
contingent on a release of all claims against the university— including tort
actions such as defamation and loss of reputation arising from the
termination.193 The Commissioner determined that the entire award was
taxable.194 Finding that the settlement made in consideration of a variety of
potential claims and that the release did not specify between tort and contract
claims, the Tax Court rejected the taxpayer’s § 104(a)(2) argument.195 Citing
to Seay, Knuckles, and Agar, the court ruled that the taxpayer had to establish
that the nature of the underlying claim was tort or tort-type and that the most
important fact in determining the nature of the claim settled was the intent of
the payor in making the settlement payment.196 Upon examining the
settlement agreement, the court concluded that the payor did not intend to
193. 41 T.C.M. (CCH) 365, 365-67 (1980).
194. Id. at 365.
195. Id. at 368. In Glynn v. Comm’r, the court followed Knuckles and held that “[i]n a case such as
this where the settlement agreement lacks express language stating that the payment was made on
account of personal injuries, the intent of the payor in making the payment must be discerned.” 76 T.C.
116, 120 (1981). The dispute in Glynn revolved around contractual rights: the school, employing the
taxpayer as a teacher, demanded that he resign, and the taxpayer alleged that he had suffered injury to
his business reputation. Id. at 117-19. Looking to the evidence at hand, the Tax Court held that the
amount received by the taxpayer in settlement of the dispute was not excludable under § 104(a)(2). Id.
at 121. The court looked at several facts, including that the taxpayer was willing to resign once the
school agreed to pay him his benefits, the taxpayer never threatened to sue, and the taxpayer never
asked the school for an amount based on damage to his personal reputation. Id. at 120. The Tax Court
took the position that payments for injury to professional reputation are not excludable from gross
income. Id. The court stated that any damages alleged to have been paid because of such injury would
not fall under the exclusion given to payments for injuries to personal reputation. Id. The court
reasoned that such damages are “more properly. . . characterized as payments made in satisfaction of
injuries to petitioner’s business reputation as compensation for past or future income which might have
been or might be lost, and thus, being compensatory by nature, would be taxable as ordinary income.”
Id.
196. Whitehead, 41 T.C.M. (CCH) at 368. For more information on tort-type rights, see McKim v.
Comm’r, where the taxpayer had been fired from his position as a salesman and had brought an action
against his former employer. 40 T.C.M. (CCH) 9, 10 (1980). As stated in his complaint, McKim’s
claims were based upon commissions that were allegedly owed to him, as well as other benefits. Id.
The parties eventually reached a settlement, whereby the taxpayer received $18,000 in exchange for
release of all claims. Id. at 11. Noting that “the law is settled that petitioner must show the nature of
the claim which was the actual basis for settlement, not the validity of the claim,” the Tax Court
examined the facts and circumstances of the case in order to determine the intent of the payor in
making the settlement. Id. at 12. The court found that the employer had settled in order to avoid
litigating a question relating to what share of commissions the taxpayer was entitled. Id. The court also
found significant the fact that the employer had withheld federal and state income taxes from the
settlement award. Id. at 13. The court held that the taxpayer did not show that the nature of the claim
was for personal injuries, even though the taxpayer may have claims for personal injuries as well as for
the commissions earned, and hence the amount received was includable in his gross income. Id.
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compensate the taxpayer for tort-type damages.197
The tort or tort-type test was derived from the language of Treasury
Regulation 1.104-1(c) which stated that “damages received means an amount
received from an action based on tort or tort-type rights.”198 The tort or tort-
type test would gain prominence in future § 104(a)(2) decisions.199 In fact,
the first § 104(a)(2) Supreme Court decision, United States v. Burke, would
apply this test and deny the § 104(a)(2) exclusion to a Title VII plaintiff who
sought to exclude back pay from income.200
H. Nussbaum: Predominant Nature of the Claim Test
In the 1982 case of Nussbaum v. Commissioner, a New York Times’
(Times) employee filed a grievance through the Newspaper Guild of New
York, Local 3 AFL-CIO, upon termination from employment.201 Pursuant to
§ 104(a)(2), the taxpayer sought to exclude from income the settlement
award received from the Times.202 The Tax Court examined the settlement
agreement and found three facts significant in determining that the
predominant nature of the claim did not arise from personal injury. First, the
only claims the employer specified were in “the ‘predominant nature’ of . . .
reinstatement, seniority, and breach of contract.”203 Second, the payment was
made in lieu of future salary and no claim for personal injury was even
brought to the employer’s attention.204 Third, the employer withheld federal,
197. Id.
198. Treas. Reg. § 1.104-1(c) (1998).
199. Roemer v. Comm’r, 79 T.C. 398, 405 (1982).
200. United States v. Burke, 504 U.S. 229 (1992).
201. 45 T.C.M. (CCH) 346, 346-47 (1982).
202. Id. at 347.
203. Id. at 348. The pertinent provision of the agreement reads as follows: “The Times will make
a special payment to Rhoda Nussbaum . . . in full settlement, satisfaction and release of any and all
claims . . . against The Times, including claims for reinstatement, seniority and breach of contract.” Id.
at 347.
204. Id. In 1982, § 104(a)(2) was amended to codify rather than change the then current law
specifically to exclude from gross income damages received for personal injuries or sickness whether
the amounts are distributed as periodic payments or lump sums. Act of January 14, 1983, Pub. L. No.
97-473, 96 Stat. 2605 (1982) (current version at 26 U.S.C. § 104(a)(2) (1998)). In 1984, the Service
reversed its position on punitive damages in Revenue Ruling 84-108. 1984-2 C.B. 32, revoking Rev.
Rul. 75-45, 1975-1 C.B. 47.
Here, the Service considered two situations. The first was an insurance policy payment upon the
death of a policyholder in exchange for a full release by the beneficiaries of any wrongful death
claims. 1984-2 C.B. at 32-33. The decedent was killed while a passenger in his employer’s corporate
airplane. Id. The terms of the insurance policy paid an award to the personal representative of the
deceased regardless of whose fault the accident was if the personal representative released the
corporation from further liability. Id. The State of Virginia’s actual statute did not allow punitive
damages for wrongful death actions. Id.
The second situation involved the Alabama wrongful death statute that provided exclusively for
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state, and local taxes and treated the payment as severance pay.205 In denying
the taxpayer’s exclusion, the court cited to the Tax Court’s decision in
punitive damages. Id. Under the Alabama wrongful death statute, damages are determined exclusively
upon the degree of responsibility of the party found liable for the death. Id. Looking to Glenshaw
Glass and the Supreme Court’s conclusion that punitive damages are not a substitute for any amounts
lost by the plaintiff, the Service concluded that punitive damages do not compensate a taxpayer for a
loss but rather add to the taxpayer’s wealth. Id. at 33-34. The service also relied on Rev. Rul. 57-54,
1957-1 C.B. 298, to defeat a claim that these proceeds were excludable as insurance proceeds. 1984-2
C.B. at 33-34. Unlike an insurance policy, the sums awarded were contingent upon the degree of need
of the survivors in the first case and the degree of fault of the liable party in the second place and
found that in those cases punitive damages are not awarded “on account of personal injury” within the
meaning of § 104(a)(2). Id.
Thus, damages under Virginia’s wrongful death statute were found to be excluded under
§ 104(a)(2), while the punitive damages under Alabama’s wrongful death statute were held to be
included in gross income. 1984-2 C.B. at 34. The Service’s conclusions were to take effect without
retroactivity and any release signed before July 16, 1984 would not be subject to the new ruling. See
id.
Revenue Ruling 84-108 was criticized in Burford v. United States, where the District Court for the
Northern District of Alabama refused to defer to the Service’s interpretation of § 104(a)(2) in regards
to punitive damages under the Alabama wrongful death statute. 642 F. Supp. 635, 636 (N.D. Ala.
1986). Here, the taxpayer had brought a wrongful death action against the University of Alabama at
Birmingham because her husband died during treatment at the school’s hospital. Id. The taxpayer
received $62,203.00 in settlement, included the amount on her 1984 return, and later filed an amended
return to exclude that amount. Id. The court called Revenue Ruling 84-108 an “unwarranted
administrative amendment of the clear language of the Internal Revenue Code,” and read § 104(a)(2)
as “express[ing] clearly the congressional intent to exclude wrongful death proceeds— regardless of
whether those proceeds are classified as compensatory or punitive— from gross income.” Id. The court
thought that the Service had inappropriately relied on Glenshaw Glass where the punitive damages
were awarded in addition to the amount necessary to compensate the plaintiff for his losses. See id. at
637. The court clearly read § 104(a)(2) to exclude from gross income all damages received under any
wrongful death acts because those damages were personal injury proceeds. See id. at 638.
In Revenue Ruling 85-98, the taxpayer sued a newspaper for alleged defamation injuring his
personal reputation as an individual. 1985-2 C.B. 51. The complaint stated that the taxpayer had
suffered damage to his personal reputation, social standing, and family relationship, and that the article
caused him embarrassment, shame, anxiety, and worry. Id. Following a prayer for both compensatory
and punitive damages, the parties settled, awarding the taxpayer an unallocated lump sum payment. Id.
The Ruling held that 25% of the award was allocated as compensatory damages, excluded under
§ 104(a)(2), and 75% of the award was allocated as punitive damages, included in the taxpayer’s gross
income. Id. at 52. In coming to its conclusion, the Service relied on Rev. Rul. 58-418, 1958-2 C.B. 18,
and Rev. Rul. 75-230, 1975-1 C.B. 93, where amounts consisting of both compensatory and punitive
damages were allocated between the two according to the best evidence accessible under the
circumstances and facts of the case. 1985-2 C.B. at 51-52.
The most recent amendment prior to 1996 took place in 1989. See Omnibus Budget
Reconciliation Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-239, § 7641, 103 Stat. 2106, 2379 (current version at 26
U.S.C. § 1996). This amendment required punitive damages to be included in gross income unless the
income arose from a physical injury or sickness. Id. (“Paragraph (2) shall not apply to any punitive
damages in connection with a case not involving physical injury or physical sickness.”). The
Conference Report implies that Congress acted in response to the then current case law, holding that
the taxpayer could exclude damages recovered as a result of a personal injury “even though there. . .
[was] no physical injury, for example, in cases involving employment discrimination.” 135 Cong. Rec.
30823, 31002 (1989). Interestingly, as will be discussed later, discrimination damages were also a
reason given for the 1996 amendment. See infra notes 597-98 and accompanying text.
205. Id. at 348.
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Roemer v. Commissioner,206 then on appeal to the Ninth Circuit.207 Here, the
Tax Court elevated the importance of the predominant nature of the claim
analysis in the application of § 104(a)(2) and thus, diminished the
predominance of the intent of the payor test.208
I. Roemer: The Nature of the Claim Test Revisited
Roemer v. Commissioner, first decided in the Tax Court in 1982,
concerned an action against a credit bureau that had grossly defamed a
taxpayer in a credit report, causing diminished profit and damage to his
professional and business reputation.209 The taxpayer, Roemer, developed a
successful casualty insurance brokerage company and contemplated an
expansion of his business into life insurance.210 Roemer submitted an
application seeking authorization from Penn Life Mutual Company (Penn) to
form a partnership for the sale of life insurance.211 The credit bureau sent to
Penn and other insurance companies a report impugning Roemer’s honesty
and erroneously stating that he “neglected his clients’ affairs, was recently
fired from his position as president of an insurance firm, and intentionally
defaced property belonging to others.”212 A jury awarded the taxpayer who
had enjoyed an excellent reputation, both personally and professionally,
$40,000 in compensatory damages and $250,000 in punitive damages.213 In
his tax return, Roemer included only a portion of the award as income, and
the Commissioner issued a deficiency declaring the entire amount of the
judgment taxable.214
The Tax Court first stated that under Treasury Regulation 1.104-1(c), the
term “damages received means an amount received from an action based on
tort or tort-type rights” and emphasized that the regulation makes “no
206. 79 T.C. 398 (1982).
207. Roemer v. Comm’r, 716 F.2d 693 (9th Cir. 1983).
208. See Nussbaum, 45 T.C.M. at 348.
209. 79 T.C. 398, 400 (1982). Roemer enjoyed an annual gross income near $300,000.00 before
Retail Credit’s defamation. Id. at 399-400. Roemer’s lawyer estimated that his client had lost
$136,000.00 as a result of Retail Credit’s defamatory acts. Id. at 406.
210. Id. at 400.
211. Id.
212. 79 T.C. at 400. When Roemer gained knowledge of the circulation of the defamatory report,
he asked Retail Credit to issue a retraction. Id. Instead of retracting the defamatory statements, Retail
Credit distributed a retraction containing additional defamatory “innuendoes” regarding Roemer’s
business and personal reputation as an agent. Id.
213. Id. at 399, 401, 403.
214. Id. at 403-04. In his federal income tax return for 1975, the taxpayer reported $16,020.00 of
the damage portion of the recovery as income, $7,751.00 for costs and $23,371.00 as interest income.
Id. at 403. In his amended petition, the taxpayer alleged he had incorrectly reported $16,020.00 of the
damage portion of the recovery and $7,751.00 of the costs. Id. at 403-04.
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distinction between physical and mental or emotional injuries.”215 The Tax
Court then stressed that “[t]he law is settled that the tax consequences of an
award for damages depend on the nature of the litigation and on the origin
and character of the claims adjudicated, but not the validity of such
claims.”216 Therefore, the Tax Court found that “[t]he proper inquiry is in
lieu of what were the damages awarded?”217 Because the jury award did not
apportion the damages, Roemer argued that although some part of the award
was in lieu of his professional reputation being damaged, an “inextricable
combination of damages to both professional and personal reputation”
existed to exclude the entire award from income.218 The Commissioner
argued that Roemer’s damage was predominantly to his professional
reputation, and thus the whole award should be taxable.219
Before siding with the Commissioner, the Tax Court stated that for
purposes of the § 104(a)(2) exclusion, a “distinction must be made” between
awards received in lieu of damages to professional reputation and those to
personal reputation.220 The Tax Court held that a taxpayer may exclude an
award from gross income to the extent that the evidence proves that the
award was received in lieu of damage to an individual’s personal
reputation.221 Based on allegations in Roemer’s complaint, testimony at the
libel trial, and his lawyer’s closing statement, the Tax Court found that the
“predominant nature” of Roemer’s claim involved damages to his
professional and business reputation. Moreover, concluding that the whole
award was taxable, the court found that the petitioner had failed to establish
that the compensatory damages remedied personal injury within the meaning
of § 104(a)(2).222
A year later, on appeal, the Ninth Circuit admonished the Tax Court for
confusing the “nature of the claim” with the nature of the damages.223
215. 79 T.C. at 405.
216. Id. (citing Woodward v. Comm’r, 397 U.S. 572, 578 (1970); United States v. Gilmore, 372
U.S. 39, 49-50 (1963); Seay v. Comm’r, 58 T.C. 32, 36-37 (1972)).
217. Id.
218. Id.
219. Id.
220. 79 T.C. at 405.
221. See id. at 406. See also Stuart M. Schabes, Comment, Roemer v. Comm’r, 12 HOFSTRA L.
REV. 211, 214 (1983) (criticizing the Tax Court in Roemer for making an unsubstantiated and
unjustified distinction under the § 104(a)(2) exclusion, between awards received in lieu of damages to
personal reputation and those to professional reputation).
222. See id. at 407-08.
223. Roemer v. Comm’r, 716 F.2d 693, 697 (9th Cir. 1983). The Ninth Circuit’s approach should
not be confused with the “predominant nature of the claim” test used in Nussbaum, which focuses
upon the tort and contract dichotomy to determine whether the claims being settled are primarily
contract or tort. See Nussbaum v. Comm’r, 45 T.C.M. (CCH) 346, 348 (1982).
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Stressing that under California law, a defamation claim flows from a
personal attack on an individual,224 the court reasoned that the “nonpersonal
consequences of a personal injury, such as a loss of future income, are often
the most persuasive means of proving the extent of the injury that was
suffered” but that “[t]he personal nature of an injury should not be defined by
its effect.”225 Moreover, “[w]hen an individual recovers damages for a
physical personal injury, the lump-sum award is not allocated between the
personal aspects of the injury and the economic loss occasioned by the
personal injury, nor is the taxpayer precluded from use of § 104(a)(2) when
the predominant result of the injury is a loss of income.”226 Therefore,
because Roemer’s “defamation suit was brought to remedy a personal
injury[,] . . . the award should not be differentiated on the basis of the
resulting damage to his personal life and his professional career.”227 In
properly directing the inquiry to the nature of the claim rather than to the
nature of the damage resulting therefrom, the Ninth Circuit held that the
compensatory and punitive damages were to be excluded under § 104(a)(2)
“on account of any personal injury.”228
Before the Ninth Circuit’s reversal of Roemer but after its decision in
Roemer, the Tax Court decided Church v. Commissioner.229 In Church, a
newspaper accused a taxpayer of being a communist, following a speech that
the taxpayer delivered in opposition to lobbying groups.230 As a result of a
successful libel suit, the jury awarded the taxpayer $250,000 in
compensatory damages and $235,000 in punitive damages.231
224. Roemer, 716 F.2d at 699. After a lengthy discussion on the history of § 104(a)(2), the Court
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit determined that the nature of the tort of defamation in California will
be the subject of the inquiry under the nature of the claim test, and the intent of the payor test as
developed in Agar, played no part in the outcome of the case because Roemer does not involve a
settlement. See id. at 697 n.3. The Ninth Circuit then went on to discuss the history of the claim of
defamation in California and determined that a defamation claim is indeed personal, especially in light
of the fact that California has a separate claim for trade libel, which allows plaintiffs to remedy attacks
made on their services or products. See id. at 699.
225. Id. This type of analysis can be traced as far back as Raytheon Prod. Corp. v. Comm’r, 144
F.2d 110, 113-14 (1st Cir. 1944), and Farmers’ & Merchants’ Bank v. Comm’r, 59 F.2d 912, 913 (6th
Cir. 1932) (“[E]arnings before the injury, as compared with those afterward, were only an evidential
factor in determining actual loss.”).
226. Roemer, 716 F.2d at 697 (emphasis added).
227. Id. at 700.
228. Id. For the proposition that taxability of damages depends on the underlying nature of the
claim, see United States v. Safety Car Heating and Lighting Co., 297 U.S. 88, 98 (1936) (stating that
“[t]o determine what the respondent got we are to consider what it did, and not what it could have had
if it had made another choice”). But see Comm’r v. Miller, 914 F.2d 586 (4th Cir. 1990) (punitive
damages are received on account of defendant’s conduct and therefore are not excludable).
229. 80 T.C. 1104 (1983).
230. Id. at 1105.
231. Id. at 1106.
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Finding that the trial court awarded compensatory damages on account of
personal injury, the Tax Court held that the compensatory and punitive
damages were excludable under § 104(a)(2).232 The Tax Court distinguished
the Roemer and Church opinions solely on the basis of whether the damages
awarded were compensating business versus personal injury.233 Once again,
the Tax Court focused its inquiry on the consequences flowing from the
injury rather than the nature of the claim.234 Furthermore, the court stated that
“personal injuries or sickness are not limited to physical trauma but include
mental pain and suffering.”235 The “shattered dreams, ruined careers, and the
mental anguish that follow are just as personal as, for instance, loss of [a]
limb.”236 No monetary award can wash away the stigma that the taxpayer
must deal with for life.237
The discrepency between the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Roemer and the
Tax Court’s ruling in Church prompted administrative rulings on the taxation
of personal injury recoveries.238 In Revenue Ruling 85-143 of 1985, the
Service refused to acquiesce to the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Roemer and
stated that it would follow the Tax Court’s Roemer decision.239 Accordingly,
the Service found a valid distinction between compensatory damages
awarded for damage to personal versus professional reputation.240 Damages
awarded for injury to professional reputation are not awarded on account of
personal injury.241 Therefore, damages received in a libel action for injury to
the taxpayer’s professional reputation, like in Roemer, are not excludable
under § 104(a)(2).242 Whether libel is a personal injury in a particular
situation depends on the nature of the libel rather than the nature of the
claim.243 Thus the characterization of a lawsuit brought under state law
would not be controlling for federal income tax purposes.
Only one year later, the Tax Court abandoned its reasoning in Roemer
and consequently, severely undercut support for the administrative
interpretation distinguishing between personal and professional injury
232. See id. at 1110.
233. See id. at 1105-06, 1110.
234. 80 T.C. at 1108. The court examined the allegations in the complaint, the evidence adduced
at trial, and the statements of counsel. See id. at 1107.
235. Id. at 1106.
236. Id. at 1109.
237. See id. at 1110.
238. Rev. Rule 85-143, 1985-2 C.B. 55; Rev. Rul. 84-108, 1984-2 C.B. 32.
239. 1985-2 C.B. 55.
240. Id. at 55-56.
241. Id. at 56.
242. Id.
243. Id.
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damages in Threlkeld v. Commissioner.244 In Threlkeld, the taxpayer received
an award of $300,000 in damages pursuant to a settlement agreement that
arose out of a suit for malicious prosecution.245 The agreement allocated
specific amounts of the award to various injuries.246
Before it decided the taxability of the taxpayer’s damage award, the Tax
Court discussed the judiciary’s disparate treatment of taxpayers who received
damages for injury to personal reputation and those who received damages
for injury to professional reputation.247 To illustrate the disparate effects that
courts created, the Tax Court presented a hypothetical of a young surgeon
who loses a finger as the result of a tortious act.248 The court stated that the
surgeon’s loss of a finger will cause “physical and emotional pain and
suffering” as well as loss of future income, and “the surgeon will likely
produce evidence of both” types of damages.249 However, because it is easier
to calculate the loss of future income based on a present dollar value than
physical and emotional pain and suffering, “the surgeon will quite
predictably place greater emphasis on lost income as a measure of his
damages and will perhaps, thereby, receive a greater recovery,” the entire
amount of which can be excluded from income.250 This surgeon’s loss of
future income award, compensating a physical injury incurred through a third
party’s tortious act, “raises no troubling questions [about] exclusion” under
§ 104(a)(2). However, a taxpayer who suffers and receives damages for
nonphysical injuries also incurred through a third party’s tortious act will
likely be treated differently. Courts “have, in the past, ignored the personal
nature of the claim and delved into an inquiry regarding the nature of the
consequences of the injury.”251
This hypothetical highlights how courts distinguish between the taxability
of physical and nonphysical personal injuries. It also illustrates how
taxpayers receiving damages for a physical personal injury can apply
§ 104(a)(2) to all claims flowing therefrom without scrutiny, including
claims for lost income. In contrast, taxpayers receiving damages for a
nonphysical personal injury, such as reputation damage, must undergo a
judicial inquiry to determine whether the components of the award are for
injury to personal or professional reputation.
244. 87 T.C. 1294, 1296 (1986).
245. Id. at 1296.
246. Id. at 1295-96.
247. Id. at 1300.
248. Id.
249. Threlkeld, 87 T.C. at 1300-01.
250. Id.
251. Id.
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With this seemingly inequitable hypothetical in mind, the Tax Court in
Threlkeld, then changed tides and adopted the Ninth Circuit’s four point
Roemer test: (1) the excludability of the award is dependant upon the nature
of the claim and not upon the validity of the claim;252 (2) no distinction is to
be made between physical and nonphysical injury;253 (3) no distinction
should be made for damages received for injury to professional reputation
and damages received for injury to personal reputation;254 and (4) “whether
the damages received are paid on account of ‘personal injuries’ should be the
beginning and the end of the inquiry.”255
The Tax Court thus rejected the professional and personal distinction,
concluding that the “appropriate question for purposes of § 104(a)(2) is
whether the damages were received on account of personal injuries.”256 In
analyzing what constitutes a personal injury the court stated that the concept
of personal injury has long included nonphysical as well as physical injuries.
Specifically, personal injuries are “‘injuries resulting from invasions of rights
that inhere in man as a rational being, that is, rights to which one is entitled
by reason of being a person in the eyes of the law.’”257
In concluding that Threlkeld’s damage settlement in a malicious
prosecution suit was received for personal injury and, therefore, was
excludable under § 104(a)(2), the Tax Court, like the Ninth Circuit in
Roemer, reviewed the “nature of the claim,” applied a totality of the
circumstances approach, and refused to find the settlement agreement
allocating damages for specific injuries incurred from the malicious
prosecution controlling of whether the claim was for a personal injury.258
The Sixth Circuit affirmed the Tax Court’s decision in Threlkeld one year
later, by expressly adopting the “nature of the claim” test and stating that it
252. Id. at 1297 (citing to Bent v. Comm’r, 87 T.C. 236 (1986); Glynn v. Comm’r, 76 T.C. 116,
119, aff’d, 676 F.2d 682 (1st Cir. 1981); Seay v. Comm’r, 58 T.C. 32, 37 (1972)).
253. Id. (citing Seay v. Comm’r, 58 T.C. 32, 40 (1972)).
254. Id. at 1298.
255. 87 T.C. at 1299.
256. Id. at 1305.
257. Id. at 1307-08 (quoting Brown v. Dunstan, 409 S.W.2d 365, 367 (Tenn. 1966) (quoting
Commerce Oil Refining Corp. v. Miner, 199 A.2d 606, 610 (R.I. 1964))).
258. 87 T.C. at 1305-8. “In such cases, we must look to various factors, including the allegations
in the State court pleadings, the evidence adduced at trial, a written settlement agreement, and the
intent of the payer . . . .” Id. at 1306. In a brief dissent, Judge Simpson stated that, “if the words of
section 104(a)(2) have any meaning, they surely do not permit the exclusion of damages declared to be
for injury to a professional reputation.” Id. at 1309 (Simpson, J., dissenting). The Tax Court had a long
tradition of drawing a distinction between damage to “personal” and “business” or “professional”
reputation. Threlkeld was a departure from this history. See, e.g., Roemer v. Comm’r, 79 T.C. 398, 405
(1982); Draper v. Comm’r, 26 T.C. 201, 203-04 (1956); Agar v. Comm’r, 19 T.C.M. (CCH) 116, 119
(1960).
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was unreasonable to distinguish between injury to personal and professional
reputation. Thereby, the Sixth Circuit also affirmatively rejected the
Service’s Revenue Ruling 85-143.259
Interestingly, the Tax Court’s decision in Roemer and Church seems to be
a brief hiatus from precedent. In Bent v. Commissioner, decided four months
prior to the Tax Court’s decision in Roemer, the Tax Court considered the
taxability of damages recovered in 42 U.S.C. § 1983 settlement against her
employer for violating the taxpayer’s First Amendment rights to freedom of
speech.260 Neither the release nor the settlement check made any allocation of
the damage award among the various injuries.261 The Commissioner argued
that the entire settlement should be included as income because it represented
to the employer three years of lost wages and attorney’s fees.262 The
petitioner asserted that the First Amendment violation was a tort-type
personal injury violation and, therefore, the damages awarded were
excludable from income.263 The Tax Court held that the taxpayer received
damages for personal injuries under the § 1983 claim for violation of the
First Amendment and that the payor’s intent was irrelevant.264 Thus, the Tax
Court agreed with the petitioner that “[i]t is abundantly clear that ‘lost
earnings’ is a proper element of compensatory damages that may be awarded
under § 1983 in order to redress the party who has been injured by a
deprivation of First Amendment rights under color of State law.”265 The
court treated lost wages as “an evidentiary factor in determining the amount
by which . . . [the taxpayer] was damaged,” rather than as “an independent
basis for recovery” not associated with the taxpayer’s nonphysical personal
injury.266 Over one year later on appeal, the Third Circuit affirmed the Tax
Court’s decision in Bent, expressly agreeing with the Ninth Circuit’s
259. See Threlkeld v. Comm’r, 848 F.2d 81 (6th Cir. 1988). Compare id. at 84 with Rev. Rul. 85-
143, 1985-2 C.B. 55.
260. 87 T.C. 236 (1986).
261. Id. at 242.
262. Id. at 243.
263. Id.
264. Id. at 246.
265. 87 T.C. at 250. In Metzger v. Comm’r, an associate professor entered into a settlement
agreement for a claim brought for breach of contract and violation of her right to be free from
discrimination on account of national origin and gender under several federal statutes. 88 T.C. 834
(1987). The agreement called for half of the $75,000 settlement to be paid for wages claims. See id. at
841-45. The Tax Court held that the petitioner could exclude half of the settlement that was allocated
towards damages for her personal injury. Id. at 859-60. In deciding this, the Tax Court looked to the
payor’s intent and the nature of the claim and found that because the settlement was in exchange for
release of all claims, half of the settlement was allocated toward the contract claims and half toward
the statutory claims. See id. at 850, 859.
266. Bent, 87 T.C. at 251.
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reasoning in Roemer.267
J. Dignitary Torts and § 104(a)(2)
Dignitary tort rights, such as those rights provided by Title VII, ADEA,
Title IX, and § 1983, are congressional attempts to protect persons from
various types of personal discrimination and the injuries resulting therefrom.
These congressional protections provided a renewed focus on the historical
problems and concerns courts have experienced in determining the taxability
of nonphysical injuries. In Thompson v. Commissioner, published in 1989,
the Tax Court decided a § 104(a)(2) claim awarding back pay and liquidated
damages.268 In a Title VII and Equal Pay Act (EPA) class action sex
discrimination suit for wage disparity, the taxpayer was awarded a total of
$66,795.19 in back wages under the EPA and Title VII and $66,135.27 in
liquidated damages under the EPA.269 The taxpayer reported only the back
pay award as income and the Commissioner declared a deficiency for the
liquidated damages.270
Focusing separately on the remedies available under the EPA and Title
VII, the Tax Court concluded that the taxpayer’s back pay recovery under the
EPA was not in the nature of damages received under a tort or tort-type claim
but was for breach of contract.271 Returning to the “in lieu of what” test, it
267. Bent v. Comm’r, 835 F.2d 67 (1987). In affirming the Tax Court in Bent, the Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit agreed with the Ninth Circuit’s opinion in Roemer and quoted
extensively from it as follows:
The relevant distinction that should be made is between personal and nonpersonal injuries, not
between physical and nonphysical injuries. I.R.C. § 104(a)(2) states that damages received on
account of personal injuries are excludable; it says nothing about physical injuries. “[T]he words
of statutes— including revenue acts— should be interpreted where possible in their ordinary
everyday senses.” Crane v. Comm’r, 331 U.S. 1, 6, 67 S. Ct. 1047, 1051, 91 L.Ed. 1301 (1947).
The ordinary meaning of a personal injury is not limited to a physical one. Indeed, the Service has
long said that certain nonphysical injuries are personal injuries and that all damages received for
nonphysical personal injuries are excludable from gross income. Sol. Op. 132, 1— 1 C.B. 92
(1922) (damages for alienation of affections, defamation of personal character, and surrender of
child custody rights are damages for invasion of personal rights and not income).
Bent, 835 F.2d at 70 (quoting Roemer v. Comm’r, 716 F.2d 693, 697 (9th Cir. 1983) and citing
Memphis Cmty. Sch. Dist. v. Stachura, 477 U.S. 299 (1986) (stating that mental anguish and emotional
distress are “standard elements of compensatory damages” under § 1983)).
268. 89 T.C. 632, 633 (1987).
269. See id. at 633, 637. Thompson was the lead plaintiff against the United States Government
Printing Office (GPO). Id. at 633. In 1982, the GPO in Thompson v. Sawyer, 678 F.2d 257 (D.C. Cir.
1982), aff’g in part and rev’g in part, Thompson v. Boyle, 499 F. Supp. 1147 (D.D.C. 1979), was
found to have violated Title VII and the Equal Pay Act. Id.
270. 89 T.C. at 641-42. After trial, petitioner was allowed to amend its petition and assert that the
back pay award was also excludable in light of the court’s holding in Threlkeld. Id. at 642.
271. See id. at 646.
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declared the back pay award taxable.272 Distinguishing the instant case, the
Tax Court found nothing in Threlkeld that converted a claim for back pay
into one for personal injury solely because the suit involved a claim for tort-
type personal injuries.273
In deciding whether the liquidated damages were taxable, the Tax Court
employed the nature of the claim test.274 The Tax Court found that “[s]ince
the right to be free from gender or sex discrimination is a personal right[,] . . .
it follows that payments of damages made for violation of that right are
damages for personal injuries.”275 Although here, the back pay award
measured the liquidated damages, the liquidated damages were nevertheless
compensation for a personal injury and excludable.276 The court’s reasoning
was consistent with that of Roemer, Threlkeld, and Bent because evidence of
nonpersonal damages can be used to measure the extent of a personal injury
without changing the nature of the claim.
In affirming the Tax Court’s opinion in Thompson, the Court of Appeals
for the Fourth Circuit noted that “[d]amages received on account of personal
injuries or sickness are not limited to physical trauma.”277 The court applied
the Ninth Circuit’s Roemer reasoning that excludability under § 104(a)(2)
focuses on whether the nature of the claim is personal or nonpersonal, not on
whether the injury is physical or nonphysical.278 The court stressed that the
definition of a tort action— “a direct invasion of some legal right of the
individual independent of contract”— justifies the dual holding that sex
discrimination actions are tort or tort-type and that damages awarded for such
violations are excludable as damages received on account of personal
injuries.279 In concluding that the back pay award was taxable, however, the
court noted that if the taxpayer was allowed to exclude her back pay award
under § 104(a)(2) she would take an advantage over other co-workers
272. See id. (“[W]hether the rights created by the Equal Pay Act are considered as in the nature of
contract and rights or some other right entitling a person to recover withheld pay, they are certainly not
a claim for damages for the personal injury of sex discrimination.”).
273. 89 T.C. at 647.
274. See id. at 648 (relying on earlier cases such as Metzger and Bent to support the conclusion
that a claim alleging violation of a person’s federal civil rights might properly be viewed as a tort
claim to redress personal injuries).
275. Id. at 649.
276. See id. at 650. The opinion of the Court of Appeals for the Circuit Court of the District of
Columbia in Thompson v. Sawyer supports the proposition that liquidated damages are compensatory
rather than punitive. 678 F.2d 257, 281 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
277. Thompson v. Comm’r, 866 F.2d 709, 711 (4th Cir. 1989) (quoting Bent v. Comm’r, 835 F.2d
67, 70 (3d Cir. 1987), and citing Church v. Comm’r, 80 T.C. 1104, 1106 (1983)).
278. See id. at 712.
279. Id. at 712 (internal quotes omitted) (quoting BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1335 (5th ed.
1979)).
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reporting their total earned wages as gross income.280 Other cases, which did
not follow the Fourth Circuit’s reasoning, held the entire award of damages
nontaxable.281
Against this background, three analogous ADEA cases were decided. The
Third Circuit decided Rickel v. Commissioner on April 3, 1990.282 The Sixth
Circuit decided Pistillo v. Commissioner on August 24, 1990.283 The Ninth
Circuit decided Redfield v. Insurance Co. of North America on August 6,
1991.284 In all three cases, the taxpayers asserted both contract and tort
claims.285 This combination of claims required the courts to analyze the
application of § 104(a)(2) to the manner in which each taxpayer was granted
the respective award. Finding the entire award of damages excludable under
§ 104(a)(2), the Third Circuit in Rickel stated that “whether the damages
were paid on account of a personal injury is the beginning and the end of the
inquiry.”286 Drawing heavily upon Rickel, the Sixth Circuit in Pistillo
concluded that “an age discrimination claim is an assertion of a tort or tort-
type right, rather than an economic right arising out of a contract,” and
therefore, damages under the ADEA are excludable under § 104(a)(2).287
Adopting the reasoning of the Third and Sixth Circuits, the Ninth Circuit in
Redfield held “that age discrimination damages are tort-type recoveries for
280. Id. at 712 (internal quotes omitted) (quoting BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1335 (5th ed.
1979)).
281. In Byrne v. Comm’r, the taxpayer was awarded $20,000 in a settlement after being
discharged from employment for cooperating with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(EEOC) in investigating her employer. 90 T.C. 1000, 1001-02, 1004-05 (1988). The Tax Court
focused on the release in applying the nature of the claim test. See id. at 1007 n.4. Although the
taxpayer contended that under New Jersey state law she made personal injury tort claims, the court
stated that no federal authority was found which characterizes the relevant Fair Labor Standards Act of
1938 (FLSA) provision as redressing personal or tort-like injuries. See id. at 1008 n.5. The Tax Court
stated that the taxpayer did not justify her exclusive reliance on the tort analogy when the contract
action appears to apply equally well to the facts here. See id. at 1009. The Tax Court thus concluded
that the federal claim seems to contain the elements of both the state tort and contract action and
equally apportioned the settlement between excludable damages and nonexcludable damages. See id.
at 1009-11. On appeal to the Third Circuit, the court, relying on Roemer and Bent, rejected the split-
allocation settlement, balanced the predominant nature of the claims, and found that the taxpayer’s
damages were excludable because the FLSA statutory scheme redressed violations of personal injury
tort or tort-type rights. See 883 F.2d 211, 215 (3d Cir. 1989). The court refused to follow the New
Jersey Supreme Court’s holding, stating that such a characterization does not bind the court’s
determination of these claims for tax purposes because such an issue is a matter of federal law,
particularly in light of the presence of the FLSA in this case. See id. at 216.
282. 900 F.2d 655 (3d Cir. 1990).
283. 912 F.2d 145 (6th Cir. 1990).
284. 940 F.2d 542 (9th Cir. 1991).
285. See Rickel, 900 F.2d at 656-57; Pistillo, 912 F.2d at 146-47; Redfield, 940 F.2d at 544.
286. Rickel, 900 F.2d at 661 (internal quotes omitted) (quoting Threlkeld v. Comm’r, 87 T.C.
1294, 1299 (1986)).
287. Pistillo, 912 F.2d at 149.
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personal injuries . . . [and as] such, they come within the purview of I.R.C.
§ 104(a)(2), and are excludable from gross income for the purposes of federal
income tax.”288 Rickel, Pistillo, and Redfield were among the first cases to
apply Roemer and its progeny in the context of age discrimination and to
decline to apportion the damages awarded.289
Against the weight of authority and by using strict statutory construction
the Circuit Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia decided Sparrow v.
Commissioner, a case involving the settlement of a racial discrimination
claim filed under Title VII.290 The D.C. Circuit focused on the meaning of
the term “damages” as the ultimately determinative, threshold inquiry.291 The
court interpreted § 104(a)(2) as containing a two-part conjunctive test: “(1)
the amount received must be damages and (2) the amount received as
damages must result from a personal injury or sickness.”292
In deconstructing § 104(a)(2), the court reviewed the legal definition of
“damages” from a historical perspective and determined that the term
“embodie[d] a monetary amount originally awarded at law, not in equity.”293
Noting that “neither the Revenue Act of 1918 nor its legislative history
defined the meaning of damages,” the court concluded that the word
“damages,” as used in § 104(a)(2) today, should be interpreted by the
meaning ascribed to it when § 213(b)(6) was originally enacted.294 Stating
that “not all awards of monetary relief are properly characterized as the legal
relief traditionally awarded in courts of law,” the court discussed whether a
Title VII back pay award constitutes damages under this definition.295
Concluding that Title VII limits its “relief to equitable remedies,” the court
held “that an award of back pay under Title VII does not constitute the legal
288. Redfield, 940 F.2d at 547 (internal quotes omitted).
289. See Rickel, 900 F.2d at 658-59; Pistillo, 912 F.2d at 148-49; Redfield, 940 F.2d at 545-46.
290. 949 F.2d 434, 436 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
291. See id. at 437. Because the court focuses on damages from the outset, the taxpayer must jump
over two hurdles in order to fit within the gambit of the statute. See id. at 437 n.5 (“After the taxpayer
. . . [shows that the award constitutes damages], he must then show that the amount was received as a
result of a personal injury.”).
292. Id. at 436. Judge Karen Henderson wrote the opinion for a three judge panel with Chief
Judge Abner Mikva and Judge David E. Sentelle joining. See id. at 434.
293. See id. at 437. The court also pointed out that under the Seventh Amendment, plaintiffs have
traditionally been allowed jury trials when seeking damages. See id. See also Ross v. Bernhard, 396
U.S. 531, 534 (1970); Capital Traction Co. v. Hof, 174 U.S. 1, 13 (1899); Whitehead v. Shattuck, 138
U.S. 146, 151 (1891). See generally Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189 (1974).
294. Sparrow, 949 F.2d at 436-37. To establish that in 1918 damages were a remedy at law, the
court cites Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 194 (1974), Rice & Adams Corp. v. Lathrop, 278 U.S. 509,
513 (1929), United States v. Or. Lumber Co., 260 U.S. 290, 293 (1922), Friederichsen v. Renard, 247
U.S. 207, 208 (1918), Archer v. Greenville Sand & Gravel Co., 233 U.S. 60, 64-66 (1914), and
Javierre v. Central Altagracia, 217 U.S. 502 (1910). Id.
295. Sparrow, 949 F.2d at 437-38 (citations omitted) (internal quotations omitted).
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remedy of damages.”296 Because the monetary award failed the first prong of
the court’s test, the D.C. Circuit was able to sidestep the most critical issue—
whether a successful race discrimination claim is a “personal injury” within
the meaning of § 104(a)(2).
Against the opinion and reasoning of numerous other courts of appeals,
the D.C. Court— just as “a derelict on the waters of the law”— attempted to
justify its reasoning by deviating from precedent.297 By analyzing the
historical meaning of damages under § 104(a)(2), the D.C. Court
distinguished its approach from the other courts which had addressed the
same issues. However, the D.C. Circuit’s narrow construction, relying on the
historical meaning of the word damages conspicuously failed to address, or
read out of § 104(a)(2) the word “any” preceeding the word “damages” in the
statute. Interestingly, this court’s lonesome methodology foreshadowed the
Supreme Court’s approach, which would define the term “personal injury”
by reference to the statutory remedies.298
K. Burke and Schleier: The Supreme Court Gets Involved
In 1991, after approximately seventy-four years of silence the Supreme
Court entered the conflict by granting certiorari to review the 1990 Sixth
Circuit opinion in United States v. Burke.299 Burke sought to exclude back
pay damages received from the Tennessee Valley Authority under a Title VII
sexual discrimination claim.300 The Federal District Court for the Eastern
District of Tennessee determined that the settlement award was taxable,
applying Raytheon’s “in lieu of what” test301 and the “intent of the payor” test
crafted in Agar.302 The Sixth Circuit reversed the District Court and relied on
Threlkeld’s reasoning that the appropriate inquiry to determine § 104(a)(2)
excludability was whether the injury and claim were “personal and tort like
296. Id. at 437, 438.
297. Id. at 439-40 (quoting Lambert v. California, 355 U.S. 225, 232 (1957) (Frankfurter, J.,
dissenting)).
298. See United States v. Burke, 504 U.S. 229, 233-37 (1992).
299. 504 U.S. 229 (1992).
300. Id. at 230.
301. Burke v. United States, No. 88-508, 1990 WL 56155, at *6-7 (E.D. Tenn. Mar. 20, 1990).
See also Raytheon Prod. Corp. v. Comm’r, 144 F.2d 110, 111-13 (1st Cir. 1944). The “in lieu of what”
test was applied in several other opinions. See, e.g., Church v. Comm’r, 80 T.C. 1104, 1107 (1983);
Fono v. Comm’r, 79 T.C. 680, 692 (1982); Yates Indus. Inc. v. Comm’r, 58 T.C. 961, 972 (1972).
302. See Burke v. United States, 1990 WL 56155, at *6 (citing Knuckles v. Comm’r, 349 F.2d
610, 613 (10th Cir. 1965); Byrne v. Comm’r, 90 T.C. 1000, 1007 (1988); Metzger v. Comm’r, 88 T.C.
834, 847-48 (1987); Fono v. Comm’r, 79 T.C. 680, 694 (1982), aff’d without opinion, 749 F.2d 37 (9th
Cir. 1984); Glynn v. Comm’r, 76 T.C. 116, 120 (1981)).
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in nature.”303 Accordingly, the Court found that a discrimination claim
qualified as a “personal injury” and excluded Burke’s damages.304
The Supreme Court on the other hand, defined the nature of a right
according to the available remedy.305 The Court emphasized that one of the
essential “hallmarks of traditional [common law] tort liability is the
availability of a broad range of damages to compensate . . . ‘fairly for injuries
caused by the violation of [a person’s] legal rights.’”306 Contrasting the broad
remedial freedom found in common law tort, the Court determined that
Congress had so circumscribed the available Title VII remedies that the
remedies themselves did not “evidence[] a tort-like conception of injury and
remedy.”307 Because the Court found that the remedies specifically provided
under Title VII did not include the right to jury trial or compensatory and
punitive damages, the Court concluded that a sex discrimination Title VII
claim was not a tort or tort-type right.308 Therefore, the Court held that the
back pay award due to the taxpayer because of the discriminator’s
underpayments were not excludable under § 104(a)(2) as compensatory
damages received on account of personal injuries.309 Although the Court
acknowledged the adoption of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 that specifically
amended the Title VII’s remedial scheme to include compensatory and
punitive damages,310 it “examine[d] the law [only] as it existed [under] . . .
‘unamended’ Title VII,”311 meaning as Title VII was found in the 1964
statute.
Under the amended Title VII, Congress permitted disparate treatment
303. Burke v. United States, 929 F.2d 1119, 1121 (6th Cir. 1991). Here, the court does not follow
the formulation of Sparrow providing for damages as the ultimate inquiry. However, it is possible that
the Sparrow analysis was the precursor of the two-prong test developed in Schleier.
304. Burke, 929 F.2d at 1121, 1123 (finding that the government could not establish that the harm
to a victim of sexual discrimination was any less “personal” than the harm to victims of other
nonphysical injuries already found to be “personal” within the meaning of § 104(a)(2)) (citing Byrne
v. Comm’r, 883 F.2d 211, 216 (3d Cir. 1989) (relying on Bent and Roemer to extend the exclusion
under § 104 to retaliatory discharge claims under the Fair Labor Standards Act)); Roemer v. Comm’r,
716 F.2d 693, 700 (9th Cir. 1983) (holding that an injury stemming from a defamation suit is
“personal” under § 104(a)(2)); Threlkeld v. Comm’r, 87 T.C. 1294, 1308, aff’d, 848 F.2d 81 (6th Cir.
1988) (finding an injury from a malicious prosecution as personal under § 104(a)(2)).
305. United States v. Burke, 504 U.S. 229, 234-35 (1992). Justice Harry Blackmun delivered the
Court’s majority opinion. Id. at 230.
306. Id. at 235 (quoting Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 257 (1978)).
307. Id. at 239.
308. See id. at 238, 240.
309. See id. at 229, 242. For cases holding similarly for different reasons, see Thompson v.
Comm’r, 89 T.C. 632 (1987), aff’d, 866 F.2d 709 (4th Cir. 1989) (back pay is included but liquidated
damages is excluded); Hodge v. Comm’r, 64 T.C. 616 (1975); and Sparrow v. Comm’r, 57 T.C.M.
(CCH) 816 (1989), aff’d, 949 F.2d 434 (1991).
310. See Burke, 504 U.S. at 235, 241 n.12.
311. See id. at 237 n.8.
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plaintiffs, not disparate impact plaintiffs, to seek compensatory and punitive
damages, indicating recovery for a tort or tort-type injury.312 Accordingly, a
year after the Supreme Court’s decision in Burke, the IRS concluded in
Revenue Ruling 93-98, that because Congress amended Title VII in 1991 to
allow back pay and compensatory damages such damage awards in Title VII
claims were now excluded from income in disparate treatment discrimination
cases but were not excluded from income in disparate impact cases.313 The
Revenue Ruling thus consistently applied Burke, elevating the remedy over
the nature of the personal invasion of the right at the essence of the wrong
being redressed.
Just three years later, three cases lured the Supreme Court into revisiting
the conflict. Downey v. Commissioner,314 Schmitz v. Commissioner,315 and
Schleier v. Commissioner316 all arose out of a class action suit filed by
employees of United Airlines for age discrimination under the ADEA and
share virtually identical underlying facts.317 All of these taxpayers worked as
pilots for United Airlines, which had a policy of forcing its pilots to retire at
the age of sixty.318 The parties’ settlement agreement labeled half of each
monetary award as back pay and the other half as liquidated damages under
the ADEA.319 Each taxpayer initially excluded the liquidated damages and
reported only the back pay as income.320 In each case, the IRS issued a
deficiency notice asserting that the entire award of damages was taxable.321
The Tax Court, however, determined that the entire settlement award in each
case was excludable under § 104(a)(2).322
In Downey, the Tax Court relied on Burke and found that liquidated
damages were traditionally associated with tort claims323 and “serve a
deterrent or punitive purpose [which] further support[ed] the conclusion that
312. See id. at 62-63.
313. See 1993-2 C.B. 61.
314. 33 F.3d 836 (7th Cir. 1994).
315. 34 F.3d 790 (9th Cir. 1994).
316. 515 U.S. 323 (1995).
317. Downey, Schmitz, and Schleier all stem from the same ADEA action in Monroe v. United Air
Lines, Inc. See Schleier, 515 U.S. at 326-27. Monroe v. United Air Lines, Inc. was a consolidated
ADEA class action by 115 individual plaintiffs that worked for defendant, United Airlines (United).
736 F.2d 394 (7th Cir. 1984).
318. See Schleier, 515 U.S. at 325; Downey, 33 F.3d at 837; Schmitz, 34 F.3d at 791.
319. See Schleier, 515 U.S. at 326; Downey, 33 F.3d at 837; Schmitz, 34 F.3d at 791.
320. See cases cited supra note 319.
321. See Schleier, 515 U.S. at 327; Downey, 33 F.3d at 837; Schmitz, 34 F.3d at 791.
322. See Schmitz, 34 F.3d at 791; Schleier v. Comm’r, No. 22909-90, 1993 WL 767976 (T.C. July
7, 1993); Downey v. Comm’r, 97 T.C. 150 (1991), aff’d on recon., 100 T.C. 634 (1993).
323. See Downey, 100 T.C. at 637 (citing United States v. Burke, 504 U.S. 229, 238 (1992)).
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a claim under the ADEA is tort like.”324 Based on Downey, the Tax Court
granted summary judgment in favor of the petitioners in Schmitz and
Schleier.325 The Commisioner seized upon the unique opportunity to argue
virtually the same case in three different courts of appeal and appealed the
Tax Court decisions to the Courts of Appeals for the Fifth, Seventh, and
Ninth Circuits.
The Seventh Circuit in the 1994 case of Downey, then examined whether
the remedies provided under the ADEA were broad enough to embody the
taxpayer’s age discrimination claim as a tort or tort-type right and, therefore,
whether the ADEA awards remedied a “personal injury” within the ambit of
Burke.326 The Seventh Circuit first creatively quoted the statute as “only
‘damages received . . . on account of personal injuries or sickness.’”327 The
Court substitutes the word “only” for the world “any” before “damages”—
albeit outside the quotation marks— signalling its intention to read the
exclusion very narrowly. Thus for the first time, the Seventh Circuit
restricted the “expansive”328 impact of the word “any” in the context of a
324. Id. at 637. See also Downey, 97 T.C. at 171 (stating that the Commissioner argued that under
Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Thurston, 469 U.S. 111 (1985), ADEA liquidated damages were the
equivalent of punitive damages and, therefore, not excludable under § 104(a)(2)). The Downey Tax
Court also rejected these arguments, as it had in Rickel v. Comm’r, 92 T.C. 510, 521-22 (1989). See 97
T.C. at 171.
325. Schmitz, 34 F.3d at 791; Schleier v. Comm’r, No. 22909-90, 1993 WL 767976 (T.C. July 7,
1993).
326. See Downey, 33 F.3d at 839. Other courts of appeals have addressed the issue of whether
ADEA claims are tort-type claims. See Redfield v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 940 F.2d 542, 546 (9th Cir.
1991) (finding ADEA awards are tort-type awards and therefore excludable and “[n]othing in the
ADEA reflects congressional attempt to rewrite the terms of employment contracts”); Pistillo v.
Comm’r, 912 F.2d 145, 150 (6th Cir. 1990) (finding award excludable although award represented lost
wages); Rickel v. Comm’r, 900 F.2d 655, 658 (3d Cir. 1990) (“[I]t is judicially well-established that
the meaning of ‘personal injuries’ in this context encompasses . . . nonphysical as well as physical
injuries.”). These other courts of appeals’ decisions were prior to Burke, and therefore, the Downey
court limited its discussion to Burke. See Downey, 97 T.C. at 150.
327. Id. at 838.
328. The Third Circuit in Rickel v. Comm’r characterized the difference between the 1989
proposed and congressionally enacted amendments as follows:
Congress’ recent amendment to § 104(a)(2) in the 1989 Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act, 103
Stat. 2379 (1989), which added the provision that: “Paragraph (2) shall not apply to any punitive
damages in connection with a case not including physical injury or physical sickness.” This action
is significant to our analysis because the original bill introduced in the House of Representatives
would have limited the § 104(a)(2) exclusion to cases involving physical injury or physical
sickness. As the House Ways and Means Committee explained the bill, “some courts have held
that the exclusion applies to damages in cases involving employment discrimination,” but that the
“committee believes that such treatment is inappropriate where no physical injury or sickness is
involved.” H.R. REP. NO. 247, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 1354-55, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N.
2824-25. The Senate bill contained no such amendment to § 104(a)(2). In its final conference bill,
Congress chose to implicitly endorse the courts’ expansive interpretation of § 104(a)(2) to
encompass nonphysical injuries and merely circumscribe the scope of the exemption as to only
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discrimination claim.
Noting that all prior court decisions holding ADEA claims to be tort-like
“antedate[d] the Supreme Court’s explanation of § 104(a)(2) in Burke,”329 the
Seventh Circuit stated that for any federal statutory antidiscrimination claim
to be considered tort-type the federal antidiscrimination statute must provide
for compensatory damages redressing the intangible elements of a personal
injury.330 Finding that ADEA liquidated damages replace prejudgment
interest, the court held that “whatever the appropriate characterization of
ADEA liquidated damages (be they punitive or contractual), as a matter of
law they do not compensate for the intangible elements of a personal injury”
and therefore are taxable.331
The Ninth Circuit decided Schmitz332 on the same day that the Seventh
Circuit decided Downey.333 Although addressing the same underlying facts334
and relying on the same Supreme Court decision,335 legislative history, and
statutory language,336 the Ninth Circuit concluded that the ADEA liquidated
damages provision was tort-like.337 Because the ADEA provides for jury
one type of remedy, i.e., punitive damages, and not other types of remedies typically available in
employment discrimination cases, such as back pay. H.R. CONF. REP. NO. 386, 101st Cong., 1st
Sess. 622-23, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3225-26. Cf. Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 580
(1978) (“Congress is presumed to be aware of an administrative or judicial interpretation of a
statute and to adopt that interpretation when it re-enacts a statute without change.”).
900 F.2d 655, 664 (3d Cir. 1990) (emphasis added).
329. Downey, 33 F.3d at 838 (citing Redfield v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 940 F.2d 542 (9th Cir. 1991);
Rickel v. Comm’r, 900 F.2d 655 (3d Cir. 1990); Pistillo v. Comm’r, 912 F.2d 145 (6th Cir. 1990)).
330. See id. at 839. In reversing the Tax Court, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
approvingly referenced Justice Scalia’s concurring opinion in Burke, which argued that § 104(a)(2)
excluded only awards for injuries to physical or mental health. See id. at 837-38.
331. Id. at 840.
332. 34 F.3d 790 (9th Cir. 1994).
333. 33 F.3d 836 (7th Cir. 1994).
334. See id. at 837; Schmitz, 34 F.3d at 790-91.
335. See United States v. Burke, 504 U.S. 229 (1992).
336. See Schmitz, 34 F.3d at 792.
337. See id. at 796. In affirming the Tax Court, the Ninth Circuit stated that in order to establish
excludability, Schmitz had to show (1) that his underlying cause of action was tort-like within the
meaning of Burke and (2) that he received the damages on account of a personal injury. See id. at 792.
The Ninth Circuit initially set forth its test, modified by Burke, in United States v. Hawkins, 30 F.3d
1077, 1081-82 (1994). While the IRS contended that the taxpayer had not met the tort-like nature
standard because the ADEA does not provide any damages for emotional distress or pain and
suffering, the Ninth Circuit disagreed, stating that “Burke does not require that a statute provide the
complete spectrum of tort remedies before it may be deemed to redress a tort-type right.” Schmitz, 34
F.3d at 793 (citing Bennett v. United States, 30 Fed. Cl. 396, 400 (1994)). Liquidated damages are
neither solely punitive nor unrelated to an ADEA plaintiff’s underlying personal injury. Schmitz, 34
F.3d at 794. Because the judiciary traditionally awards liquidated damages to compensate victims for
obscure or difficult to prove damages, such damages result in an exclusion from a plaintiff’s gross
income. See id.
Interestingly, the Seventh Circuit in Downey expressly relies on Burke and rejects Rickel, Pistillo,
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trials, one of the missing factors that the Supreme Court emphasized in
Burke,338 and the ADEA’s legislative history and case law indicates that
Congress intended to allow victims of willful discrimination greater
compensation than victims of nonwillful discrimination,339 the Ninth Circuit
reasoned that ADEA liquidated damages served both a punitive and
compensatory function.340 The court concluded that the ADEA’s remedial
scheme satisfied the broad range of remedies specifically identified in Burke
as tort-like and, therefore, allowed exclusion of the taxpayer’s liquidated
damages and back pay received under the ADEA.341
To resolve the circuit split, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in
Schleier.342 Following the Seventh and Ninth Circuits and the Supreme Court
in Burke, the Schleier Court based its determination of § 104(a)(2)’s tax
consequences initially on the range of remedies available under the statute,
rather than on the nature of the claim or injury.343 The majority noted that the
ADEA constricts the remedies available to plaintiffs in two important ways.
“First, unlike the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 (FLSA),344 the ADEA
specifically provides that ‘liquidated damages shall be payable only in cases
of willful violations’ . . . . Second, . . . the ADEA does not permit a separate
recovery of compensatory damages for pain and suffering or emotional
and Redfield, while the Ninth Circuit in Schmitz relies not on Burke but on the post-Burke ADEA
decision of Purcell v. Seguin State Bank & Trust Co. and the Downey Tax Court, which held ADEA
damages excludable even under the more restrictive test of Burke. See Downey, 33 F.3d at 838;
Schmitz, 34 F.3d at 792-93. In Purcell v. Seguin State Bank & Trust Co., Purcell received liquidated
damages under the ADEA in a age discrimination suit and the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
found that his award exceeded his injury. 999 F.2d 950, 955 (5th Cir. 1993). When it recalculated the
damages, the Fifth Circuit found it improper to increase damages to reflect the liability a plaintiff
would have for income taxes. See id. at 961. The Fifth Circuit upheld the Tax Court’s decision in
Downey holding that Burke does not apply to ADEA claims because there is no doubt that ADEA
claims are tort-like injuries. See id. at 960. If damages were increased in ADEA awards to reflect
income tax liability before the § 104(a)(2) exclusion, ADEA plaintiffs would clearly be awarded too
much in damages.
338. Burke, 504 U.S. at 240-41.
339. See Schmitz, 34 F.3d at 793-94, 796. The Commissioner argued that because they are
available under the ADEA only in cases of willful discrimination, liquidated damages were therefore,
solely punitive and not compensatory. The court rejected the argument stating:
In enacting ADEA, Congress [attempted] to balance the need[s] to compensate victims and [to]
deter discrimination with the need to protect businesses from crushing liability . . . . [W]e see
nothing “peculiar” in Congress’s decision to resolve these competing interests by compensating
victims of willful discrimination at a higher rate than victims of “non-willful” discrimination.
Id. at 795.
340. See id. at 794.
341. See id.
342. 515 U.S. 323 (1995).
343. See id. at 325-26.
344. For more information on the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 (FLSA), see infra notes 495-
500.
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distress.”345
Highlighting the broad definition and sweeping scope of gross income
under § 61(a) with “the default rule of statutory interpretation that exclusions
from income must be narrowly construed,”346 the Court went on to analyze
the “plain language of § 104(a)(2)” and focused its attention on the statutory
language, “on account of personal injuries.”347 Using a hypothetical
automobile accident as an example, the Court acknowledged that while the
injured victim may have sustained medical expenses, lost wages, and pain
and suffering, the entire amount received in a settlement was excludable
because each discrete segment of the award constituted damages “on account
of personal injuries.”348 As authority for the proposition that lost wages were
excludable as personal injuries under the Code, the Court cited to the Tax
Court’s decision in Threlkeld, referencing the hypothetical of the surgeon
who lost a finger.349 In addition, the Court made the assertion in a footnote
that while the language, “on account of personal injuries,” may be textually
ambiguous on the issue of the excludability of pain and suffering, “it is by
now clear that § 104(a)(2) encompasses recoveries based on intangible as
well as tangible harms.”350 The opinion states with regard to the ADEA
settlement at issue however, that “[w]hether one treats respondent’s attaining
the age of 60 or his being laid off on account of his age as the proximate
cause of respondent’s loss of income, neither the birthday nor the discharge
can fairly be described as a ‘personal injury’ or ‘sickness.’”351 While the pilot
may have experienced “some psychological or ‘personal’ injury [from
345. Schleier, 515 U.S. at 326 (citing Schmitz v. Comm’r, 34 F.3d 790 (9th Cir. 1994); Goldstein
v. Manhattan Indus., Inc., 758 F.2d 1435, 1446 (11th Cir. 1985); Johnson v. Al Tech Specialties Steel
Corp., 731 F.2d 143, 147 (2d Cir. 1984); Perrell v. Finance Am. Corp., 726 F.2d 654 (10th Cir. 1984);
Hill v. Spiegel, Inc., 708 F.2d 233 (6th Cir. 1983); Pfeiffer v. Essex Wire Corp., 682 F.2d 684, 687-88
(7th Cir. 1982); Fiedler v. Indianhead Truck Line, Inc., 670 F.2d 806 (8th Cir. 1982); Slatin v.
Stanford Research Inst., 590 F.2d 1292 (4th Cir. 1979); Vazquez v. E. Air Lines, Inc., 579 F.2d 107
(1st Cir. 1978); Dean v. Am. Sec. Ins. Co., 559 F.2d 1036 (5th Cir. 1977); Rogers v. Exxon Research
& Eng’g Co., 550 F.2d 834 (3d Cir. 1977)). See generally HOWARD C. EGLIT, 2 AGE DISCRIMINATION
§§ 8.30-9.42 (1997 & Supp. 1999); KALET, supra note 14, at 110-11.
346. Schleier, 515 U.S. at 327-28 (citing Burke, 504 U.S. 229, 244, 248 (1992) (Scalia, J., and
Souter, J., concurring in judgment respectively); United States v. Centennial Sav. Bank FSB, 499 U.S.
573, 583 (1991); Comm’r v. Jacobson, 336 U.S. 28, 49 (1949)).
347. Schleier, 515 U.S. at 329-30.
348. Id. at 329.
349. Id. at 329-33 (citing Threlkeld v. Comm’r, 87 T.C. 1294, 1300 (1986)).
350. Id. at 329 & n.4. While the Court cites to both the majority opinion and Scalia’s concurring
opinion in Burke for support, Scalia actually posited that the 1989 amendment to § 104(a)(2) clarified
the fact that Congress intended the phrase “personal injuries or sickness” to include both physical and
psychological harm or disease and to exclude “injuries that affect neither mind nor body.” United
States v. Burke, 504 U.S. 229, 244-45 n.3. (1992) (Scalia, J., concurring).
351. Schleier, 515 U.S. at 330.
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United Airlines unlawful termination] comparable to the intangible pain and
suffering caused by an automobile accident,” clearly the pilot did not recover
back wages because of such injury.352 In contrasting the automobile accident
to age discrimination, the Court found an intervening factor in its
hypothetical: “[while] the accident causes a personal injury which in turn
causes a loss of wages . . . . the discrimination [independently] causes both
personal injury and loss of wages . . . . The amount of back wages recovered
[in age discrimination cases] is completely independent of the existence or
extent of any personal injury.”353 The Court then concluded that the
§ 104(a)(2) personal injury exclusion does not include the pilot’s back wages
award because the pilot did not recover “back wages . . . ‘on account of’ any
personal injury and because no personal injury affected the amount of back
wages recovered.”354
In contention, the taxpayer first argued that the plain meaning of
§ 104(a)(2) includes liquidated damages, “too obscure and difficult of proof
for estimate” as compensation for the victims personal injuries rather than as
penalty to the payor.355 While the Court acknowledged that the House
Conference Report accompanying the 1978 amendments to the ADEA
contains language supporting the pilot’s argument that the ADEA liquidated
damages were compensatory,356 the Court decided that nevertheless, the
352. Id. at 330.
353. Id.
354. Id. at 331. It is inconceivable to think that turning age sixty is the proximate cause of
anything.
It strains the imagination to say that while age discrimination caused plaintiff’s loss of wages,
plaintiff’s “being fired” (by whom and why, we may ask) was a closer, independent, and more
proximate cause sufficient to make age discrimination no longer a legally relevant cause of
plaintiff’s lost wages. Remember, a defendant is liable under the ADEA only if the defendant
takes some adverse employment action against the plaintiff, like reducing his pay or firing him on
account of age. Yet, when we consider taxation, somehow the loss of wages was not “caused” by
the age discrimination. If that really is true, the defendant is not liable under the ADEA— because
the event of his birthday, or his “being fired” (and not the age discrimination), caused his loss of
wages.
F. Philip Manns, Jr., Down and Out: RIFed Employees, Taxes, and Employment Discrimination
Claims After Burke and Schleier, 44 U. KAN. L. REV. 103, 123-24 (1995). See also David B. Jennings,
Note, The Supreme Court Gets Tough with I.R.C. § 104(a)(2) Exclusions: Taxpayer Discrimination
Awards Suffer Injury as a Result of Commissioner v. Schleier, 40 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 865, 888-89
(1996).
355. Schleier, 515 U.S. at 331 (internal quotations omitted) (citing Overnight Motor Transp. Co.
v. Missel, 316 U.S. 572 (1942)).
356. Schleier, 515 U.S. at 332 n.5. Respondent’s argued in their brief that “[i]f Congress had
wished to provide for an exclusively punitive remedy in the ADEA, it could just as easily have
authorized victims of age discrimination to recover ‘fines,’ ‘penalties,’ ‘exemplary damages,’ or
‘punitive damages.’” Brief for Respondent at 16, Commissioner v. Schleier, 515 U.S. 323 (1995) (No.
94-500). The House Conference Report accompanying the ADEA Amendments of 1978 unequivocally
supported Respondent’s position that liquidated damages constituted legal compensatory relief for
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provisions of the ADEA were punitive in nature.357 Furthermore, the Court
reasoned that because the ADEA only permitted liquidated damages for
willful violations, they were punitive and not awarded “on account of
personal injury or sickness.”358
Second, the taxpayer proposed that Treasury Regulation Section 1.104-
1(c)359 makes ADEA actions tort or tort-type and thus, this liquidated
damages award was excludable.360 The Court viewed the taxpayer’s
contention based on the Commissioner’s regulation as an attempt to
circumvent the plain meaning of the statute.361 The Court found that the
Treasury Regulation repeats the statutory requirement that the taxpayer
receive the damage award for personal injuries or sickness and adds the
requirement that the taxpayer receive the damages in a tort-type action.
Third, even if the liquidated damages were punitive in nature,362 the
taxpayer asserted that the Court’s decision in Burke considering the
availability of jury trials and punitive damages as indicators that a claim may
be in tort or of a tort-type, compelled it to hold the ADEA claim in this case
to be tort or tort-type and thus the damages to be excludable because both
jury trials and liquidated damages were available under the ADEA’s
remedial scheme.363 The Court noted that Burke emphasized the lack of jury
difficult to estimate intangible injuries. Specifically, the Report stated the following in regards to
providing liquidated damages for legal relief:
[A party must] have the factual issues underlying such a claim decided by a jury. The ADEA as
amended by the act does not provide remedies of a punitive nature. The Conferees therefore
agreed to permit a jury trial of the factual issues underlying a claim for liquidated damages
because the Supreme Court had made clear that an award of liquidated damages under the FLSA
was not a penalty but rather was available in order to provide full compensatory relief for losses
that were “too obscure and difficult of proof for estimate other than by liquidated damages.”
H.R. CONF. REP. NO. 95-950, at 14 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 504, 535 (internal
citations omitted) (quoting Overnight Motor Transp. Co. v. Missel, 316 U.S. 572, 583-84 (1942)). The
above quotation from Missel and included in the House of Representatives’ Conference Report is
particularly interesting in that the Schleier Court discounted this legislative history and rather indicated
that Congress may not have been aware of the Missel Court’s statement. See Comm’r v. Schleier, 515
U.S. 323, 332 (1995).
357. Schleier, 515 U.S. at 331 (citing Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Thurston, 469 U.S. 111, 126
(1985), and Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 581 (1978)).
358. Schleier, 515 U.S. at 332. The Court in footnote six stated that it found “odd” Justice Sandra
Day O’Connor’s assertion in the dissent, that the majority holding presumed intangible harms from
discrimination were not personal injuries. See id. The majority further stated that while the intangible
harms of discrimination could constitute a personal injury, liquidated damages under ADEA did not
necessarily compensate the victim on account of such harms. See id.
359. See Treas. Reg § 1.104-1(c) (1994). Promulgated in 1956, this regulation is long-standing.
See also T.D. 6169, 1956-1 C.B. 63.
360. Schleier, 515 U.S. at 333.
361. See id.
362. See id.
363. See id. at 334.
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trials and punitive damages as factors in deciding that a claim was not in tort
or of a tort-type; however, the Court concluded that Burke had not decided
whether the presence of jury trials, punitive damages, “or both of those
factors[,] would be sufficient to bring a statutory claim within the coverage of
the regulation.”364 The Schleier majority held that Burke is narrower than the
taxpayer contended because in Burke, the determination of a tort or tort-type
claim is not the beginning or the end of the analysis under § 104(a)(2).365
Rather, the majority interpreted Burke as holding that the presence of
compensatory damages was the primary indicator of whether a claim was tort
or tort-type.366 Therefore, because Congress limited the ADEA’s remedial
scheme to economically motivated back wages and what the Court
characterized as noncompensatory liquidated damages, ADEA damages were
not tort or tort-type and were included in income.367 In consolation to the
taxpayer, the Schleier majority noted that the presence of jury trials and
liquidated damages made Schleier a “closer case than Burke.”368
The Court concluded that in order to qualify damages under § 104(a)(2),
the action must first be based upon the violation of a tort or tort-type right,
and the award must then be received on account of personal injury or
sickness.369 Because the taxpayer could satisfy neither of the prongs, with
respect to the back pay or the liquidated damages, the whole award was
taxable.370
Shortly after Schleier, the Treasury issued Revenue Ruling 96-65, which
made “back-pay and damages for emotional distress received to satisfy a
claim for disparate treatment employment discrimination under Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act” not excluded from gross income under § 104(a)(2).371
Revenue Ruling 96-65 made obsolete Revenue Ruling 93-38 which had ruled
that under Title VII as amended in 1991, back pay and compensatory
damages were excluded from income in disparate treatment discrimination
cases.372
The last in the trilogy of Supreme Court decisions concerning § 104(a)(2)
364. Id. at 335.
365. See Schleier, 515 U.S. at 336.
366. See id. at 335.
367. See id. at 336.
368. Id. at 333.
369. See id. The Court noted in footnote seven, that the Commissioner had in the past treated the
tort or tort-type language in the regulation as encompassing the “on account of” language in the
statute. Id. at 334 n.7 (citing United States v. Burke, 504 U.S. 229, 242 n.1 (1998) (Scalia, J.
concurring)).
370. See id. at 336.
371. 1996-2 C.B. 6.
372. See id. at 6-7.
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is the case of O’Gilvie v. United States373 decided in 1986. O’Gilvie
concerned a jury award of punitive damages after trial. O’Gilvie died in 1983
of toxic shock syndrome and suit was brought resulting in an $1,525,000
compensatory damage and $10,000,000 punitive damage award.374 The
Court extended its interpretation of the phrase “on account of personal
injuries” to hold that the punitive damages were not excludable.375 Justice
Breyer, building from the Schleier opinion, underscored the interpretation of
the words “on account of personal injuries or sickness” as setting forth an
independent statutory requirement.376 The Court considered the 1989
amendment to § 104(a)(2) which provided that the § 104(a)(2) exclusion did
not apply to punitive damages in cases not involving physical injury or
physical sickness.377 However, the Court determined that the amendment
only related to the treatment of punitive damages in nonphysical injury cases
and could not be interpreted as authority for excluding punitive damages in
physical injury or physical sickness cases.378 Finding that the punitive
damage award was not intended to compensate for the personal injury, the
Court held that the independent requirement “on account of” was not
satisfied and the punitive damages were not excludable.379
L. The 1996 Amendments
Although Congress amended § 104 five times between 1954 and the
1983,380 not until 1989 did Congress begin three attempts to limit the
373. 519 U.S. 79 (1996).
374. Id. at 454.
375. Id.
376. Ogilvie, 519 U.S. at 454-55.
377. Id. 454-58.
378. Id.
379. Id. 458.
380. Act of Jan. 14, 1983, Pub. L. No. 97-473, § 101(a), 96 Stat. 2605, 2605 (1982) (amending
subsection (a)(2) by substituting “whether by suit or agreement and whether as lump sums or as
periodic payments” for “whether by suit or agreement”); Foreign Service Act of 1980, Pub. L. No.
96-465, § 2206(e)(1), 94 Stat. 2071, 2162 (1980) (amending subsection (a)(4) by substituting reference
to § 808 of the Foreign Service Act of 1980 for reference to § 831 of the Foreign Service Act of 1946);
Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, §§ 505(b), (e)(1), 1901(a)(18), 90 Stat. 1520, 1567,
1568, 1766 (1976) (amending subsection (a)(4) by striking out 60 Stat. 1021 following 22 U.S.C 1081,
amending § 104 by adding subsection (a)(5); and amending §104 by adding subsection (b) while
redesignating old subsection (b) to new subsection (c)); Self-Employed Individuals Tax Retirement
Act of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-792, § 7(d), 76 Stat. 809, 829 (1962) (amending subsection (a) by
inserting sentence that requires contributions made on behalf of an individual who has been or is a
§ 401(c)(1) employee, “while he was such an employee to a trust . . . which is exempt from tax . . . , or
under a plan described in section 403(a), . . . to . . . be treated as contributions by the employer which
were not includible in the gross income of the employee”); Foreign Service Act Amendments of 1960,
Pub. L. No. 86-723, § 51, 74 Stat. 831, 847 (1960) (amending subsection (a)(4) to provide for the
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§ 104(a)(2) income exclusion to damages received on account of physical
injury or sickness. First, the House Ways and Means Committee (House
WMC) proposed limiting the exclusion to amounts received for physical
injury381 within the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1989.382 The
House WMC noted that “[c]ourts have interpreted [the § 104(a)(2)] exclusion
. . . broadly in some cases to cover awards for personal injury that do not
relate to a physical injury or sickness.”383 In response, the House WMC
stated that allowing an exclusion of damages received on account of
nonphysical injury “is inappropriate,”384 without giving any reason but
obviously targeting employment discrimination cases, based on its statement
of present law.385 While the Senate did not adopt the House version of the
amendment regarding § 104(a)(2), the conference agreement eliminated from
the income exclusion punitive damages received for personal injuries not
involving physical injury or sickness.386
Once again, while attempting to pass the Balanced Budget Act of 1995,
the House WMC tried to limit the exclusion to damages on account of
physical injury.387 This time however, the House WMC justified the change
by arguing that receipts resulting from nonphysical injuries should be taxable
because “[d]amages received on a claim not involving a physical injury or
physical sickness are generally to compensate the claimant for lost profits or
lost wages that would otherwise be included in taxable income.”388
Furthermore, the Committee called for the taxation of all punitive
damages.389 The Senate amendment followed the House bill in relevant part,
exclusion from gross income disability annuities payable under § 831 of the Foreign Service Act of
1946).
381. H.R. REP. NO. 101-247, at 1354-55 (1989), reprinted in 1989 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1906, 2824-25.
382. Pub. L. No. 101-239, 103 Stat. 2106 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.).
383. H.R. REP. NO. 101-247, at 1354-55 (1989), reprinted in 1989 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1906, 2824-25.
This statement is repeated in 1995 and 1996 when Congress attempted to limit the exclusion to
damages received on account of physical injury. H.R. REP. NO. 104-280, pt. 2, at 318 (1995); H.R.
CONF. REP. NO. 104-737, at 300-02 (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1677, 1792-94.
384. See id.
385. H.R. CONF. REP. NO. 101-386, at 622-23 (1989), reprinted in 1989 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3018,
3225.
386. Id.
387. H.R. REP. NO. 104-280, pt. 2, at 318-20.
388. Id. at 319. The Committee also went on to state:
The confusion as to the tax treatment of damages received in cases not involving physical injury
or physical sickness has led to substantial litigation, including two Supreme Court cases within the
last 4 years. The taxation of damages received in cases not involving a physical injury or physical
sickness should not depend on the type of claim made.
Id.
389. See id.
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and the Conferees agreed to the House WMC proposals.390 The § 104(a)(2)
amendment nevertheless failed because President Clinton vetoed the
Balanced Budget Act of 1995.391
The House WMC reiterated its 1995 position on nonphysical injuries and
punitive damages392 during passage of the Small Business Job Protection Act
of 1996.393 Although the Senate called for taxation of punitive damages, it
voiced no opinion on whether § 104(a)(2) should be limited to damages
received on account of physical injuries.394 Nonetheless, the Conferees
agreed to follow the House WMC bill.395 On August 20, 1996, the Small
Business Job Protection Act of 1996 became law and amended § 104(a)(2) to
limit the § 104(a)(2) exclusion to damages on account of physical injury or
physical sickness and not allow an exclusion for punitive damages.396 Section
104(a)(2) thus silently eliminated equal protection for those taxpayers that
Congress vocally attempted to protect from discrimination in the last thirty-
five years.
M. Conclusion of Part II
Early administrative opinions on the exclusion of damage awards
misapplied, confused, and entangled the concepts of human capital and
income. This embroilment paved the way for courts’ bewilderment in
adjudicating damage award tax exclusion litigation. Conflicting decisions
continued until the 1955 Supreme Court Glenshaw Glass decision, which
redefined income to include any “undeniable accession to wealth, clearly
realized, and over which the taxpayer [had] complete dominion and
control.”397 Because taxpayers after Glenshaw Glass needed to qualify under
a specific statutory exclusion from income, courts finally began to analyze, to
interpret, and to apply the § 104(a)(2) exclusion in the personal injury
context. After Glenshaw Glass, taxpayers structured their settlements to fall
within the statutory exclusion. As a result, judicial opinion backlash forced
courts to craft tests to filter out undeserving claims under § 104(a)(2). In the
390. H.R. CONF. REP. NO. 104-350, at 1452 (1995).
391. See Message Returning Without Approval to the House of Representatives Budget
Reconciliation Legislation, II PUB. PAPERS 1853-55 (1995).
392. H.R. REP. NO. 104-586, at 142-44 (1996).
393. Pub L. No. 104-188, 110 Stat. 1755 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.).
394. S. REP. NO. 104-281, at 115-16 (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1474, 1589-90.
395. H.R. CONF. REP. NO. 104-737, at 300-302 (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1677,
1792-94.
396. Pub L. No. 104-188, § 1605, 110 Stat. 1755, 1838 (codified as amended at 26 U.S.C.
§ 104(a)(2) (Supp. II 1996)).
397. Comm’r v. Glenshaw Glass, 348 U.S. 426, 431 (1955).
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early and mid-‘80s, some thirty years after Glenshaw Glass, concrete
principles were set for analyzing § 104(a)(2) litigation. However, beginning
in 1989, when all the major § 104(a)(2) cases began to deal with Title VII
and ADEA damage awards, these principles crumbled.
In 1989, the courts began contorting the prior § 104(a)(2) analysis, and
Congress began trying to amend § 104(a)(2) to disallow the exclusion of
punitive damage awards from income where the underlying injury was
nonphysical. Three years later in Burke, the Supreme Court began its short
yet detrimental involvement in the § 104(a)(2) controversy, stirred up by the
Commissioner in a multijurisdictional campaign. Between its 1992 decision
in Burke and its 1995 decision in Schleier, the Supreme Court manufactured
a § 104(a)(2) analytical framework that denigrated and marginalized victims
of dignitary torts. Finally in 1996, the Treasury and Congress, influenced by
the Schleier decision, limited the § 104(a)(2) exclusion to damages on
account of physical injury or physical sickness.
III. IS § 104(a)(2) UNSUPPORTABLE?: THE POLICY (NON)JUSTIFICATIONS
This Part summarizes the policy justifications offered by scholars as
explanations for the existence of the § 104(a)(2) exclusion. Sections A-H
introduce and explain one theory or justification from the perspectives of
before and after the 1996 amendments.
Commentators have attempted to explain the absence of the exclusion in
the 1913 Act,398 its subsequent inclusion in the 1918 Act,399 and the Service’s
rationale in initially limiting the exclusion to physical personal injury
398. See, e.g., Dodge, supra note 106, at 150. Curiously, the exclusion did not appear in the
first modern federal income tax law. One possibility is that the original concept of gross income
excluded nonregular receipts, such as windfalls. Id. Another is that gross income viewed through the
lens of either business accounting or trust accounting emphasizes a clear-cut distinction between
capital and income and is often expressed in the “fruit and tree” metaphor. Id. Under this view, a
recovery for personal injury is not the “fruit” or income, but rather, compensation for loss of part of
the “tree” or capital). Id.
399. See J. Martin Burke & Michael K. Friel, Tax Treatment of Employment-Related Personal
Injury Awards: The Need for Limits, 50 MONT. L. REV. 13, 14 (1989) (stating that the history
surrounding the passage of § 213(b)(6) “suggests that Congress intended it to codify then-recent
administrative decisions”). The statute was amended in 1942, Revenue Act of 1942, ch. 619, § 127, 56
Stat. 798, 825-26 (1942). Otherwise the statute remained unchanged until 1954. See Revenue Act of
1921, ch. 136, § 213(b)(6), 42 Stat. 227, 238 (1923); Revenue Act of 1924, ch. 234, § 213(b)(6), 43
Stat. 253, 268 (1925); Revenue Act of 1926, ch. 27, § 213(b)(6), 44 Stat. 9, 24-25 (1927); Revenue
Act of 1928, ch. 852, § 22(b)(5), 45 Stat. 791, 798 (1929); Revenue Act of 1932, ch. 209, § 22(b)(5),
47 Stat. 169, 179 (1933); Revenue Act of 1934, ch. 277, § 22(b)(5), 48 Stat. 680, 687 (1934); Revenue
Act of 1936, ch. 690, § 22(b)(5), 49 Stat. 1648, 1658 (1936); Revenue Act of 1938, ch. 289,
§ 22(b)(5), 52 Stat. 447, 458 (1938); Revenue Act of 1942, ch. 619, § 127, 56 Stat. 798, 825-26
(1942).
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awards.400 Explanations for the exclusion comprise a wide range of theories
including humanitarianism,401 involuntariness of injury,402 bunching of
income,403 noncommercial zone,404 imputed income,405 national income
pie,406 administrative convenience,407 and return of human capital.408 As
discussed in Part II, the human capital rationale has been one of the most
prevalent rationales, yet also the most misunderstood and misapplied.409
Before the 1996 amendment to § 104(a)(2), these explanations and criticisms
of the income tax exclusion of damages for physical and nonphysical
personal injuries provided fertile ground for tax policy discussion and debate.
However, since Congress made the physical/nonphysical distinction in the
1996 Amendments, these theories fail to explain or to justify the current
status of § 104(a)(2) because each justification, with the possible exception
of the administrative convenience theory, equally supports an exclusion of
damages for both physical and nonphysical injuries.410
400. See Knickerbocker, supra note 83, at 431 (concluding that “[t]he statute and its
accompanying committee report led, one must say inescapably, to the conclusion that the only objects
of the legislative solicitude were recoveries on account of physical injuries”).
401. See discussion infra Part III.A.
402. See discussion infra Part III.B.
403. See discussion infra Part III.C.
404. See discussion infra Part III.D.
405. See discussion infra Part III.E.
406. See discussion infra Part III.F.
407. See discussion infra Part III.G.
408. See discussion infra Part III.H.
409. See supra notes 59-79, 86-90, 98-106 and accompanying text.
410. Furthermore, allowing an exclusion of any damage award may violate the principle of
horizontal equity. Under this principle people who are in similarly situated “economic positions”
should bear the same tax liability. See Renée Judith Sobel, United States Taxation of its Citizens
Abroad: Incentive or Equity, 38 VAND. L. REV. 101, 103 (1985). The all-important inquiry under the
principle of horizontal equity, is how “equal economic position” is defined. See Victor Thuronyi, The
Concept of Income, 46 TAX L. REV. 45, 51 (1990). First, in order to define “equal economic position,”
a discernible index of ability to pay needs to be used in order to assess tax liability. Such indices
commonly used “include income, consumption, or wealth— or perhaps some combination of these or
other factors.” Eric M. Zolt, The Uneasy Case for Uniform Taxation, 16 VA. TAX REV. 39, 87 (1996).
Although the subject of some criticism, one traditional measure is the Haig-Simons tax base. See id.
Under this formulation, “[p]ersonal income may be defined as the algebraic sum of (1) the market
value of rights exercised in consumption and (2) the change in the value of the store of property rights
between the beginning and end of the period in question.” HENRY C. SIMONS, PERSONAL INCOME
TAXATION 50 (1938). This definition of personal income “seeks to tax individuals by measuring their
consumption and net accretions in wealth [and] . . . focuses on all accretions with no distinction[s] as
to source [or] . . . generally . . . as to use.” Zolt, supra, at 87. Moreover, “the amendment disserves the
principle of horizontal equity by treating job bias victims less favorably than similarly situated
‘physically injured’ persons.” Karen B. Brown, Not Color- Or Gender-Neutral: New Tax Treatment of
Employment Discrimination Damages, 7 S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN’S STUD. 223, 233 (1998).
Nevertheless, because it increases net wealth and allows for greater consumption, damage recovery
improves one’s economic position so that allowing a taxpayer to exclude the recovery from gross
income violates horizontal equity. See also Steven R. Schneider, Recent Development, Does Uncle
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A. Humanitarianism Theory
Humanitarianism theory reasons that Congress excluded the entire award
because of “a feeling that the injured party, who has suffered enough, should
not be further burdened with the practical difficulty of sorting out the taxable
and nontaxable components of a lump-sum award.”411 Consistent with this
theory, Boris I. Bittker and Lawrence Lokken note that many would consider
it heartless to tax as income the compensation received by seriously injured
individuals unless the tortfeasors had to pay correspondingly higher
damages.412
J. Martin Burke and Michael K. Friel criticize the humanitarianism theory
as an inadequate justification for the exclusion.413 While they agree with
Bittker and Lokken that taxing compensation on account of severe physical
injuries may be heartless, they find few humanitarian reasons to exclude
damages on account of “a sprained ankle or a bruised arm; for defamation of
personal or business reputation; for violation of free speech rights; for
violation of open meeting laws; or for all manner of claims that can plausibly
be shoehorned into a personal injury mold.”414 Burke and Friel would likely
agree that humanitarianism theory justifies amending § 104(a)(2) to allow
exclusions for severe damages only. However, a statute that looks to the
severity of an injury in order to determine tax liability would be extremely
problematic. The courts and the IRS would have to make a case-by-case
determination to see if an injury satisfies the criteria for exclusion.
“Moreover, the difficulties inherent in classifying particular injuries as
‘serious’ border on the ridiculous when forced to account for differences in
Sam Deserve Part of Your Discrimination Award? The Taxability of Back Pay Awards Under IRC
Section 104(A)(2), 46 WASH. U. J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 345, 363 (1994) (stating that “[e]xcluding
back pay violates . . . [the principle of horizontal equity because]. [c]laimants who receive awards of
back pay representing lost wages are made better than whole if the award is not taxed; they would
receive tax advantages not available to their co-workers”).
411. Roemer v. Comm’r, 716 F.2d 693, 696 (9th Cir. 1983) (citing Note, Taxation of Damage
Recoveries from Litigation, 40 CORNELL L. Q. 345, 346 (1955)). The Respondent in Schleier relied
upon this humanitarianism theory to justify the exclusion of ADEA awards. Brief for Respondent at
24, Comm’r v. Schleier, 515 U.S. 323 (1995) (No. 94-500).
412. See BITTKER & LOKKEN, supra note 51, § 13.1.1 (emphasis added).
413. Burke & Friel, supra note 399, at 43. Cf., F. Patrick Hubbard, Making People Whole Again:
The Constitutionality of Taxing Compensatory Tort Damages for Mental Distress, 49 FLA. L. REV.
725, 741 (criticizing the humanitarian justification because punitive damages are not excludable and
because many tort victims go uncompensated); Amy McNamer, Note, Interest not Excludable Under
Section 104(a)(1): Pagliarulo v. Commissioner, 48 TAX LAW. 1075, 1080-81 (1995) (arguing that the
humanitarianism justification does not support the exclusion of the interest component of damages).
414. Burke & Friel, supra note 399, at 43. Although Burke and Friel do not accept the
humanitarianism theory, they do acknowledge the existence of strong policy reasons for the exclusion
of damages on account of racial discrimination. See id. at 44.
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occupation, lifestyle, and other personal idiosyncrasies.”415
Similarly, Douglas A. Kahn states that the humanitarianism justification
for excluding damages is “weaker when the injury is exclusively nonphysical
than when physical injury is involved.”416 He argues that the “plight of a
victim who has suffered only nonphysical injuries does not arouse anything
like the sympathy that is engendered by a physical injury.”417 Although he
recognizes that victims of extreme mental harm “arouse substantial
sympathy,” Kahn does not think that any case of extreme mental harm
“attract[s] the degree of compassion that is felt for a victim of serious
physical injury [like] the loss of a limb or a facial disfigurement.”418
Even if it originally justified the exclusion, humanitarianism theory no
longer supports such exclusion under the current version of § 104(a)(2).
Presently, the statute completely denies tax relief to plaintiffs with the severe
emotional injuries while allowing plaintiffs with a sprained ankle full tax
relief. Few would honestly claim that a person with a minor physical injury
deserves compassion while an individual who has suffered severe emotional
injury does not.419
B. Involuntariness of Injury Theory
The involuntariness of injury theory argues that damage awards are
involuntary conversions and therefore should be exempt from taxation
because other Code sections, such as § 1033, exempt involuntary
415. Jerome A. Ecker, Keys To Effective Litigation: Equitable Exclusion of Civil Rights Damage
Awards Under I.R.C. Section 104(a)(2), 11 REV. LITIG. 415, 442 (1992) (criticizing Burke and Friel).
416. See Kahn, supra note 106, at 357.
417. Id.
418. Id.
419. See Sharon E. Stedman, Note, Congress’s Amendment to Section 104 of the Tax Code Will
Not Clarify the Tax Treatment of Damages and Will Lead To Arbitrary Distinctions, 21 SEATTLE U. L.
REV. 387, 410 (1997) (“[T]he compassion or humanitarianism policy that a taxpayer has suffered
enough would justify excluding all compensatory damages from income.”). See also Clay R. Stevens,
Killing Two Birds with One Stone: Elimination of the Punitive Damage Exemption of Section
104(a)(2) Leads to Greater Efficiency and Raises Revenue, 28 BEVERLY HILLS B.A. J. 168, 176
(1994) (“Because the humanitarian theory fails to provide any justification for differentiating between
. . . [physically and nonphysically injured] taxpayers, applying the exclusion solely to taxpayers
suffering physical injury causes other taxpayers in the same economic position to bear different tax
burdens. Therefore, this arbitrary distinction violates horizontal equity.”). Nicholas M. Whittington,
Note, Against the Grain: An Interdisciplinary Examination of the 1996 Federal Statutory Changes to
the Taxability of Personal Injury Awards, 37 WASHBURN L.J. 153, 165-66 (1997) ([W]hen applied to
the humanitarian aid policy, [the amendment’s changes] show that Congress values the taxpayers in
the small business group over the taxpayers in . . . emotional[ly] distress[ed] tort victims [group] . . .
[stealing] an expenditure . . . from some tort victims to give an expenditure to small businesses and
their employees.”).
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conversions.420 This theory, however, is flawed because § 1033— unlike
§ 104 (a)(2), which excludes amounts from income permanently— provides
only for tax deferral and requires the taxpayer to reinvest the compensation
received for destroyed property in replacement property.421 Regardless of the
incongruence between § 104(a)(2) and § 1033, however, involuntariness of
injury theory does not explain the distinction in § 104(a)(2) that would
consider physical injury damages as a receipt from an involuntary transaction
and nonphysical injury damages as a receipt from a voluntary transaction.422
Realistically, both physical and nonphysical injuries are injuries arising from
involuntary transactions.
C. Bunching of Income Theory
Very often, judgement awards are paid in a lump sum that represents
several years of backpay or lost profits. Absent injury, these profits would
have been subject to annual taxation. However, this injured taxpayer must
declare the lump sum award in the taxable year he receives it, and this
bunching of back pay or lost profits will normally send the plaintiff into a
higher marginal tax bracket given the progressive rate of the federal income
tax.423 Thus, under the bunching of income theory, a taxpayer should receive
“relief from the bunching effect, perhaps by a form of income-averaging”424
or “wholesale exclusion from gross income” of the lump sum.425 As with the
humanitarianism and involuntariness of injury theories, this theory fails to
support the modern exclusion of nonphysical damages from income tax relief
420. See Mark W. Cochran, Should Personal Injury Damage Awards Be Taxed?, 38 CASE W.
RES. L. REV. 43, 46-47 (1987); Kahn, supra note 106, at 347-48.
421. See Cochran, supra note 420, at 47; Lawrence A. Frolik, Personal Injury Compensation as a
Tax Preference, 37 ME. L. REV. 1, 20 (1985); Kahn, supra note 106, at 347-48; Stedman, supra note
419, at 390-91; Steven Jay Stewart, Note, Damage Award Taxation under Section 104(a)(2) of the
I.R.C.— Congress Clarifies Application of the Schleier Test, 47 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1255 (1997). See
also Dodge, supra note 106, at 183-84 (“Involuntariness may be a legitimate rationale for deferral of
income or perhaps deductibility of outlay, but not for total and permanent exclusion of a clearly-
realized accession to wealth.”).
422. See Stedman, supra note 419, at 410.
423. See Cochran, supra note 420, at 49.
424. Kahn, supra note 106, at 348. See Frolik, supra note 421, at 11-12; Brent B. Nicholson,
Recent Developments Concerning the Taxation of Damages Under Section 104(a)(2) of the Internal
Revenue Code, 61 ALB. L. REV. 215, 236 (1997). The elimination of the income averaging provisions
by the Tax Reform Act of 1986 indicates that Congress cares little about income bunching. See
Stedman, supra note 419, at 393. The flatter tax rates enacted in 1986 also serve as an additional
indicator of Congress’s lack of concern about income bunching. See Chapman, supra note 83, at 429;
Malcolm L. Morris, Taxing Economic Loss Recovered in Personal Injury Actions: Towards Capital
Idea?, 38 U. FLA. L. REV. 735, 756-57 (1986); Stewart, supra note 421, at 1264.
425. Cochran, supra note 420, at 49.
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because bunching results from lump sum awards for physical injuries just as
it does for nonphysical injuries.
D. Noncommercial Zone Theory
Under the noncommercial zone theory, tax laws are intended to tax
commercial transactions. Although a victim of either physical or nonphysical
injury must actively petition for compensation, such petition directly results
from the injury not any “voluntary entrance into the commercial market.”426
Damage awards, therefore, should be exempt from taxation since the
compensation received by the injured party does not originate from a
voluntary commercial transaction.427 This theory fails to explain the
§ 104(a)(2) exclusion because neither victims of physical nor nonphysical
injuries receive compensation as a result of a voluntary commercial
transaction.428
E. Imputed Income Theory
Under the imputed income theory, damages are exempt from taxation
because the award to a victim resembles intangible gains that would not
otherwise be taxed. One commentator notes that while “imputed income is
[generally] exempt because of the difficulties inherent in defining and
administering such [intangible income,]” personal injury damages are not
inherently difficult to define nor difficult to administer.429 Even if personal
injuries are easy to define and administer, unlike most intangibles, the
imputed income theory still fails to justify the current statutory exclusion
because awards for physical and nonphysical injuries compensate plaintiffs
for intangibles that would not otherwise be taxed.430 Congress does not tax a
good personal or business reputation any more than it taxes a healthy ankle
or positive self-image or self-confidence.
426. Id. at 349.
427. See Kahn, supra note 106, at 348.
428. Kahn, however, supports the physical and nonphysical distinction. See id. at 358 (stating that
“[a] physical-nonphysical division would be a surrogate for a commercial-noncommercial distinction,
and any imprecision in the reach of the exclusion would be relatively minor and justified by the
administrative convenience of having a bright-line standard”).
429. Robert Cate Illig, Note, Tort Reform and the Tax Code: An Opportunity to Narrow the
Personal Injuries Exemption, 48 VAND. L. REV. 1459, 1465 (1995). For support of this proposition,
see Cochran, supra note 420, at 48; Stedman, supra note 419, at 392. Examples of imputed income
include the value of the use of a personally owned home and the fruits of one’s labor. See Inclusion Of
Damages Under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 109 HARV. L. REV. 319, 326 (1995).
430. See Stedman, supra note 419, at 410 (stating “because [all] compensatory damages may
compensate a taxpayer for an intangible, the imputed income theory is justified”).
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F. National Income Pie Theory
Professor Joseph M. Dodge discusses the national income pie theory,
under which all damage receipts may be excludable from gross income.
Here, the purpose of the tax base is to allocate among taxpayers national
income,431 which “is limited to economic activity that generates gain or
profit.”432 Moreover, national “income cannot result from a mere transfer,
which would include damage recoveries of all kinds as well as gratuitous
transfers.”433 Dodge, however, criticizes this theory for its weakness as a
matter of positive law, because the Code includes as income receipts of
transfers absent a specific exclusionary provision.434 In addition, the national
income pie theory does not support the inclusion of nonphysical damage
receipts while supporting the exclusion of physical damage receipts because,
under this theory, all kinds of damage recoveries are excludable.
G. Administrative Convenience Theory
The administrative convenience theory argues that injury damages should
not be taxed because determining the allotment to different categories of
recovery would place “a significant administrative burden on taxpayers and
the Service.”435 Dodge denounces this theory because it is just as
administratively convenient to tax all damages as it is to exclude them all.436
Another commentator argues that courts have not had difficulty properly
allocating portions of the monetary recovery for personal injuries.437 Even if
one argues that administrative convenience was a valid justification for the
§ 104(a)(2) exclusion prior to the 1996 amendments when both physical and
nonphysical injury damage awards were excludable, the current version of
§ 104(a)(2) is even more administratively inconvenient to implement because
damages arising out of nonphysical injury are taxed and damages arising out
431. See Dodge, supra note 106, at 147.
432. Id.
433. Id.
434. See id. at 147-48 (“On the normative level, the ‘pie’ theory is generally inferior to other
theories such as the ‘ability to pay’ and ‘standard of living’ theories for constituting an income- or
consumption-tax base.”).
435. Kahn, supra note 106, at 354.
436. See Dodge, supra note 106, at 150.
437. See Robert M. Elwood, Supreme Court’s Ruling On Taxation of Discrimination Damages
Provides Little Resolution, 83 J. TAX’N 148, 151 (1995). See also Morris, supra note 424, at 744
(stating that the administrative convenience theory lacks merit because “numerous instances [exist]
where taxpayers and the government make difficult allocations for tax purposes . . . . [and] the addition
of one more would not cause the system to collapse”).
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of physical injury are not taxed.438 Regardless of the congruent result,
however, Congress explicitly redrafted § 104(a)(2) along physical and
nonphysical lines, not along any underlying policy advocating administrative
convenience. Furthermore, the distinction may, in the future, actually burden
the judiciary and the Service with constantly having to decide what
constitutes a physical injury and what does not.439
H. Return of Human Capital Theory
The return of human capital theory is the most prevalently used, the most
misunderstood, and the most misapplied theory. Under the return of human
capital theory, recoveries for personal injuries represent a return of human
capital rather than any gain, and therefore are not taxed.440 Because the
restoration of human capital only returns the victim to the same position he
or she occupied before the injury, thus making the individual whole again, he
or she does not receive a taxable gain.441 Here, the human body is likened to
a piece of property.442 Similar to a suit for damage to property, it is important
for an individual to establish a tax basis for recovery because as a matter of
positive law, the plaintiff has the burden of establishing his or her tax basis,
and especially in an instance where the basis is difficult to calculate,443 the
court may determine that the tax basis equals zero.444
Professor Dodge proffers that a human’s tax basis may be “equal to the
sum of human-capital expenditures, which might include such items as
outlays for food, education, preventive health care, vitamins, and
minerals.”445 Unfortunately, Dodge contends, these expenditures are not
accounted for nor would it be feasible to perform an accounting of such
expenditures during life.446 Accordingly, every plaintiff’s tax basis equals
438. See H.R. CONF. REP. NO. 104-737, reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1474, 1677. See also
Burke & Friel, supra note 20, at 178 (“The 1996 amendments, as filtered through the committee
report, . . . [both] place enormous weight on whether the ‘origin’ of a claim lies in a physical injury,
and . . . deny this all-important physical injury status to a significant, but undefined range of physical
‘symptoms’ grouped under the term ‘emotional distress.’”).
439. See Burke & Friel, supra note 399, at 185-86.
440. See Cochran, supra note 420, at 45.
441. See id.
442. See id. See also Mary L. Heen, An Alternative Approach to the Taxation of Employment
Discrimination Recoveries under Federal Civil Rights Statutes: Income from Human Capital,
Realization, and Nonrecognition, 72 N.C. L. REV. 549, 555-60 (1994) (comparing human capital to
investment capital).
443. See Cochran, supra note 420, at 45-46.
444. If the basis is equal to zero, then any amount received will be over the basis and thus taxable
income. See Kahn, supra note 106, at 343.
445. Dodge, supra note 106, at 152.
446. See id.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol78/iss4/4
1341 Wolff.doc 04/24/01   5:02 PM
2000] DOUBLE DISCRIMINATION IN TORTS AND TAXES 1407
zero unless the plaintiff can perform the impossible accounting of human-
capital outlays.447 Dodge notes that “the sentimentalist would argue that the
taxpayer, given the unfortunate circumstance of being injured, should be
given the benefit of the doubt by a presumption that the basis lost as a result
of the personal injury equals the amount realized” especially since most of
the above outlays are “non-deductible personal expenses and not capital
expenditures.”448 Dodge criticizes this “basis equals recovery” view first as
“nonsensical” where the injured party is a young child449 and second as
inconsistent with the Code’s treatment of human capital.450 Specifically, the
Code does not afford deductions for taxpayers uncompensated for their
injuries and does not include any depreciation deduction to offset wages
earned by the taxpayer.451 Therefore according to Dodge, “[o]n the merits,
human capital should not be treated as a conventional asset with basis.”452
Professor Paul B. Stephan, III, takes a different view from that of Dodge.
According to Stephan, human capital is defined as the “present value of the
flow of future satisfactions that an individual can command in the course of
his life.”453 The concept of human capital can be compartmentalized into two
distinct components: (1) an endowment given from “the biological and social
inheritance that accompanies a person into the world;”454 and (2) personal
acquisition and other “changes resulting from lifetime events.”455 While we
are born with the former, the latter results from personal effort. The personal
acquisition portion would require an “impossible” accounting of outlays as
explained by Dodge.456
The endowment portion of Professor Stephan’s human capital thoery can
have a tax basis equivalent to its value or a basis of zero.457 Assigning a zero
basis to the endowment portion may be justified because of the difficulty in
calculating depreciation in human capital where a positive basis is accorded.
However, “[h]uman capital has an ascertainable useful life, and the normal
pattern of capital cost recovery would permit an annual deduction to amortize
447. See id.
448. Id.
449. Id.
450. See id. at 152-53.
451. See Dodge, supra note 106, at 152-53.
452. Id. at 153. Furthermore, human capital is not treated as a conventional asset with basis
because an individual will never realize appreciation in human capital. See Laura Sager & Stephen
Cohen, Discrimination Against Damages for Unlawful Discrimination: The Supreme Court, Congress,
and the Income Tax, 35 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 447, 478 (1998).
453. Stephan, supra note 160, at 1358.
454. Id. at 1359.
455. Id. at 1389.
456. See supra notes 445-47 and accompanying text.
457. See Stephgan, supra note 160, at 1390.
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the taxpayer’s basis. If everyone’s human capital had a nonzero basis, then
separate calculations of these values for depreciation purposes would be
necessary.”458 Professor Stephan believes that it is possible to dispense with
deducting depreciation while assigning a positive basis to the endowment
portion. In order to do so, a uniform value must first be assigned to
everyone’s endowment. “If we then used straight-line methods and a
standard . . . life expectancy, everyone would have the same deduction every
year, in which case the deduction could be ignored.”459 Therefore, Professor
Stephan argues that the use of a positive basis for the endowment component
eliminates the need to undertake the “impossible” accounting of outlays
required by the personal acquisition component under his human capital
theory.460
On the other hand, if accounting of human capital expenditures is the sole
means of establishing basis, then the human capital theory is weak given that
the taxpayer must prove the basis in order to avoid the Service’s assumption
that the basis is zero. If Professor Stephan’s theory of adopting a standard
positive basis in the endowment component is sound, then the human capital
theory may justify the original passage of § 104(a)(2). What the human
capital theory fails to explain is the physical and nonphysical distinction in
the current § 104(a)(2). Emotions, mentality, and dignity are as much a part
of our biological endowment as are our legs, arms, and eyes.461
I. Conclusion of Part III
None of these theories can explain the current status of § 104(a)(2). Under
the theories discussed, victims of nonphysical injuries deserve the
§ 104(a)(2) exclusion as much as victims of physical injuries. In fact, as will
be discussed in Part IV, not only are the traditional policy justifications
insufficient to support the current status of § 104(a)(2), but also broader
458. Id.
459. Id.
460. For a variation of the endowment as basis theory, see Frank J. Doti, Personal Injury Income
Tax Exclusion: An Analysis and Update, 75 DENV. U. L. REV. 61, 63, 80 (stating that human capital
equals a “person’s birthright— an uninjured body and mind” and concluding that § 104(a)(2) personal
injuries should “be limited to human capital losses to the body, mind, and reputation of the victim of a
tort or tort-like claim”).
461. See Stedman, supra note 419, at 410 (“[U]nder the return of capital theory, compensatory
damages would compensate taxpayers for loss of their human capital of mental and physical well-
being.”); Whittington, supra note 419, at 165 (“Application of the human capital theory results in the
changes made by the amendment violating this principle of income and suggests that Congress does
not believe that emotional distress is a reduction in capital.”).
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social policy supports the equal treatment of victims of nonphysical and
physical injuries under § 104(a)(2).
IV. SECTION 104(a)(2) IN BROADER CONTEXT: RECOGNIZING
NONPHYSICAL INJURIES VERSUS TORT REFORM
If the law can be made to articulate rather than mask social
domination, if it can be made to reveal . . . the effect of . . . male
dominance, then perhaps substantive rather than merely formal
equality can be won through civil rights law.462
This Article has thus far presented the history of and lack of justification
for leaving out nonphysical injury damages from § 104(a)(2)’s physical
injury damages income exclusion. Parts II and III provided a conventional
legal survey of § 104(a)(2) case law and legislative history as well as
potential theories explaining this discriminatory exclusion. The analysis in
Part IV, however, departs from traditional tax analysis and § 104(a)(2)
scholarship to better explain what gave rise to the 1996 amendments to
§ 104(a)(2). Because § 104(a)(2) deals not with familiar economic
transactions but with interpersonal relations resulting in economic
consequences, departure from the traditional tax analysis is necessary to
examine what conditioning factors influenced the enactment of the 1996
amendments to § 104(a)(2). This Part discusses the civil rights movement
and tort reform as conditioning factors that are relevant to the current status
of § 104(a)(2).
Understanding the origins of the nonphysical damages exclusion requires
studying the socio-economic factors generating the historical evolution of
§ 104(a)(2). Section A familiarizes the reader with major civil rights
legislation. Specifically, subsections A.1–A.5 look at the purposes for
enacting the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the ADEA, the Equal Employment
Opportunity Act of 1972 (EEOA), the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, the
Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA), and the Civil Rights Act of
1991, respectively. Section B examines the rise of tort reform at both the
state and federal level. Section C examines tort reform in the context of
§ 104(a)(2), demonstrating how the civil rights movement and tort reform
influenced the current status of § 104(a)(2). This Part further demonstrates
that judicial and congressional tort reform efforts functioned as a backlash to
civil rights legislation and spawned the 1996 amendments to § 104(a)(2).
462. WENDY BROWN, STATES OF INJURY: POWER AND FREEDOM IN LATE MODERNITY 130 (1995)
(emphasis added).
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A. Civil Rights Legislation
1. Civil Rights Act of 1964
Although the Thirteenth and Fifteenth Amendments granted black males
freedom from slavery and the right to vote,463 and the Nineteenth
Amendment464 afforded all women the right to vote, the white, male-
dominated nation continued to resist the movement for equality by
manipulating the law within political, economic, and social spheres.465 Not
463. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 1 (“Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a
punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the United
States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction.”); U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 1 (“The right of citizens
of the United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on
account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude.”). Although dignity is at the heart of the
Thirteenth Amendment, motivation behind its passage is said to lie elsewhere. According to one
commentator, the Thirteenth Amendment was enacted shortly after the Civil War partly as a means to
punish the South and partly from a feeling of obligation to the Blacks who had fought along side the
North in their battle with the Confederacy. See generally GEORGE H. HOEMANN, WHAT GOD HATH
WROUGHT: THE EMBODIMENT OF FREEDOM IN THE THIRTEENTH AMENDMENT (1982). Ulterior
motives have also been cited for the passage of the Fifteenth Amendment. See A. CAPERTON
BRAXTON, THE FIFTEENTH AMENDMENT: AN ACCOUNT OF ITS ENACTMENT 15-17 (5th ed. 1934). The
South realized that the political power of Southern whites would increase if blacks were included in
the determination of electoral votes yet kept from the polls. See id. at 16. Moreover, Republicans felt
that the freed slaves would be forever gracious to the Republican party for their freedom, thus
increasing its own political power. See id. at 17.
464. U.S. CONST. amend. XIX, cl. 1 (“The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not
be denied or abridged by the United States or by any state on account of sex.”).
465. Shortly after the enactment of the Fifteenth Amendment, Mississippi, South Carolina,
Louisiana, Alabama, and Virginia held constitutional conventions to effectuate disfranchisement of
blacks, and North Carolina, Texas, and Georgia followed suit without conventions. See DERRICK A.
BELL, JR., RACE, RACISM AND AMERICAN LAW 135 (2d ed. 1980). Moreover, Florida, Tennessee, and
Arkansas disfranchised minorities through the state legislatures’ use of a combination of the poll tax
and registration, multiple-box or secret ballot rules. Id. at 135-36. Anecdotal accounts illustrate how
these laws institutionalized discrimination in voting. In Fayette County, Tennessee, in 1959, 0.05% of
the blacks in the county were reregistered to vote and fewer actually went to vote. Tent City: “Home of
the Brave,” reprinted in DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT 87 (Peter B.
Levy ed., 1992) [hereinafter Tent City]. Blacks who tried to exercise their right encountered resistance
as government officials erected barriers such as an “all-white primary” to deter blacks from voting. See
id. at 87. By 1960, when black voter registration drives commenced in full, the racist establishment
refused to concede defeat, and “they set in motion the machinery of reprisal: economic strangulation,
threats, police harassment and sometimes even gunfire from their cowardly ambush.” Id. at 86.
As a retaliatory reaction to the Thirteenth Amendment, former Confederate states introduced
broad vagrancy ordinances known as “Black Codes” in an attempt to maintain control over the newly
freed slaves. See Gary Stewart, Black Codes and Broken Windows: The Legacy of Racial Hegemony in
Anti-Gang Civil Injunctions, 107 YALE L.J. 2249, 2257-59 (1998) (“[T]he prospect of being arrested
and charged with vagrancy deterred black laborers from leaving their former masters’ plantations.”).
Other forms of social repression included segregation. See BELL, supra, at 83 (“By 1900, all the
southern states had segregated railroad trains, and the laws were being extended to cover all travel
facilities. Local transportation facilities, street-and horsecars were next. Then quite quickly, separation
of the races in all public facilities and private facilities open to the public was mandated.”).
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until the ‘50s and ‘60s did the three branches of government undertake
significant political, economic, and social change to promote equality in
many human endeavors.
In the 1954 case of Brown v. Board of Education, the Warren Court
overruled the separate but equal doctrine established in Plessy v. Ferguson466
holding racially-motivated segregation of public school children
unconstitutional under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection
Clause.467 The Executive Branch soon followed suit when, in 1961, President
John F. Kennedy issued Executive Order 10, that directed federally funded
contractors to take affirmative measures to eliminate racial discrimination in
their employment endeavors.468 In 1964, Congress, faced with a mounting
revolt by the historically underprivileged racial minority,469 enacted the Civil
466. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
467. 347 U.S. 483, 492-93 (1954) (“[W]e cannot turn the clock back to 1868 when the
[Fourteenth] Amendment was adopted, or even to 1896 when Plessy v. Ferguson was written. We
must consider public education in the light of its full development and its present place in American
life throughout the Nation.”). The Court “conclude[d] that in the field of public education the doctrine
of ‘separate but equal’ has no place.” Id. at 495
468. Exec. Order No. 10,925, 3 C.F.R. 448 (1959-1963). The executive branch played an
important role in the civil rights movement. The inauguration of President John F. Kennedy stirred the
public’s expectations for social change. See ROBERT WEISBROT, FREEDOM BOUND: A HISTORY OF
AMERICA’S CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT 49 (1990). Kennedy had initially intended to effect change
gradually, but civil rights leaders and public sentiment urged him to move more forcefully. See JAMES
N. GIGLIO, THE PRESIDENCY OF JOHN F. KENNEDY 159 (1991). President Kennedy became a
“vigorous advocate” of the civil rights movement, appointing over “forty blacks to top administration
posts” and instituting fifty-seven voting-rights suits during his administration. Id. at 159, 163-64. He
became a champion of the cause, evidenced by his support of the Civil Rights Bill of 1963. See id. at
159. After President Kennedy’s assassination, President Johnson continued in his predecessor’s
footsteps, aware that the nation’s political agenda had been altered by the civil rights movement. See
WEISBROT, supra, at 87.
In certain cases, the Executive Branch took more drastic measures, such as sending the National
Guard to escort black students to white schools. Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 9 (1958). In 1957 the
Governor of Arkansas called out the National Guard to prevent nine black students from entering an
all-white high school. Id. After a court ordered the Guard to be withdrawn, threats of violence lead
President Eisenhower to call on paratroopers to enforce integration. See id. at 9-12. The troops
remained for one year. See id. at 12. In 1963, in order to enforce the Supreme Court’s 1955 order to
admit black students into the University of Alabama, President Kennedy called on the Alabama
National Guard to ensure the safety of the black students in the wake of Governor George Wallace’s
repeated assertions that he would not allow blacks into the University. See E. CULPEPPER CLARK, THE
SCHOOLHOUSE DOOR: SEGREGATION’S LAST STAND AT THE UNIVERSITY OF ALABAMA 182-83, 229-
31 (1993).
469. Most believe that the Civil Rights Movement began with Rosa Parks simply asserting herself.
Robert D. Loevy, Introduction: The Background and Setting of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, reprinted
in THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964, at 1, 22 (Robert D. Loevy ed., 1997). While riding a city bus in
Montgomery, Alabama, on the first of December, 1955, Rosa Parks was ordered to give up her seat so
that a white man could sit down. Rosa L. Parks, Recollections, reprinted in DOCUMENTARY HISTORY
OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT, supra note 465, at 52. She refused and was arrested for “suspicion.”
Id. at 53. Although such arrests had occurred numerous times before, the black leadership believed that
the time was right to reject this treatment; E. D. Nixon, a black leader, recalled that he “felt that the
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Negroes in Montgomery were at last anxious to move, prepared to sacrifice and ready to endure
whatever came.” E. D. Nixon, How It all Started, reprinted in DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE CIVIL
RIGHTS MOVEMENT, supra note 465, at 54. See also Parks, supra, at 51-52. Pamphlets were
distributed throughout the Black community recounting the story of Rosa Parks and announcing a bus
boycott. See Woman’s Political Council, Leaflet, reprinted in DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE CIVIL
RIGHTS MOVEMENT, supra note 465, at 57. Black leaders had no idea whether such a move would be
supported by the black masses. See David J. Garrow, The Montgomery Bus Boycott and the Women
Who Started It: The Memoir of Jo Ann Gibson Robinson, reprinted in DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF
THE CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT, supra note 465, at 55-56. To their surprise, the boycott lasted one year.
See Garrow, supra, at 57. By December of 1956, the Montgomery bus lines were desegregated. See
Hollinger F. Barnard, Outside the Magic Circle: The Autobiography of Virginia Foster Durr, reprinted
in DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT, supra note 465, at 61. The Black
leadership constituted four main groups: The National Association for the Advancement of Colored
People (NAACP), The Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC), The Congress of Racial
Equality (CORE), and The Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC). See Tent City, supra
note 465, at 85.
The NAACP focused on legal battles against formal segregation. See Loevy, supra, at 21. One
such fight occurred in Little Rock, Arkansas. DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS
MOVEMENT, supra note 465, at 48. The NAACP fought to integrate the main high school. See MARK
V. TUSHET, MAKING CIVIL RIGHTS LAW: THURGOOD MARSHALL AND THE SUPREME COURT, 1936-
1961, at 259 (1994). Elizabeth Eckford, one of the nine black children who tried to attend classes at
Central High School, describes her encounters with law enforcement officers as she proceeded to enter
the all-white Central High School in Little Rock, Arkansas. See Elizabeth Eckford, The First Day:
Little Rock, 1957, reprinted in DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT, supra note
465, at 44-46.
The SNCC directed student protests; sit-ins were their most effective form of peaceful, nonviolent
protests against segregation. See Loevy, supra, at 38. At a Woolworth’s store in Greensboro, North
Carolina, four black men sat down at an all-white counter on February 1, 1960, attempted to order
coffee and donuts, and were refused service. See Franklin McCain, Interview, reprinted in
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT, supra note 465, at 66. The men refused
to leave until they were served. See id. News of this protest disseminated throughout the South. See id.
at 67. Within days, similar protests occurred at lunch counters all over the South. See Loevy, supra, at
37. In 1961, CORE decided to launch “Freedom Rides.” See DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE CIVIL
RIGHTS MOVEMENT, supra note 465, at 75. Fresh from a Supreme Court victory, activists assembled
and rode busses through the South to test the newly espoused rights in Boynton v. Commonwealth of
Virginia. See id. See also Boynton v. Commonwealth of Virginia, 364 U.S. 454 (1960) (holding that
interstate passengers had a right to expect food service at designated layover terminals regardless of
their skin color). CORE felt that such endeavors would anger the segregationists and cause them to
mobilize in protests. See DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT, supra note 465,
at 75. Such protests would cause the national attention, forcing the federal government to act. See id.
The SCLC, led by Martin Luther King, Jr., concentrated on peaceful marches and boycotts to
provoke racist, violent reactions from the establishment. See DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE CIVIL
RIGHTS MOVEMENT, supra note 465, at 107. The marches on Birmingham and Washington, D.C.,
became the most famous. See id. In the Spring of 1963, the black leadership chose to march on
Birmingham, Alabama, because among other things, the town’s sheriff had previously demonstrated
his dislike and hostility towards the Civil Rights Movement. See id. Again, black leaders correctly
predicted that black nonviolent protests would encourage the sheriff to react with excessive force, that
such force would be captured on film by the national media and shown throughout the country, and
that such pressure would force the President to act. See id. at 107-08, 114. When the blacks marched
on Birmingham, the sheriff used sickeninlgy excessive force, that was shown on nationwide television.
See id. President Kennedy proposed in the Summer of 1963 what would soon become the Civil Rights
Act of 1964. See id. at 117. The March on Washington, D.C., organized to support the proposed civil
rights legislation, induced over 200,000 Americans to fill the Lincoln Memorial complex. See id. at
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Rights Act of 1964470 to prohibit discrimination based on sex, color, race,
religion, or national origin.471
The Civil Rights Act of 1964 applied to public voting (Title I),472 public
119-20. This march climaxed with Martin Luther King, Jr.’s now world-famous “I Have a Dream”
speech, in which he proclaimed that “I have a dream that my four children will one day live in a nation
where they will not be judged by the color of their skin but by the content of their character.” See id. at
122. Martin Luther King, Jr., I Have a Dream, reprinted in DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE CIVIL
RIGHTS MOVEMENT, supra note 465, at 124.
470. Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
The Civil Rights Act of 1964 was not the first legislative attempt to protect minorities. The initial
congressional civil rights endeavor occurred with the enactment of the Civil Rights Act of 1866, ch.
31, 14 Stat. 27 (1868), which prohibited discrimination based on race and national origin in an attempt
to guarantee former slaves the same property and contractual rights enjoyed by whites. Moreover,
from 1870 through 1875, Congress enacted a series of civil rights legislation. See, e.g., Enforcement
Act of 1870, ch. 114, 16 Stat. 140 (1871) (protecting the rights of black men by making it a federal
crime to conspire in order to deprive any citizen of any right guaranteed by federal law); Act of Feb.
28, 1871, ch. 99, 16 Stat. 433; Civil Rights (Ku Klux Klan) Act of 1871, ch. 22, 17 Stat. 13 (1873)
(responding directly to widespread violence against newly freed slaves by organizations such as the
Ku Klux Klan); Civil Rights Act of 1875, ch. 114, 18 Stat. 335 (providing for equal enjoyment of
facilities and accommodations and outlawing racial discrimination in state jury selection). For other
congressional civil rights attempts, see Civil Rights Act of 1957, Pub. L. No. 85-315, 71 Stat. 634
(creating the Commission on Civil Rights and authorizing the Attorney General to bring suits to put an
end to discriminatory practices); The Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241
(making it criminal to interfere with persons attempting to comply with court orders relating to civil
rights and providing that the Attorney General could inspect voting records that officers of elections
were required by the Act to retain).
471. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 703, 78 Stat. 241, 255-57 (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(b) (1994 & Supp. II 1996)). The Act states:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer-
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any
individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment,
because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees in any way which would deprive or tend to
deprive any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an
employee, because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.
Id. With the exception of Title VII, sex is not mentioned anywhere else in the text of the Act.
Ironically, in an effort to weaken the proposed bill, “sex” was added to the protections mandated by
the act. Congressman Howard Smith of Virginia introduced the amendment to add the word “sex” to
Title VII right after the word “religion.” 110 CONG. REC. 2547, 2577 (daily ed. Feb. 8, 1964). The
proposal by Congressman Smith surprised other members of the House because he had previously
been opposed to the bill. See id. at 2578. Congressman Smith was evidently not entirely serious in his
intentions. He referred to a letter he claimed to have received from a lady, who wished to air her
grievances after she heard that Congressman Smith was going to propose the amendment. See id. at
2577. The excerpt read by Congressman Smith described a gender “imbalance” based on the existence
of 2,661,000 more females than males in the United States. Id. The letter stated that the number
imbalance interfered with the “right” of every woman to have a husband of her own and urged
Congress and the President to take action to assist females in “obtaining their ‘right’ to happiness.” Id.
Congressman Smith found it necessary to assure members of the House that he was “serious about this
thing” during the debate. Id.
472. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 101, 78 Stat. 241, 241 (codified as amended
at 42 U.S.C. 1971 (1994 & Supp. II 1996)). Title I, designed to remedy the problems in operation and
enforcement of the Civil Rights Acts of 1957 and 1960, addressed the problem of judicial delays that
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had occurred under prior acts with regard to voting rights litigation. H.R. REP. NO. 88-914, at 19
(1964), reprinted in 1964 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2355, 2394. Section 101 of Title I sanctioned the Attorney
General to enter into “agreements with appropriate State or local authorities” to ensure that there is no
unlawful employment of “any literacy test as a qualification for voting in any election.” Civil Rights
Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 101, 78 Stat. 241, 241 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§ 1971(a)(2)(C) (1994 & Supp. II 1996)). Section 101 authorized the Attorney General to file actions
in front of a three-judge panel challenging patterns or practices of unlawful discrimination in the
voting process. Id. § 101. In furtherance of the pro-civil rights goals of the ‘60s, in seeking to remove
impediments to registration for minorities, and in an effort to give blacks full franchise, Congress
amended Title I by enacting the Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, 76 Stat. 446 (codified
as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971, 1973-1973bb-1 (1994 & Supp. II 1996)). Section 4 of the Voting
Rights Act prohibited the use of literal tests and other devices as qualifications for voting in any
federal, state, or local elections in those states or political subdivisions within its scope. Id. § 4. Section
4 also forbids denial of the vote to Spanish-speaking Americans having received at least a sixth grade
education in American flag schools. Id. Section 9 of the Voting Rights Act provides an administrative
process that functions separately from the judiciary in locating and abolishing discriminatory practices
and assuring immediate registration of minorities deprived of their right to vote. Id. § 9. Moreover,
miscellaneous provisions are directed at certain abuses related to the voting rights issues. Id. §§ 11-19.
Section 10 of the Voting Rights Act authorizes the Attorney General to challenge in federal courts the
constitutionality of poll taxes that are used in state elections as preconditions to voting. Id. § 10.
Finally, section 16 of the Voting Rights Act calls for a study of voting discrimination against military
personnel. Id. § 16.
Oversight of the polls became one of the major tenets of the Voting Rights Act in effectuating its
stated purpose. Nevertheless, “[r]egardless of the terms of civil rights laws, their effect might have
been muted in the absence of sufficient staff to enforce them,” crippling the effects of the laws. See
HARRELL R. RODGERS, JR. & CHARLES S. BULLOCK, III, LAW AND SOCIAL CHANGE: CIVIL RIGHTS
LAWS AND THEIR CONSEQUENCES 27, 31 (1972) (noting the number of attorneys in the Department of
Justice’s Civil Rights Division increased from a total of 20 in 1963 to 50 just “patroll[ing] the South
during the 1966 general elections[,] . . . approximately 600 Federal officials [watched over] . . . the
1966 elections, and 1,500 [participated] . . . in Southern elections in 1966 and 1967,” and detailing
state-by-state the effects of the Voting Rights Act before and after the enactment of the Civil Rights
Act of 1965) (citations omitted). In order to perfect its provisions, Congress amended the Voting
Rights Act in 1970, 1975, and 1982. Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-285, 84
Stat. 314, 315 (amending Title I, § 3 by striking out the words “five years” wherever they appear and
inserting the words “ten years”); Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-73, 89 Stat.
400, 400-02 (expanding section 4 of the Act to safeguard against language barriers for minorities);
Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-205, 96 Stat. 131, 132-34 (extending special
coverage provisions, adopting a new procedure by which a jurisdiction can exempt itself from
coverage under special provisions, amending Section 2 to extend the language assistance provisions
for an additional seven years, and adding a section governing assistance to voters who are blind,
disabled, or unable to read or write). See also QUIET REVOLUTION IN THE SOUTH: THE IMPACT OF THE
VOTING RIGHTS ACT, 1965-1990, at 30 (Chandler Davidson & Bernard Grofman eds., 1994)
(“[E]xtensions and amendments of the act in all three years reflected a strong bipartisan consensus . . .
although there were initial attempts by presidents Nixon and Reagan in 1970 and 1982, respectively, to
sabotage extension of various important provisions of the act.”). Unfortunately minorities continue to
face voting barriers as their votes are sometimes rendered meaningless due to the device of “racially
polarized voting,” that occurs when:
election laws or practices, either singly or in concert, combine with systematic bloc voting among
an identifiable group to diminish the voting strength of at least one other group. The idea is that
one group, voting cohesively for its preferred candidates, is systematically outvoted by a larger
group that is also cohesive. If both groups . . . vote as opposing blocs, then racially polarized
voting occurs.
Id.
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accommodations (Title II),473 public facilities (Title III),474 public education
(Title IV),475 federally assisted programs (Title VI),476 and public and private
employment of 15 or more employees affecting interstate commerce (Title
VII).477 In order to compel compliance with the Act’s provisions and to deter
future discrimination, the Act provided a broad range of remedial relief,
473. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, §§ 201-207, 78 Stat. 241 (codified as amended
at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a-2000a-6 (1994 & Supp. II 1996)). Section 201 of Title II prohibits
discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion, or national origin in public accommodations which
have a nexus with interstate commerce, including hotels, restaurants, theaters, and gas stations. Id.
§ 201. Section 204 of Title II allows for injunctive relief and attorneys fees to remedy violations. Id.
§ 204. The Supreme Court has ruled that the scope of Title II extends to privately owned
accommodations. See, e.g., Daniel v. Paul, 395 U.S. 298, 304-05 (1969) (holding that a privately
owned snack bar in a privately owned recreational facility engaged in selling food to interstate
travelers and therefore was a public accommodation under Title II); Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United
States, 379 U.S. 241, 250 (1964) (holding that Title II applies to privately owned hotels that serve
interstate travelers and upheld the constitutionality of the statute as within congressional powers
derived from the Commerce Clause); Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 303-04 (1964) (holding
that Congress was within its powers to find that discrimination in family-owned restaurants which
receive a substantial amount of their food from out of state had a direct impact on interstate
commerce).
474. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, §§ 301-304, 78 Stat. 241, 246 (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000b-2000b-3 (1994 & Supp. II 1996)). Section 301 of Title III allows the
Attorney General to “institute for or in the name of the United States a civil action in any appropriate
district court of the United States against such parties and for such relief as may be appropriate” where
there has been a violation of Title III by “any public facility which is owned, operated, or managed by
or on behalf of any State or subdivision thereof, other than a public school or public college as defined
in section 2000c.” Id. § 301.
475. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352 §§ 401-410, 78 Stat. 241, 246-49 (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000c-2000c-9 (1994 & Supp. II 1996)). Section 407 of Title IV grants the
Attorney General authority to institute desegregation and “such relief as may be appropriate,” when in
furtherance of public policy, and when private parties are unable “to bear the expense of the litigation
or to obtain effective legal representation; or whenever [the Attorney General] . . . is satisfied that the
institution of such litigation would jeopardize the personal safety, employment, or economic standing
of such person or persons, their families, or their property.” Id. § 407
476. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, §§ 601-605, 78 Stat. 241, 252-53 (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1994 & Supp. II 1996)). Section 601 of Title VI makes it unlawful for
a “program or activity receiving federal financial assistance” to discriminate “on the ground of race,
color, or national origin.” Id. § 601. Section 602 of Title VI directs “[e]ach Federal department and
agency which is empowered to extend Federal financial assistance to any program or activity, by way
of grant, loan, or contract other than a contract of insurance or guaranty, . . . to effectuate the
provisions of section 2000d.” Id. § 602.
477. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, §§ 701-716, 78 Stat. 241, 253-66 (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-15 (1994 & Supp. II 1996)). Section 703 of Title VII makes it
unlawful to discriminate in employment on the basis of “race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.”
Id. § 703. Section 706 of Title VII provides as follows:
[If the court finds that an employer] engaged in or is intentionally engaging in an unlawful
employment practice charged in the complaint, the court may enjoin the respondent from
engaging in such unlawful employment practice, and order such affirmative action as may be
appropriate, which may include, but is not limited to, reinstatement or hiring of employees, with or
without back-pay.
Id. § 706.
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including a measure in Title VII authorizing the courts to “order such
affirmative action as may be appropriate, which may include reinstatement or
hiring of employees, with or without back pay” where an employer’s
discriminatory intent is shown.478 In addition, the Act created the Community
Relations Service to assist people in resolving disagreements stemming from
discrimination,479 and established the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (EEOC) to arbitrate or recommend federal litigation for
employment discrimination claims.480
478. Id. § 706.
479. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 1002, 78 Stat. 241, 267 (codified as amended
at 42 U.S.C. § 2000g-1 (1994 & Supp. II 1996) (providing “assistance to communities and persons
therein in resolving disputes, disagreements, or difficulties relating to discriminatory practices . . .
which impair the rights of persons in such communities under the Constitution or laws of the United
States or which affect or may affect interstate commerce”)).
480. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, §§ 705-706, 78 Stat. 241, 258-61 (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-4 to -5 (1994 & Supp. II 1998)). For a thorough accounting of the
responsibilities, jurisdiction, and budget analysis of the EEOC, see generally U.S. COMMISSION ON
CIVIL RIGHTS, FUNDING FEDERAL CIVIL RIGHTS ENFORCEMENT: A REPORT OF THE UNITED STATES
COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS 36-46 (1995). The numerous claims handled annually by the
Commission serve as evidence of the stark reality of discrimination. From 1991 to 1997, between
49,584 and 62,811 charges were filed under Title VII. See The U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 Charges 1991-1997, available at
http://www.eeoc.gov/stats/vii.html (last visited Feb. 12, 2001).
The Act also gave duties to other agencies. Section 402 of Title IV directs the Commissioner of
Education to conduct a survey addressing the lack of available educational avenues for individuals due
to certain immutable qualities. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 402 (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000c-1 (1994 & Supp. II 1996)). Furthermore, this section directed that a
report be given to the President and Congress within two years of passage of the Act. Id. § 402.
Section 403 of Title IV directs the Commissioner of Education to render assistance to any
governmental body charged with the execution of public education. Id. § 403. Section 404 of Title IV
authorizes the Commissioner of Education to provide training to any governmental body charged with
providing public education to improve the abilities and faculties of educators. Id. § 404. Section 405 of
Title IV authorizes the Commissioner of Education to fund seminars and individual training sessions
to assist education professionals with managing change incident to desegregation. Id. § 405. Section
501 of Title V empowers the Commission on Civil Rights to hold hearings. Id. § 501. Section 504 of
Title V dictates that the Commission shall explore any allegations of violations of the Act. Id. § 504.
This section also directs the Commission to explore all incidences of deprivation, either in fact or by
administration, of civil rights because of “race, color, religion, or national origin;” empowers the
Commission to assess the discriminatory impact of the current laws and regulations of the Federal
Government; permits the Commission to collect information about illegal discrimination “in such
areas, including but not limited to voting, education, housing, employment, the use of public facilities,
and transportation, or in the administration of justice;” vests the Commission with the authority to
pursue all allegations of infractions that impair an individual’s voting ability on account of “race,
color, religion, or national origin;” and excludes the Commission from investigating private social
clubs. Id. Finally, section 504 of Title V directs the Commission to produce as many reports on the
findings of the Commission as either the Commission, the President, or Congress so desires. Id.
Section 602 of Title VI mandates that each federal department will authorize grants to the public only
if the party receiving those benefits complies with Section 601 of Title VI, stating that “[n]o person in
the United States shall, on the ground of race, color, or national origin, be excluded from participation
in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving
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Although Congress minimally debated providing injunctive and equitable
relief,481 Congress did express considerable concern over what appropriate
affirmative action entailed as provided under some of the Act’s provisions.482
Specifically, Congresspersons and Senators attacked Title VII for requiring
racial balancing as a remedy because they feared Title VII’s breath would
require preferential treatment including racial quotas, that would result in
discrimination against nonminorities.483 Proponents argued that the Act,
Federal financial assistance.” Id. § 602. Section 715 of Title VII instructs the Secretary of Labor to
conduct an investigation of circumstances which promote discrimination in employment and the
subsequent effects of that discrimination on not only the national economy but also the direct victims
of discrimination. Id. § 715. Section 801 of Title VIII empowers the Secretary of Commerce to initiate
a review of voting practices in such areas of the country as directed by the Commission on Civil
Rights. Id. § 801.
481. See H.R. REP. NO. 88-914, at 19 (1963), reprinted in 1964 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2355, 2391. See
also Additional Views Of Hon. George Meader, 1964 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2415-19 (discussing the effects
of injunctive relief as affording too much power to the government, circumventing individual rights
and liberties, and costing great amounts of money over a period of time); Minna J. Kotkin, Public
Remedies for Private Wrongs: Rethinking the Title VII Back Pay Remedy, 41 HASTINGS L.J. 1301,
1314 (1990) (concluding that “Congress never gave serious thought to the question of monetary relief”
as the impact of the remedial scheme adopted without its original administrative enforcement
component was never discussed). The Senate did not debate the addition of the words “any other
equitable relief” when they were added by amendment on the Senate Floor in 1972. 118 CONG. REC.
3839, 3979 (1972). The only explanation of legislative intent appears in Section–by-Section Analysis of
H.R. 1746, Accompanying the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972— Conference Report, 118
CONG. REC. 7001, 7166-69 (1972) stating:
The provisions of [§ 706(g)] . . . are intended to give the courts wide discretion exercising their
equitable powers to fashion the most complete relief possible. In dealing with the present section
706(g) the courts have stressed that the scope of relief under that section of the Act is intended to
make the victims of unlawful discrimination whole, and that the attainment of this objective rests
not only upon the elimination of the particular unlawful employment practice complained of, but
also requires that persons aggrieved by the consequences and effects of the unlawful employment
practice be, so far as possible, restored to a position where they would have been were it not for
the unlawful discrimination.
Id. at 7168.
482. See H.R. REP. NO. 88-914, at 19 (1963), reprinted in 1964 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2355, 2391.
Members of the House opposed to the bill issued a minority report asserting that employers could be
“forced . . . to hire in a ‘racially balanced’ manner— so long as the potential employee had a modicum
of skill-else be in violation of law.” Id. at 2442. This concern was repeatedly raised in the Senate by
opponents to the bill. See, e.g., 110 CONG. REC. 5871, 5877-78 (1964) (statement of Sen. Byrd); 110
CONG. REC. 7045, 7091 (1964) (statement of Sen. Stennis); 110 CONG. REC. 7770, 7774, 7778 (1964)
(statement of Sen. Tower); 110 CONG. REC. 7770, 7878-79 (1964) (statement of Sen. Russell); 110
CONG. REC. 8169, 8175 (1964) (statement of Sen. Smathers); 110 CONG. REC. 8495, 8500 (1964)
(statement of Sen. Smathers); 110 CONG. REC. 13,050, 13,076 (1964) (statement of Sen. Sparkman).
483. See H.R. REP. NO. 88-914, at 19 (1963), reprinted in 1964 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2355, 2391. “[T]he
bill, under the cloak of protecting the civil rights of certain minorities, will destroy civil rights of all
citizens of the United States who fall within its scope.” Id. at 2433. The Committee on Judiciary
Substitute for H.R. 7152 called the bill “a not too subtle system of racism-in-reverse.” Id. at 2441.
Representative Alger also stated his opinion that Congress “cannot enforce preferential treatment for
the Negro by making jobs available to him for which he is not qualified because of injustices practiced
upon his forbears, without doing violence to the rights and freedoms of all our other citizens.” 110
CONG. REC. 1580, 1645 (1964).
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prohibiting all racial discrimination,484 used affirmative action relief to make
victims of discrimination whole, not to set racial quotas.485 Proponents of the
Act denied that preferential treatment could be ordered as relief under Title
VII,486 based on the language “[n]o order of the court shall require the . . .
hiring, reinstatement, or promotion of an individual . . . if such individual . . .
was refused employment or advancement . . . for any reason other than
discrimination on account of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.”487
Nevertheless, the Act that Congress eventually passed represented a
major step in the eradication of discrimination, affording victims a means
with which to redress their harms within the justice system and assistance
doing so. The social impact of the Act was equally significant.488 The Act
served as a catalyst for further civil rights legislation because the
concentrated attention that Congress and the judiciary devoted to questions of
civil rights during the ‘50s and ‘60s increased the average American’s
awareness of, and sensitivity to, discrimination as well as encouraged legal
action to remedy problems of discrimination.489
2. Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967
In 1963, Congress considered adding “age” as a protected class under the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 but ended up omitting the word to assure timely
passage of the Act.490 Consequently, the passage of the ADEA in 1967491 to
484. 110 CONG. REC. 7188, 7213 (1964) (finding Title VII does not require any “employer [to]
maintain a racial balance in his work force [and] . . . any deliberate attempt to maintain a racial
balance, whatever such balance may be, would . . . violat[e] . . . Title VII because maintaining such a
balance would require an employer to hire or to refuse to hire on the basis of race”).
485. 110 CONG. REC. 1957, 1994, 2547, 2558 (1964) (stating that opponents wrongly suggest that
the bill establishes racially based job quotas when, in fact, “[i]t is a matter of an individual’s rights
having been violated”). Senator Humphrey stated that Title VII does not “in any way authorize the
Federal Government to prescribe . . . a ‘racial balance’ of job classifications . . . or ‘preferential
treatment of minorities.’” 110 CONG. REC. 5411, 5423 (1964). Senator Clark stated, “The bill does not
make anyone higher than anyone else. It establishes no quotas.” 110 CONG. REC. 13,050, 13,080
(1964).
486. 110 CONG. REC. 6490, 6563 (1964) (“[T]he court cannot order preferential hiring or
promotion consideration for any particular race, religion, or other group. Its power is solely limited to
ordering an end to discrimination which is in fact occurring.”); Id. at 6490, 6549 (stating that “the last
sentence of section 707(e), . . . makes clear what is implicit throughout the whole title[:] . . . that
employers may hire and fire, promote and refuse to promote for any reason, good or bad, provided
only that individuals may not be discriminated against because of race, religion, sex, or national
origin”).
487. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–5(g) (1976).
488. For a comprehensive presentation of the events leading to, the impact of, and the current
status of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, see generally THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964, supra note 469.
489. MICHAEL LES BENEDICT, CIVIL RIGHTS AND CIVIL LIBERTIES 64 (1987). See also U.S.
COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 480, at 2-4.
490. See Michael W. Reschke, The Age Discrimination in Employment Act: Procedural and
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deter age discrimination in America’s work environment surprised few.
Congress found that arbitrary age limits unfairly disadvantage older workers,
causing prolonged unemployment, a deterioration of skills and morale, and
the attendant decrease in future employability.492 Accordingly, Congress
designed the ADEA to “promote employment of older persons based on their
ability rather than age; . . . [to] prohibit arbitrary age discrimination in
employment; . . . and [to] help employers and workers find ways of meeting
problems arising from the impact of age on employment.”493
Although initial drafts of the ADEA incorporated remedies similar to
Title VII’s,494 the final version of the ADEA used the enforcement scheme of
Substantive Issues in the Aftermath of the 1978 Amendments, 1979 U. ILL. L. F. 665. Age
discrimination provisions were proposed to be included in Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
but failed to pass. 110 CONG. REC. 13,427, 13,490-92 (1964); 110 CONG. REC. 9873, 9911-13 (1964);
110 CONG. REC. 2547, 2596-99 (1964).
491. Pub. L. No. 90-202, 81 Stat. 602 (1967) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634
(1994)). See also Age Discrimination Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Labor of the Senate Comm.
on Labor and Public Welfare, 90th Cong. 23 (1967) (evidencing age discrimination prior to the
enactment of the Civil Rights Act of 1964). Congress directed the Secretary of Labor to study the
problem of age discrimination and the Secretary of Labor subsequently made a report to Congress.
Report of the Secretary of Labor, The Older American Worker: Age Discrimination in Employment
(1965). See also Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-601, § 606, 80 Stat. 830,
845 (containing specific recommendations by the Secretary of Labor).
492. Pub. L. No. 90-202, § 2, 81 Stat. 602, 602 (1967) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 621(a)
(1994)). The stated findings of Congress are that:
(1) in the face of rising productivity and affluence, older workers find themselves disadvantaged in
their efforts to retain employment, and especially to regain employment when displaced from
jobs;
(2) the setting of arbitrary age limits regardless of potential for job performance has become a
common practice, and certain otherwise desirable practices may work to the disadvantage of older
persons;
(3) the incidence of unemployment, especially long-term unemployment with resultant
deterioration of skill, morale, and employer acceptability is, relative to the younger ages, high
among older workers; their numbers are great and growing; and their employment problems
grave;
(4) the existence in industries affecting commerce, of arbitrary discrimination in employment
because of age, burdens commerce and the free flow of goods in commerce.
Id.
493. Id. (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 621(b) (1994)). Protection for this group is necessary
because society in general is getting older. FRANK B. HOBBS & BONNIE L. DAMON, 65+ IN THE
UNITED STATES 2-2 (1996) (stating that the “elderly population increased 11-fold between 1900 to
1994,” compared with only a 3-fold increase for those under age 65). Half of the population of the
United States was under twenty in 1860. Id. at 2-1. In 1994, half of the population was thirty-four or
older and, at a minimum, half of the population is projected to be thirty-nine or older by the year 2030.
In addition, the ratio of elderly to working-age persons is expected to double between 1990 and 2050.
Id. America faces the challenge of determining “how to maintain the quality of life with advancing
age.” Id. at 1-3. For an in-depth study of the characteristics, needs, and impact of an aging population
in American Society, see generally SHEILA R. ZEDLEWSKI ET AL., URBAN INSTITUTE REPORT 90-5,
THE NEEDS OF THE ELDERLY IN THE 21ST CENTURY (1990).
494. See KALET, supra note 14, at 2 (stating that “[t]he original intent of the ADEA drafters was
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the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 (FLSA).495 Thus, the ADEA provides
for liquidated damages496 and “legal or equitable relief as may be appropriate
to effectuate the purposes of” the Act.497 In 1978, amendments to the Act
tolled the statute of limitations for an additional period up to one year,498
relaxed the notice requirements of the original Act,499 and expressly granted
jury trials to resolve “a civil action in any court of competent jurisdiction for
such legal or equitable relief as will effectuate the purposes of” the
ADEA.500
3. Griggs v. Duke: Disparate Impact Theory and a Stronger Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission
In the 1971 landmark decision, Griggs v. Duke Power Co.,501 the
Supreme Court secured disparate impact theory in Title VII plaintiffs’
arsenals.502 Noting that Congress enacted Title VII to equalize employment
opportunities and to remove favoritism for white employees, the Court
established a new standard to be employed by employers under the Act.503
First, Griggs called for the plaintiff to initially make a prima facie showing
that a facially neutral employment practice disproportionately affected
merely to accord age the same protected status as that extended to race and sex under Title VII”).
495. Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, ch. 676, § 1, 52 Stat. 1060, 1060 (codified as amended at
29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (1994)); Note, The Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 90 HARV. L.
REV. 380, 381 (1976). One of the reasons for incorporating the enforcement procedures of the FLSA
was to prevent overburdening the EEOC. See id. By adopting the FLSA provisions, the Wage and
Hour Division of the Department of Labor would have a duty to handle complaints under the 1967
Act. See id.
496. Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, ch. 676, § 16, 52 Stat. 1060, 1069 (codified as amended at
29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (1994)). FLSA provides: “Any employer who violates the provisions . . . of this
title shall be liable to the employee or employees affected in the amount of their unpaid minimum
wages, or their unpaid overtime compensation, as the case may be, and in an additional equal amount
as liquidated damages.” 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). Under Overnight Motor Transp. Co. v. Missel, the
imposition of liquidated damages was held mandatory. 316 U.S. 572, 583-84 (1942). However,
Section 2(e) of the Portal to Portal Act of 1947 (PPA) modified the FLSA by allowing liquidated
damage awards only upon a showing of bad faith. Portal to Portal Act, ch. 52, § 11, 61 Stat. 84, 89
(codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 260 (1994)).
497. See Age Discrimination in Employment Act, Pub. L. No. 90-202, § 7(b), 81 Stat. 602, 604
(1967) (codified and amended at 29 U.S.C. § 626(c) (1994)).
498. See Age Discrimination in Employment Act Amendments of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-256,
§ 4(c), 92 Stat. 189, 191 (codified and amended at 29 U.S.C. § 626(e) (1994)).
499. See id. § 4(b) (codified and amended at 29 U.S.C. § 626(d) (1994)).
500. See Age Discrimination in Employment Act, Pub. L. No. 90-202, § 7(c), 81 Stat. 602, 604
(1967) (codified and amended at 29 U.S.C. § 626(c) (1994)).
501. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
502. Id. at 431 (finding that Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 “proscribes not only overt
discrimination but also practices that are fair in form, but discriminatory in operation”).
503. Id. at 429-30.
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minority workers.504 Thereafter, the burden shifted to the employer to
establish that “business necessity” compelled the challenged practice.505
Thus, after Griggs, the plaintiff no longer had to prove that the employer
acted with discriminatory intent to prevail under Title VII.506
Although Griggs became one of the civil rights movement’s greatest legal
victories, it became only symbolic when Congress found faulty “the
machinery created by the Civil Rights Act of 1964” to enforce Title VII.507
Determining that employment discrimination “is a far more complex and
pervasive phenomenon” than originally expected to be,508 Congress passed
the Equal Employment Opportunity Act (EEOA)509 to empower the EEOC
“to issue complaints and hold hearings, to issue cease-and-desist orders
against discriminatory practices, and to seek enforcement of its orders in the
Federal Courts.”510 Vested with these new powers, the EEOC became the
504. Id. at 429-33.
505. Id. at 432 (stating that “Congress has placed on the employer the burden of showing that any
given requirement must have a manifest relationship to the employment in question”). After Albemarle
Paper Co. v. Moody, it was settled that if the employer succeeded in discharging the burden, the
plaintiff still prevailed upon directing to the court’s attention an alternatively less discriminatory
practice that would suffice the needs of the business. 422 U.S. 405, 425 (1975).
506. 401 U.S. at 431. See also Developments in the Law, Employment Discrimination, 109 HARV.
L. REV. 1568, 1572 (1996) (stating that the “first major development pursuant to . . . [Title VII] was
the evolution of the disparate impact theory of discrimination, which the Supreme Court enunciated in
Griggs v. Duke Power Co. and which Congress later codified in the Civil Rights Act of 1991”)
(internal footnotes omitted). Congress supported the Griggs decision in the Civil Rights Act of 1972.
See H.R. REP. NO. 92-238, at 21-22 (1971), reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2137, 2156-67; S. REP.
NO. 92-415, at 14 (1971). One commentator has tried to explain the reason behind the congressional
support in Griggs.
Griggs harmed big business, which saw itself faced with Title VII lawsuits simply for having “bad
numbers,” and in 1971-72 a majority in Congress probably did not agree with the sweeping
reconceptualization of Title VII in Griggs. However, the Labor Committees in both chambers
were significantly to the left of their chamber medians and probably preferred Griggs to any bill
their chambers would have passed. Hence, no committee-generated bill contained a Griggs
provision, and both committees inserted language in their reports for the 1972 amendments to
Title VII that strongly approved of Griggs.
William N. Eskridge, Jr., Overriding Supreme Court Statutory Interpretation Decisions, 101 YALE L.
J. 331, 370-71 (1991) (internal footnotes omitted).
507. H.R. REP. NO. 92-238, at 3 (1971), reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2137, 2139.
508. See id. at 2144. Significantly, “[d]uring the first 5 years of its existence, the . . . [EEOC
received] more than 52,000 charges . . . [of which] 35,445 were recommended for investigation . . . .
[Of those,] . . . reasonable cause was found in over 63% of the cases, but in less than half of these
cases was the Commission able to achieve a totally or even partially successful conciliation.” Id. at
2139-40. Of the charges recommended for investigation, approximately 56% involved racial
discrimination, 23% alleged gender discrimination, and the remainder claimed discrimination based on
national origin or religion. See id. at 2139.
509. Pub. L. No. 92-261, 86 Stat. 103 (1972) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5
(1994)).
510. H.R. REP. NO. 92-238, at 9 (1971), reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2137, 2145. The alleged
victim is also at liberty to proceed privately with a suit if the Commission “finds no reasonable cause,
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gatekeeper for all Title VII claims in federal court and ultimately the
Supreme Court, which eventually became swamped with cases involving
Title VII, affirmative action, and the Equal Protection Clause.511
fails to make a finding of reasonable cause, or takes no action in respect to a charge, or has not within
180 days issued a complaint nor entered into a conciliation or settlement agreement which is
acceptable to the person aggrieved . . . .” See id. at 2147. Furthermore, jurisdiction of “Pattern or
Practice” suits was transferred to the EEOC. See id. at 2149.
511. The history of affirmative action in the Supreme Court is clouded with divisiveness. In
Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, the first affirmative action case decided by the
Supreme Court, strict scrutiny was applied, and the Court found unconstitutional a medical school’s
use of a quota system which reserved sixteen slots in the incoming class for minorities. 438 U.S. 265,
289 (1978). The Court, however, held that because the school had a “substantial interest that
legitimately may be served by a properly devised admissions program involving the competitive
consideration of race and ethnic origin . . . [the portion of the] California court’s judgment [that]
enjoins petitioner from any consideration of the race of any applicant must be reversed.” Id. at 320. In
contrast, the dissent applied intermediate scrutiny and looked to the government’s goal of diversity as
a substantial interest justifying affirmative action. See id. at 357-62. Although Justices Blackmun,
Brennan, White, and Marshall agreed that rational basis should not apply to the case at hand, they
believed that the proper standard of review should not be strict in the popular sense of the term. See id.
at 358-59, 361-62. Because the white group was burdened by the admissions program, rather than the
black group, the dissenters applied a standard that was “strict–not ‘“strict” in theory and fatal in fact.’”
Id. at 357, 361-62 (citing Gerald Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term–Foreward: In Search of
Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1,
8 (1972) (“The Warren Court embraced a rigid two-tier attitude. Some situations evoked the
aggressive ‘new’ equal protection, with scrutiny that was ‘strict’ in theory and fatal in fact.”).
In United Steelworkers of America v. Weber, a steelworkers’ union and a steel corporation set up a
program that reserved fifty percent of all training positions for minorities and that was to remain in
place until the discrepancy between the percentage of blacks in the labor force (39%) and the
percentage of blacks in skilled positions (1.83%) was remedied. 443 U.S. 193, 198-99 (1979). The
Court carved out a four-prong test for affirmative action programs holding that the Court does not bar
private, voluntary race-conscious affirmative action arrangements provided they are temporary and do
not become a roadblock to the advancement of white employees. See id. at 208. Concluding that the
Weber plaintiffs met their test and that Congress did not exclude such a program through the wording
of Title VII, the five-member Court majority upheld the affirmative action plan. See id. Chief Justice
Burger and Justice Rehnquist dissented because to them Title VII prohibited any and all discrimination
on the basis of race. See id. at 216, 218, 254, 255. See also Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 454,
473, 480 (1980) (upholding business set-aside programs because Congress could use racial
classifications, not under- or over-inclusive, but temporary and narrowly tailored classifications in
order to remedy effects of past discrimination, that it should suffice that Congress had resolved to
abrogate practices that “might result in perpetuation of the effects of prior discrimination which had
impaired or foreclosed access by minority businesses to public contracting opportunities”).
In a series of cases that followed, the Court developed criteria under which affirmative action
programs could survive a challenge. See, e.g., Johnson v. Transp. Agency, Santa Clara County, Cal.,
480 U.S. 616, 619-23, 641-2 (1987) (holding that an employment program which allowed for race and
gender to be considered in hiring and promoting decisions did not violate Title VII); United States v.
Paradise, 480 U.S. 149, 153-67, 185-86 (1987) (upholding a district court order that required fifty
percent of all new hires to be black and subsequent order that fifty percent of all promotions be given
to blacks, where through 1972 no black individual had been employed as a state trooper in Alabama,
on the grounds that the orders were temporary and did not force the layoffs or the hiring of unqualified
individuals as required under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment); Local
Number 93, Int’l Ass’n of Firefighters, AFL-CIO v. City of Cleveland, 478 U.S. 501, 530 (1986)
(holding that section 706(g) of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 allows a court to approve a
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4. The Rehabilitation Act of 1973 and the Americans with Disabilities
Act of 1990
With the passage of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (REHAB), Congress
extended civil rights protections to individuals with both mental and physical
disabilities.512 REHAB prohibited federal contractors, recipients of federal
financial assistance, and participants in federal programs from discriminating
against individuals with disabilities.513 Although REHAB afforded the
disabled some protection from discrimination, it did not protect the disabled
from discrimination by privately funded entities and programs. Not until after
significant findings showed the severe effects of discrimination against the
disabled did Congress pass the ADA514 to provide a “clear and
consent decree to resolve Title VII compliance problems and provide relief that may benefit an
individual who was not the victim of the defendant’s past discriminatory acts); Local 28 of the Sheet
Metal Workers’ Int’l Ass’n v. Equal Employment Opportunity Comm’n, 478 U.S. 421, 482 (1986)
(holding that a court “may, in appropriate circumstances, order preferential relief benefiting
individuals who are not the actual victims of discrimination as a remedy for violations of Title VII”
and more specifically, upholding a court-imposed 29% racial minority membership goal in a union that
had discriminated in the past with respect to recruitment, selection, training, and admissions). For
Supreme Court decisions holding affirmative action programs unconstitutional, see Wygant v. Jackson
Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 269-70, 284 (1986) (holding a collective bargaining agreement
unconstitutional under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment where the agreement
provided preferential treatment to minority teachers in times of lay-offs); Firefighters Local Union No.
1784 v. Stotts, 467 U.S. 561, 565-68, 583 (1984) (holding that a court order forcing an employer to lay
off senior employees in favor of junior employees, in order to preserve a particular percentage of
blacks in the work force, violates Title VII).
512. Rehabilitation Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-112, 87 Stat. 355 (codified as amended at 29
U.S.C. §§ 701-797(b) (1994)).
513. See Pub. L. No. 93-112, § 504, 87 Stat. 355, 394 (1973) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C.
§ 794(a) (1994)). Section 794(a) states:
No otherwise qualified individual with a disability in the United States, . . . shall, solely by reason
of her or his disability, be excluded from the participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be
subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance or
under any program or activity conducted by any Executive agency or by the United States Postal
Service.
Id.
514. Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327 (1990) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-
12213 (1994)); § 2, 104 Stat. at 328-29 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a) (1994)) (stating
that Congress established from “census data, national polls, and other studies . . . that people with
disabilities, as a group, occupy an inferior status in our society, and are severely disadvantaged
socially, vocationally, economically, and educationally”). The legislative history of the ADA shows
that Congress recognized that “historically, society has tended to isolate and segregate individuals with
disabilities, and . . . such forms of discrimination against individuals with disabilities continue to be a
serious and pervasive social problem.” STAFF OF HOUSE COMM. ON EDUCATION AND LABOR, 101ST
CONG., THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT 6 (Comm. Print 1990). Congress noted the
magnitude of the problem and the number of Americans affected in the Hearings Before the Comm. on
Labor and Human Resources and the Subcomm. on the Handicapped, 101st Cong. 201-02 (1989).
This report stated:
[O]ver 36 million people in this country are disabled by reason of some physical or mental
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comprehensive national mandate for the elimination of discrimination against
individuals with disabilities.”515 The ADA made it unlawful for public and
private organizations to discriminate against the disabled in employment
(Title I),516 in public services (Title II),517 in accommodations (Title III),518
handicapping condition. The mere existence of these conditions does not for many of these
individuals prevent them from interacting freely with others in society, or from performing the
tasks that others perform on a daily basis. But persons with disabilities are all too often not
allowed to participate because of stereotypical notions held by others in society— notions that
have, in large measure, been created by ignorance and maintained by fear.
Id. at 201.
515. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-336, § 2(b)(1), 104 Stat. 327, 329
(1990) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(1) (1994)).
516. Id. §§ 101-108, 104 Stat. at 330-37 (1990) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111-
12117 (1994)). Section 102 of the Act states that “[n]o covered entity shall discriminate against a
qualified individual with a disability because of the disability of such individual in regard to job
application procedures, the hiring, advancement, or discharge of employees, employee compensation,
job training, and other terms, conditions, and privileges of employment.” Id. § 102. Section 101
defines a “covered entity” as any employer type entity. Id. § 101. The Act covers entities with more
than 15 people working each business day at least 20 hours. Id. Section 102 defines “qualified
individual with a disability [as] an individual with a disability who, with or without reasonable
accommodation, can perform the essential functions of the employment position that such individual
holds or desires.” Id. § 102. By using a broad definition of discrimination, the Act is designed to
thwart all variations of discrimination, even those remotely tangential to the employment relationship.
Id. § 102. The Act also prohibits medical exams used as a pretext or screening process unless there is a
job-related necessity. Id. § 102. Furthermore, the Act prohibits even an investigation by the employer
of an employee as to the nature and extent of the disability. Id. § 102. Section 103 of the Act provides
that an employer generally can defeat an accusation of discrimination by demonstrating a “business
necessity, and [that] such performance cannot be accomplished by reasonable accommodation.” Id.
§ 103. Section 104 of the Act declares that the Act “shall not include any employee or applicant who is
currently engaging in the illegal use of drugs, when the covered entity acts on the basis of such use.”
Id. § 104. Employers may prohibit the use of drugs or alcohol on the job and require drug testing. Id.
§ 104. However, an employer may not use the fact that an individual has completed, or is currently in,
a drug rehabilitation program to discriminate against them. Id. § 104.
517. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-336, §§ 201-246, 104 Stat. 327,
337-53 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 12131-12165 (1994)). Section 202 of the Act provides
that no public entity shall discriminate against a person with a disability. Id. § 202. A public entity is
defined as “(A) any State or local government; (B) any department, agency, special purpose district, or
other instrumentality of a State or States or local government; and (C) the National Railroad Passenger
Corporation.” Id. § 201. Any entity that procures new equipment, builds new facilities, or fails to make
accommodations to current equipment or facilities violates the law. Id. § 303. In general, there is a
simultaneous violation of this Act and section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973; section 203 of the
ADA states that “[t]he remedies, procedures, and rights set forth in section 505 of the Rehabilitation
Act of 1973 (29 U.S.C. 794a) shall be the remedies, procedures, and rights this title provides.” Id.
§ 203.
518. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-336, §§ 301-310, 104 Stat. 327,
353-65 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 12181-12189). Section 302 of the Act provides that “[n]o
individual shall be discriminated against on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of
the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of any place of public
accommodation by any person who owns, leases (or leases to), or operates a place of public
accommodation.” Id. § 302. Among others, a public accommodation includes “an inn, hotel, motel, or
other place of lodging, . . . restaurant, bar, or other establishment serving food or drink, . . . motion
picture house, theater, concert hall, stadium, . . . or other place of public gathering, . . . bakery, grocery
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and in telecommunications (Title IV).519
5. Civil Rights Act of 1991
In 1989, at the same time Congress was passing the ADA, the Supreme
Court decided seven cases that weakened affirmative action programs and
civil rights protections.520 Two of these cases— City of Richmond v. J.A.
store, clothing store, . . . or other sales or rental establishment, . . . laundromat, . . . bank, . . . funeral
parlor . . . or other service establishment.” Id. § 301. However, private clubs and religious institutions
are specifically exempted from this act by section 307. Id. § 307. Any entity that procures new
equipment, builds new facilities, or fails to make accommodations for current equipment or facilities
violates the law. Id. § 303. An individual may be discriminated against in various forms that includes
“denial of participation, . . . participation in unequal benefit, . . . [or] separate benefit.” Id. § 302.
Furthermore, access “shall be afforded to [the] individual with a disability in the most integrated
setting appropriate to the needs of the individual.” Id. § 302.
519. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-336, §§ 401-402, 104 Stat. 327,
366-69 (codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. §§ 225, 611 (1994)). Section 401 amends Title II of the
Communications Act of 1934, § 401, Pub. L. No. 101-336, § 201, 48 Stat. 1064, 1070 (codified as
amended at 47 U.S.C. § 201 (1994)). This section of the Act requires that all common carriers
establish and maintain communication equipment for the disabled. Id. § 401. This service is to be
provided 24 hours a day, 7 days a week, and at no additional cost to the disabled. Id. The Act also
“prohibit[s] relay operators from failing to fulfill the obligations of common carriers by refusing calls
or limiting the length of calls that use telecommunications relay services.” Id. A common carrier is
defined as an entity “engaged in interstate communication by wire or radio.” Id.
520. First, in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, the Court held that an employer does not violate Title
VII when an employer can prove that it would have made the same decision without the existence of
an impermissible motive. 490 U.S. 228, 258 (1989). Second, in Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, the
Supreme Court held that 42 U.S.C. § 1981, which prohibits discrimination on the basis of race in
making and enforcing private contracts, does not prohibit racial harassment by an employer because
the acts of the employer do not impair the right of the employee to “make” or to “enforce” contracts.
491 U.S. 164, 170-71 (1989). Third, in Lorance v. AT&T Technologies Inc., the Supreme Court held
that the statute of limitations for challenging seniority plans that are discriminatory begins to run when
the employer adopts the plan rather than on the date when the injury occurs. 490 U.S. 900, 911-12
(1989). Fourth, in Martin v. Wilks, a group of white firefighters brought a reverse discrimination claim
against Birmingham, Alabama (City) and Jefferson County Personnel Board (County) in reaction to a
consent decree providing that the City and County promote blacks under an affirmative action
program. 490 U.S. 755, 759 (1989). The consent decrees were entered into when a group of black
firefighters and the NAACP sued the city of Birmingham, Alabama, and Jefferson County Personnel
Board for discriminating in their hiring practices under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. See
id. At first, a group of white firefighters tried to challenge putting the consent decrees into effect. See
id. at 758-59. The district denied the intervening motion and the decrees went into effect. See id. When
the subsequent group of white firefighters challenged the operational decree as violating federal law
the district court allowed the second group of white firefighters to proceed in their action and declared
that the decrees would only provide an affirmative defense to the claim of the second group of white
firefighters. See id. at 760. The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reversed the decision of the
district court on the grounds that the second group of white firefighters were “neither parties nor
privies to the consent decrees” and therefore, “their independent claims of unlawful discrimination are
not precluded.” Id. at 761. The Supreme Court granted certiorari and affirmed the decision of the
Eleventh Circuit. See id. at 761. Fifth, in Independent Federation of Flight Attendants v. Zipes, the
Supreme Court held that under Title VII attorney’s fees could only be collected from losing
intervenors where there is a showing that the intervener acted frivolously, unreasonably, or without
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Croson Co.521 and Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio522— caused especially
devastating consequences.
The Supreme Court decision of City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co.
marked the trend in the Court itself and circuit courts of appeals generally
advancing strict scrutiny when racial classifications were made to employ
any statute or program, including affirmative action efforts.523 This case
concerned the constitutionality of a minority business set-aside program,
voluntarily established by the City of Richmond, Virginia, which sought to
remedy the effects of past discrimination in the construction business.524
Unlike previous decisions regarding affirmative action programs, a majority
of the Court applied strict scrutiny as the standard of review.525 Therefore,
the City of Richmond needed to show that its program was narrowly tailored
to remedy the past effects of discrimination.526 The Court held that City of
Richmond needed specific evidence of “identified discrimination in the
Richmond construction industry” in order for the program to survive
review.527
Richmond argued in response that it would subvert federalist principles to
hold that the federal government without such evidence of “identified
discrimination” has a compelling interest in remedying the effects of racial
discrimination in its own public works program, but a city government does
not share the same compelling interest under the same standards.”528 The
Court disagreed and held Richmond’s program unconstitutional.529 Although
voluntary set-aside programs may survive under Croson, “[i]n the extreme
case, [where] some form of narrowly tailored racial preference might be
necessary to break down patterns of deliberate exclusion,”530 the decision, in
practical terms, paralyzed affirmative action programs. As a result of Croson,
several lower courts struck down city, county, and state set-aside programs,
and several state and local governments decided to abandon their affirmative
foundation. 491 U.S. 754, 765-66 (1989). Cases six and seven are discussed infra notes 521-35.
521. 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
522. 490 U.S. 642 (1989).
523. See George R. La Noue, The Impact of Croson on Equal Protection Law and Policy, 61 ALB.
L. REV. 1 (1997).
524. See Croson, 488 U.S. at 478.
525. See id. at 507-08. Specifically, the Court chose not follow Fullilove v. Klutznick which held
that Congress did not need to make specific findings of discrimination in order to engage in
nationwide race-conscious relief. See id. at 488-93.
526. See id. at 508.
527. Id. at 500.
528. Id. at 489 (quoting Brief for Appellant at 32). Here, Richmond was attempting to persuade
the Court to apply the Fullilove analysis to city set-aside programs.
529. See id. at 511.
530. Croson, 488 U.S. at 509.
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action programs rather than “attempt to defend or restructure them.”531
The Supreme Court, in Wards Cove Packing Company, Inc. v. Atonio,
overruled key aspects of the disparate impact theory articulated in Griggs.
The Court first held that the “proper basis for the initial inquiry” in disparate
impact analysis is “between the racial composition of the qualified persons in
the labor market and the persons holding at-issue jobs” and not between one
section of the employer’s labor force and another.532 Second, in order to
establish a prima facie case of disparate impact under Title VII, the Court
held that a “plaintiff must demonstrate that . . . the application of a specific or
particular employment practice . . . has created the disparate impact under
attack.”533 Third, the Court held that to prove business necessity the
defendant must show that “a challenged practice serves, in a significant way,
the legitimate employment goals of the employer.”534 Fourth, the Court
emphasized that while “the employer carries the burden of producing
evidence of a business [necessity]. . . for his employment practice,” the
disparate impact plaintiff still carries the burden of persuasion.535
Thereafter, the legislature found that because “the Supreme Court[‘s
decision] in Wards Cove . . . weakened the scope and effectiveness of
Federal civil rights protections . . . additional remedies under Federal law
[were] needed to deter unlawful harassment and intentional discrimination in
the workplace . . . and . . . to provide additional protections against unlawful
discrimination in employment.”536 Thus, Congress passed the Civil Rights
Act of 1991537 to strengthen the effectiveness of civil rights legislation.538
531. Paul K. Sonn, Note, Fighting Minority Under-representation in Publicly Funded
Construction Projects After Croson: A Title VI Litigation Strategy, 101 YALE L.J. 1577, 1577 (1992)
(discussing detailed effects of Croson).
532. Id. at 650-51.
533. Id. at 657.
534. Id. at 659.
535. Id. One commentator explains that the outcome of Wards Cove may be due to the “political
orientation of the Supreme Court.” Girardeau A. Spann, Color-Coded Standing, 80 CORNELL L. REV.
1422, 1479 (1995).
When Griggs was decided in 1971, the Court was still similar to the Warren Court. Chief Justice
Warren had retired only two years earlier. By 1989, however, when Wards Cove was decided, Justices
Black, Douglas, Harlan, and Stewart had been replaced by Chief Justice Rehnquist, and Justices
O’Connor, Scalia, and Kennedy. The 1989 Court was much more conservative on racial issues than
the immediate post-Warren Court had been. A measure of the 1989 Court’s racial conservatism is
provided by the fact that none of the four replacement Justices has ever voted in favor of the minority
position in an affirmative action case that the Court has decided on constitutional grounds. Now that
Justices Brennan and Marshall have been replaced by Justices Souter and Thomas, the present
Supreme Court is even more conservative on racial issues. See id. at 1479-80.
536. Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 2, 105 Stat. 1071, 1071.
537. Id.
538. Id. § 3.
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Several sections of the 1991 Act directly overruled or responded to the
Supreme Court’s holding in Wards Cove.539 Section 105 of the Act restored
and codified the Griggs rule.540 In addition, the Act extended jury trials to
cases originating under Title VII541 and provided compensatory and punitive
damages for claims brought under Title VII, the ADA, and the ADEA.542
Unfortunately, however, the Act did nothing to remedy the dehabilitating
effects of Croson.
In short, society’s longstanding cry for justice culminated in the Civil
539. See H.R. REP. NO. 102-40, at 2-4 (1991), reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 694, 694-96. First,
the 1991 Act overrules Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164 (1989). “Section 12 of the
Act amends Section 1981 to reaffirm that the right ‘to make and enforce contracts’ includes the
enjoyment of all benefits, privileges, terms and conditions of the contractual relationship.” Id. at 694-
95. Second, Congress nullified the holding in Pricewaterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989).
Section 5 of the 1991 Act states that any case where an employer relies “on prejudice in making
employment decisions is illegal. At the same time, [however,] the Act makes clear that, in considering
the appropriate relief for such discrimination [in a mixed motives case], a court shall not order the
hiring, retention or promoting of a person not qualified for the position.” Id. at 695. Third, [s]ection 6
of the Act eliminates the possibility of the errant outcome of Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755 (1989), “by
encouraging the giving of notice to persons who might be adversely affected by a proposed court
order, . . . affording them a reasonable opportunity to challenge the order [but barring] subsequent
lawsuits challenging the court order, except under certain circumstances.” Id. Fourth, “[s]ection 7 of
the Act overrules Lorance [v. AT&T Technologies, 490 U.S. 900 (1989),] and permits person[] [sic] to
challenge discriminatory employment practices when those practices actually harm them.” Id. Fifth,
[s]ection 10 of the Act overrules the Supreme Court’s holding in Library of Congress v. Shaw, 478
U.S. 310 (1986), to “expressly waive[] [sic] the Government’s immunity from interest . . . [and]
clarifies that courts may award interest or other compensation to prevailing parties and their counsel
for delayed payment of monetary relief by the federal government.” Id. at 727. Sixth, [s]ection 9 of the
Act addressed three Supreme Court cases that attacked fee recovery through the following means: (1)
permitting prevailing plaintiffs to recover reasonable costs for experts who assist them in their case
unlike Crawford Fitting Co. v. J.T. Gibbons, Inc., 482 U.S. 437 (1987); (2) permtting prevailing
parties to recover reasonable attorney’s fees incurred defending the original proceeding against a
subsequent challenge, unlike Independent Federation of Flight Attendants v. Zipes, 491 U.S. 754
(1989); and (3) forbidding settlement “through a court order or stipulation of dismissal unless the
parties or their counsel attest to the court that a waiver of all or substantially all attorney’s fees was not
compelled as a condition of the settlement, unlike Evans v. Jeff D., 475 U.S. 717 (1986). Id. at 696.
Section 9 also overrode the Court’s holding in Marek v. Chesny, 473 U.S. 1 (1985), allowing
“plaintiffs who reject an offer of settlement more favorable than what is thereafter recovered at trial
[to] . . . recover[] [sic] attorney’s fees incurred for services performed after the offer is rejected.” Id.
540. See Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 105, 105 Stat. 1071, 1074-75 (codified
at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k) (1994)).
541. Id. at § 102, 105 Stat. at 1073 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 19819(c) (1994)).
542. See H.R. REP. NO. 102-40, pt. 2, at 28-29 (1991), reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 694, 722.
The pertinent language provides:
[T]he Act amends Title VII to grant victims of intentional discrimination the right to recover
compensatory damages, and, in egregious cases, punitive damages as well . . .
A number of other laws banning discrimination, including . . . [the ADA and the ADEA] are
modeled after, and have been interpreted in a manner consistent with, Title VII.
The Committee intends that these other laws modeled after Title VII be interpreted consistently in
a manner consistent with Title VII as amended by this Act.
Id.
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Rights Act of 1964,543 the ADEA,544 REHAB,545 the ADA,546 and the Civil
Rights Act of 1991.547 These statutory enactments fundamentally changed
federal law to reflect societal value for each individual’s right to equality, to
be treated with dignity, and to be afforded the opportunity to develop fully
his or her potential in political, economic, social, and legal contexts.548
However, while the civil rights movement flourished between the ‘60s and
early ‘90s, in the ‘80s and ‘90s, a diametrically opposed movement mounted
in Congress that directly effected individuals protected by civil rights
legislation. This movement was tort reform.
B. Tort Reform
While the civil rights era brought forth the above-mentioned civil
measures, the era also marked a turning point in congressional action. Three
circumstances gave rise to massive tort reform at both the federal549 and the
state550 legislative level. First, a purported medical malpractice litigation
crisis in the late ‘60s caused increases in physician’s malpractice insurance
and, in turn, increased medical treatment costs throughout the country.551
Next, an alleged overflow of products liability litigation in the ‘70s increased
manufacturers’ insurance rates.552 Third, a supposed general tort crisis in the
543. Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (1964) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42
U.S.C.).
544. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1994 & Supp. II 1996).
545. Id. §§ 701-797(b).
546. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (1994 & Supp. II 1996).
547. Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.)
548. See JOSEPH PARKER WITHERSPOON, ADMINISTRATIVE IMPLEMENTATION OF CIVIL RIGHTS
23 (1968) (“This federal action has resulted . . . from a vital, profound shift in the real structure and
dynamism of our pluralistic society, and it has produced a fundamental change in our federal system.”)
549. For articles discussing various state tort reform, see Drier, Analysis: 1987 Product Liability
Act, 41 RUTGERS L. REV. 1279 (1989); Graham, 1987 Oregon Tort Reform Legislation: True Tort
Reform or Mere Restatement?, 24 WILLAIMETTE L. REV. 83 (1988). See also Peter A. Bell, Legislative
Intrusions into the Common Law of Medical Malpractice, 35 SYRACUSE L. REV. 939, 943 (1984)
(discussing massive state medical malpractice limitations); Nancy L. Manzer, Note, Tort Reform
Legislation: A Systematic Evaluation of Caps on Damages and Limitations on Joint and Several
Liability, 73 CORNELL L. REV. 628, 633 (1988).
550. See Note, “Common Sense” Legislation: The Birth of Neoclassical Tort Reform, 109 HARV.
L. REV. 1765, 1767 (1996).
551. See SENATE SUBCOMM. ON EXECUTIVE REORGANIZATION, 91ST CONG., REPORT ON
MEDICAL MALPRACTICE: THE PATIENT VERSUS THE PHYSICIAN (Comm. Print 1969); PATRICIA M.
DANZON, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE: THEORY, EVIDENCE, AND PUBLIC POLICY 97-117 (1985). But see
W. John Thomas, The Medical Malpractice “Crisis”: A Critical Examination of a Public Debate, 65
TEMP. L. REV. 459, 526 (1992) (discussing tort reform and concluding that the tort system is not solely
to be blamed for the perceived medical malpractice crises).
552. See U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE INTER-AGENCY TASK FORCE ON PRODUCTS LIABILITY, FINAL
REPORT (1978); Impact on Product Liability: Hearings Before the Senate Select Comm. on Small
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‘80s caused companies to refuse to reissue policies to high-risk holders.553
Additionally, the judiciary may have been acting in concert with federal
and state legislatures in discouraging law suits. While the judiciary did not
absolutely abandon the aggrieved plaintiffs, the courts were cognizant of the
titanic amounts of tort litigation flowing through the gates and worked to
decrease that amount.554
During the ‘80s states endeavored to drain tort litigation from the ever-
increasing dockets of the judiciary and limit the overall risk associated with
insurance companies.555 From January to June of 1986, nineteen states
established tort reform committees.556 Ten states placed limits on
noneconomic and punitive damages.557 Thirteen states minimized the
exposure of defendants by imposing limitations on liability or establishing
immunities from suit.558 Nine states reevaluated and modified their doctrines
of joint and several liability.559 Four states sought to limit access to the court
system by shortening their respective statutes of limitations.560 Eleven states
ratified dram shop laws.561 In an effort to promote alternative dispute
resolution, seventeen states enacted laws to encourage nonjudicial resolution
of disputes.562 Seven states provided for structured or periodic payments
Business, 94th Cong. pt. 1, at 1, 733-35, pt. 2, at 1473-74, 1582 (1976); Impact on Product Liability:
Hearings Before the Senate Select Comm. on Small Business, 95th Cong. pt. 4, at 1787, pt. 5, at 2187
(1977). See also STEPHEN D. SUGARMAN, DOING AWAY WITH PERSONAL INJURY LAW 85-87 (1989)
(discussing congressional action on tort reform). But see U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, INTERAGENCY
TASK FORCE ON PRODUCT LIABILITY: FINAL REPORT (1977), reprinted in 9 LOUIS R. FRUMER &
MELVIN I. FRIEDMAN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY app. G, at 667 (1998) (finding that one of the major
reasons behind the products liability crisis was the liability ratemaking procedure). For findings on the
alleged overflow of products liability litigation, see U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE INTERAGENCY TASK
FORCE ON PRODUCTS LIABILITY, FINAL REPORT (1978); Impact on Product Liability: Hearings Before
the Senate Select Comm. On Small Business, 94th Cong. pt. 1, at 1, 733-35, pt. 2, at 1473-74, 1582
(1977); Impact on Product Liability: Hearings Before the Senate Select Comm. on Small Business,
95th Cong. pt. 4, at 1787, pt. 5, at 2187 (1977).
553. For findings on the supposed general tort crisis, see REPORT OF THE TORT POLICY WORKING
GROUP ON THE CAUSES, EXTENT AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF THE CURRENT CRISIS IN INSURANCE
AVAILABILITY AND AFFORDABILITY 6-15 (1986). But see George L. Priest, The Current Insurance
Crisis and Modern Tort Law, 96 YALE L.J. 1521, 1523 (1987) (stating that one of the theories behind
the insurance rate crises blames the insurance industry for price fixing).
554. See id. at 1523-24, 1532-34.
555. See id. at 1523.
556. See id.
557. Glenn Blackmon & Richard Zeckhauser, State Tort Reform Legislation: Assessing Our
Control of Risk, reprinted in TORT LAW AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST 272, 274 tbl. 2 (Peter H. Schuck
ed., 1991).
558. Id.
559. Id
560. Id
561. Id.
562. Blackmon & Zeckhauser, supra note 557, at 274 tbl.2.
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methods of damages awards.563 Finally, four states discouraged plaintiffs’
suits by imposing limitations on attorneys’ ability to collect contingency
fees.564
The states also looked at the insurance industry, concerned that they bore
the brunt of the rising tides of tort litigation.565 In addition to controlling the
tort litigation presumably causing higher insurance costs, the states began
rigorously policing the insurance industry itself.566 Twelve states regulated
insurance rates and insurance suppliers.567 Additionally, twelve states
imposed limits on the insurance industry’s ability to limit midterm policy
cancellation.568 Ten states created insurance industry alternatives like self-
insurance.569 Finally, five states limited the amount of damages that could be
collected through collateral sources.570
This restrictive movement continued, and by 1988, forty-eight states
participated in tort reform.571 Twenty-three states limited the availability of
extravagant damage awards by imposing caps on the amounts recoverable.572
Thirty-six states passed measures limiting governmental liability.573 Thirty
states hobbled the doctrine of joint and several liability.574 Twenty-five states
made material alterations to their collateral source rule.575 Twenty states
established legislation allowing defendants to make periodic damage
payments to prevailing plaintiffs.576 Finally, twenty-five states attacked
punitive damage awards by limiting either their availability or amount.577
With the onset of the ‘90s, concerns about overly abundant litigation
incentives remained steady. For example, in 1990, Congress introduced the
Civil Rights Act of 1991. Although the 1991 Act deceptively sounds as
benevolent as its ‘60s counterparts, the 1964 and 1991 Civil Rights Acts are
actually polar opposites. While 1964 Act sought to vindicate rights, the 1991
Act protected the perpetrators by imposing a $150,000 cap on punitive
563. Id.
564. Id.
565. Id.
566. Id.
567. Blackmon & Zeckhauser, supra note 557, at 274 tbl.2.
568. Id.
569. Id..
570. Id.
571. Joseph Sanders & Craig Joyce, “Off to the Races”: The 1980s Tort Crisis and the Law
Reform Process, 27 HOUS. L. REV. 207, 220-22 (1990).
572. Id.
573. Id.
574. Id.
575. Id.
576. Sanders & Joyce, supra note 574, at 220-22.
577. Id.
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damages to prevent what Congress perceived as a leviathan of overly inflated
recovery awards.578 Notwithstanding the abundant testimony on the severe
personal and economic tribulations Title VII plaintiffs endure in bringing
actions, opponents to the implementation of compensatory and punitive
damages argued that “strengthening Title VII’s existing remedial scheme
would ‘open the floodgates’ to many frivolous lawsuits, [would] produce
multi-million dollar awards, and [would] scuttle Title VII’s goal of
encouraging voluntary settlement.”579 When the Act finally passed, Congress
capped damages at different amounts based on the number of individuals
employed by the discriminator.
Similarly, tort reform effected the passage of the ADA. Although the
ADA provoked surprisingly little controversy in Congress, extensive debate
did occur on the issue of whether Title I should permit compensatory and
punitive damages and jury trials.580 House bill, H.R. 2273,581 and Senate bill,
S. 933,582 were originally incorporated by reference the enforcement
provisions of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and 42 U.S.C. § 1981.
Thus, these referenced provisions permitted compensatory and punitive
damages and jury trials583 in legal actions brought where “any individual . . .
believes that he or she is being or about to be subjected to discrimination on
the basis of disability.”584 Although the Senate passed S. 933 within four
months,585 negotiations between the Bush Administration forced proponents
of S. 933 to eliminate compensatory and punitive damages and jury trials
prior to its passage.586 Unlike the Senate bill, the House bill proceeded slowly
because four separate committees reviewed the bill.587 Also, the Bush
578. See 136 CONG. REC. H6810-13 (daily ed. Aug. 2, 1990). In 1991, sponsors elected to
introduce a bill without a cap on damages. See Nicole L. Gueron, Note, An Idea Whose Time Has
Come: A Comparative Procedural History of the Civil Rights Acts of 1960, 1964, and 1991, 104 YALE
L.J. 1201, 1204 (1995).
579. H.R. REP. NO. 102-40, at 70 (1990), reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 549, 608.
580. 1 HENRY H. PERRITT, JR., AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT HANDBOOK 19 (3d ed.
1997).
581. H.R. 2273, 101st Cong. (1989).
582. S. 933, 101st Cong. (1989).
583. See Hearings Before the Comm. on Labor and Human Resources and the Subcomm. on the
Handicapped, supra note 514, at 3 (“[U]nder . . . [S. 933], relief for employment discrimination
includes . . . compensatory and punitive damages, and the right to a jury trial available under § 1981”).
See also Johnson v. Ry. Express Agency, 421 U.S. 454 (1975).
584. H.R. 2273, 101st Cong. (1989); S. 933, 101st Cong. (1989).
585. See 135 CONG. REC. 19,903 (1989) (passing by a vote of 76 yeas to 8 nays).
586. See H.R. REP. NO. 101-485(II), at 164, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 267, 441 (1990); 135
CONG. REC. 19,903 (1989).
587. See generally H.R. REP. NO. 101-485(I), at 1, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 267, 267
(1990) (Committee on Public Works and Transportation); H.R. REP. NO. 101-485(II), at 1, reprinted in
1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 267, 303 (1990) (Committee on Education and Labor); H.R. REP. NO. 101-
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Administration refused to support incorporation of future Title VII
amendments resulting from pending civil rights legislation into the ADA
because this scheme was not part of the original bargain struck with
supporters of S. 933.588 Nevertheless, H.R. 2273 came to resemble S. 933
and incorporated Title VII remedies, as may be amended, into Title I of the
ADA. 589
In 1989, Congress again amended § 104(a)(2) to deny the exclusion for
punitive damages in cases involving nonphysical personal injuries, thus
making taxable any punitive damages awarded in discrimination or sexual
harassment cases not involving a physical injury.590 In 1994, a resurgence of
conservatism allowed Republicans to take control of the Senate and to
solidify their House platform in a Contract with America. In the early months
of the newly composed House and Senate, the Republican majority seized on
Tenet Nine of the Contract with America591 introducing a series of “Common
Sense” tort reform acts which promised an overall reconstruction of tort law
including caps on punitive damage awards, a revision of products liability
law, and application of the English Rule of fee shifting.592 While these bills
485(III), at I, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 267, 445 (1990) (Committee on the Judiciary); H.R.
REP. NO. 101-485(IV), at 1, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 267, 512 (1990) (Committee on Energy
and Commerce).
588. See PERRITT, supra note 580, at 23-24.
589. See H.R. REP. NO. 101-485, at 23 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 267, 445-46.
590. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-239, § 7641(a), 103 Stat.
2106, 2379 (codified as amended at 26 U.S.C. § 104(a)(2) (1994)).
591. The Contract with America has been cited as the “centerpiece of the republican party’s
strategy in the 1994 Congressional campaigns.” Carl Tobias, Common Sense and Other Legal
Reforms, 48 VAND. L. REV. 699, 700 (1995). Tenet Nine or point nine of the Contract with America
was the Common Sense Legal Reforms Act of 1995 (CSLRA), H.R. REP. NO. 104-50 (1995). Tenet
Nine would have imposed numerous procedural and substantive tort reforms. See id. See also Elsa F.
Kramer, Tort Reform: Does it Make “Common Sense” for Indiana?, RES GESTAE, Feb. 1995, at 8.
592. Common Sense Legal Reforms Act of 1995, H.R. 10, (1995); The Common Sense Legal
Standards Reform Act of 1995, H.R. 956 (1995). The Common Sense Product Liability Reform Act of
1996 called for a cap on punitive damages to the extent of the greater of $250,000 or double the
amount of compensatory damages. This was approved by the Joint Conference Committee. H.R.
CONF. REP. NO. 104-481, at 34-35 (1996). The House and the Senate had earlier passed different
versions of this legislation, namely, the Common Sense Product Liability Act of 1995 and the Product
Liability Fairness Act of 1995. See Thomas A. Eaton & Susette M. Talarico, Testing Two Assumptions
About Federalism and Tort Reform, 14 YALE J. ON REG. 410 n.4 (1996). Subsequently, however,
President Clinton vetoed H.R. 956 on May 2, 1996, thus putting an end for the time being to the
various Common Sense Product Liability Reform Acts and Common Sense Legal Standards Reform
Act of 1995. See President’s Message on Returning Without Approval to the House of Representatives,
The Common Sense Legal Reform Act of 1995, 32 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 780, 780-81 (May 6,
1996). See also John F. Harris, Clinton Vetoes Product Liability Measure, WASH. POST, May 3, 1996,
at A14. Prior to the 1994 attempts at passing tort reform, Congress began to involve itself in tort
reform by passing and attempting to pass products liability reform. To address “questionable insurer
ratemaking and reserving practices” in products liability, Congress passed the Product Liability Risk
Retention Acts of 1981 to permit product manufacturers to purchase insurance on a group basis at
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were met with a general lack of enthusiasm and eventually failed, they
spawned other acts that would ultimately succeed such as the Securities
Litigation Reform Act of 1995,593 and charted a larger, more active path for
the federal government in an area of law traditionally governed by state law.
Against this backdrop of developing congressional civil rights and tort
reform legislation, courts had to determine whether § 104(a)(2) applied to
monetary awards and settlements under the remedial provisions of these acts.
Amidst this tension, the Supreme Court decided Burke594 and Schleier which
virtually eliminated the exclusion for damages received in discrimination
suits.595 Meanwhile, Congress attempted in 1989, 1995, and 1996 to limit the
§ 104(a)(2) exclusion to damages received on account of physical injury or
physical sickness despite full knowledge of the severe psychological and
emotional effects of discrimination.596
C. Tort Reform and a Taxing Statute
After almost eighty years of administrative, regulatory, and judicial
pronouncements excluding nonphysical injury awards under § 104(a)(2), the
final step in judicial and legislative “back-door” tort reform occurred in a
taxing statute. In 1989, the first congressional attempt to limit the § 104(a)(2)
exclusion to physical injury or physical sickness awards was predicated on
the statement that “some courts have held that the exclusion applies to
damages in cases involving employment discrimination . . . where there is no
physical injury or sickness.”597 The Conferees made this statement even
though the courts and the IRS consistently interpreted the exclusion to apply
to awards on account of both physical and nonphysical injuries for the past
seventy years.598 Although Congress did not limit the § 104(a)(2) exclusion
to physical injury or physical sickness awards in 1989, it did pass
more favorable rates or to self-insure through insurance cooperatives. See Pub. L. No. 97-45, 95 Stat.
949, 949 (1981) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 3901-05 (1994)).
593. Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (placing
limitations upon the conduct of private actions being brought under the Securities Act of 1933 and the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934). See also Robert L. Rabin, Federalism and the Tort System, 50
RUTGERS L. REV. 1, 1-3 (1997).
594. 504 U.S. 229 (1992).
595. 515 U.S. 323 (1995).
596. See supra Part II.L.
597. H.R. REP. NO. 101-247, at 1354-55 (1989), reprinted in 1989 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1906, 2824-25
(emphasis added).
598. See Knuckles v. Comm’r, 349 F.2d 610 (10th Cir. 1965); Starrels v. Comm’r, 304 F.2d 574
(9th Cir. 1962); Agar v. Comm’r, 290 F.2d 283 (2d Cir. 1961); Raytheon Prod. Corp. v. Comm’r, 144
F.2d 110 (1st Cir. 1994); Cent. R.R. Co. v. Comm’r, 79 F.2d 697 (3d Cir. 1935); Farmers’ &
Merchants’ Bank v. Comm’r, 59 F.2d 912 (6th Cir. 1932).
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amendments denying the income exclusion for punitive damages awards
received for nonphysical personal injuries, thus taxing any punitive damages
awarded in discrimination cases not involving a physical injury.599
Ironically, Congress considered the amendment to limit the tax exclusion
to only physical injuries at the same time that it enacted the ADA.600
Additionally in 1990, congresspersons attempted to provide additional
remedies for victims of discrimination.601 The hearings preceeding the Civil
Rights Act of 1991 established that the current, available protections and
remedies completely failed to carry out the congressional goal to eradicate all
forms of discrimination and make discrimination victims whole.602 As a
consequence, the 1991 amendments provided for compensatory and punitive
damages and for jury trials.603 Nonetheless, the House WMC continued to
believe that allowing an income tax exclusion for damages from
discrimination “is inappropriate where no physical injury or sickness is
involved.”604 Such inconsistent congressional policy is duplicitous behavior.
On the one hand, Congress recognized the legal right to be protected from
discrimination while, on the other hand, failed to recognize the injury of
discrimination for tax purposes.
In 1995, Republicans once again attempted to pass a bill limiting the
§ 104(a)(2) exclusion to damage awards on account of physical injury or
physical sickness.605 While the provision amending § 104(a)(2) passed both
the House and Senate,606 a larger dispute over the budget resulted in a
Presidential veto of the bill.607 In 1996 as part of the Small Business Job
Protection Act, an almost identical bill passed both the House and the Senate
and was signed by President Clinton.608
Both the 1995 and 1996 legislative histories reflect a clear misconception
of the law. Both years, the Conferees vaguely refer to Schleier to support
599. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-239, § 7641(a), 103 Stat.
2106, 2379 (codified as amended at 26 U.S.C. § 104(a)(2) (1994)).
600. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-336, § 2(b), 104 Stat. 327, 329
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b) (1994)).
601. S. 2104, 101st Cong. § 2(b)(2) (1990); H.R. 4000, 101st Cong. § 2(b)(2) (1990).
602. See H.R. REP. No. 102-40, at 66-74 (1991), reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 549, 604-12.
603. Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 102, 105 Stat. 1071, 1072-74 (1991)
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1981a (1994)).
604. H.R. REP. NO. 101-247, at 1354-55 (1989), reprinted in 1989 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1906, 2824-25
(emphasis added).
605. See H.R. REP. NO. 104-280, pt. 2, at 318-20 (1995).
606. See H.R. CONF. REP. NO. 104-737, at 300-01 (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1474,
1792-94.
607. See President Veto of Balanced Budget Act H.R. 2491, 31 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC.
2140-42 (Dec. 6, 1995).
608. Pub. L. No. 104-188, § 1605, 110 Stat. 1755, 1838-39 (1996).
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their position that § 104(a)(2) should be limited to awards for physical
injury.609 The conference reports stated that the “[c]ourts have interpreted the
exclusion from gross income of damages received on account of personal
injury or sickness broadly in some cases to cover awards for personal injury
that do not relate to a physical injury or sickness.”610 In light of the Supreme
Court’s opinions in Burke and Schleier, such error is particularly glaring.611
Specifically, Burke recognized that since the change from § 213(b)(6) to
§ 104(a)(2) in 1954, both the courts and the IRS have interpreted personal
injuries to include “in accord with common judicial parlance and
conceptions, . . . nonphysical injuries to the individual, such as those
affecting emotions, reputation, or character, as well.”612 In addition, the
Supreme Court stated that the 1989 congressional amendment to § 104(a)(2)
supports such an interpretation because the elimination of the income
exclusion for punitive damage awards for nonphysical injuries implies
congressional acceptance of the fact that “other damages (i.e., compensatory)
would be excluded in cases of both physical and nonphysical injury.”613 The
Court also noted that “Congress rejected a bill that would have limited the
§ 104(a)(2) exclusion to cases involving “physical injury or physical
sickness.”614 The Schleier opinion likewise acknowledged that regardless of
the facial ambiguities in the text of § 104(a)(2), “it is by now clear that
§ 104(a)(2) encompasses recoveries based on intangible as well as tangible
harms.”615
According to the House Reports in 1995 and 1996, the House WMC’s
limited the § 104(a)(2) tax exemption to personal physical injuries or
sickness for three reasons: (1) damages received for nonphysical injury or
sickness generally tends to compensate a claimant for lost profits or wages
otherwise taxable as personal income”; (2) confusion about the tax treatment
of damages received in nonphysical injury or sickness cases has led to
“substantial litigation, including two Supreme Court cases within the last
four years”; and (3) taxation of damages received on account of nonphysical
injury or sickness “should not depend on the type of claim made.”616 The first
609. H.R. CONF. REP. NO. 104-737, at 300-02 (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1474,
1792-94.
610. See H.R. CONF. REP. NO. 104-737, at 300 (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1474,
1792.
611. United States v. Burke, 504 U.S. 229, 235-36 n.6 (1992).
612. Id.
613. Id.
614. Id.
615. Comm’r v. Schleier, 515 U.S. 323, 329 n.4 (1995).
616. H.R. CONF. REP. NO. 104-737, at 300-01 (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1474,
1792-94.
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reason reveals a fundamental congressional misconception grounded in the
personal and business dichotomy. The confusion relates to the distinction
between the measurement and consequences of an injury and the nature and
substance of the injury. No one would suggest that the damage award
received by the surgeon for her lost finger, measured primarily upon proof of
the consequent lost earning capacity, adequately offsets the loss of her finger.
Equally absurd is a suggestion that a damage award for employment
discrimination, based primarily upon evidence of lost wages, adequately
compensates for the loss of a person’s dignity. The fact that discrimination
occurs within the employment or business context does not transform the
nature of the injury and consequent damage award into that resembling
income lost. Rather, the loss of income is a by-product of the reduced earning
capacity suffered becaue of the discriminatory injury to human dignity. Both
examples demonstrate inadequate attempts to monetarily compensate
individuals for irreparable injury to the human person.
Congressional statements that “substantial litigation” has occurred
concerning cases not involving physical injury or physical sickness and that
“taxation . . . should not depend on the type of claim made,” clearly evidence
legislative back door tort reform.617 Such statements indicate congressional
fears of opening a floodgate of litigation and fraudulent pleading by
taxpayers who wish to qualify their damages under § 104(a)(2). A potential
flood of litigation is no justification for denying redress for injured rights.
Moreover, courts had developed legal rules, such as the totality of the
circumstances test in Threlkeld, to filter out fraudulent claims undeserving of
the § 104(a)(2) exclusion. Interestingly, Congress may have been responding
to the courts continuing struggle over whether a taxpayer was deserving of
the § 104(a)(2) exclusion and therefore attempted to make a bright-line rule
to eliminate or at least lessen the amount of § 104(a)(2) litigation in federal
courts. Nevertheless, the elimination of “substantial litigation” over
§ 104(a)(2) issues does not justify the disparate effect a bright-line rule has
on dignitary tort victims.
The decisions in Wards Cove, Burke, and Schleier also demonstrate back-
door tort reform but, in the judicial context. These cases and the 1989 and
1996 amendments to § 104(a)(2) discourage plaintiffs from bringing
discrimination claims in the federal courts. Especially in the case of a
disparate impact claim, Wards Cove explicitly discourages plaintiffs from
bringing actions absent a showing of discriminatory intent.618 While the
617. H.R. REP. NO. 104-586, at 142-44 (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. (110 Stat.) 1755,
1838-39.
618. See supra notes 530-35 and accompanying text.
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decision was couched in language of shifting burdens of proof and
persuasion, this decision substantively closed the courthouse doors to most
disparate impact plaintiffs.619
Burke, Schleier, and the amendments to § 104(a)(2) economically
discourage victims of discrimination or of sexual harassment from
prosecuting claims to redress their injuries. Prior to the 1989 amendment,
plaintiffs who were awarded damages for personal physical or nonphysical
injuries could exclude back pay, compensatory damage awards, and punitive
damages awards from income tax under § 104(a)(2). After the 1989
amendment, these same plaintiffs could only exclude back pay,
compensatory damages and punitive damages received for physical injuries.
Before Burke, Title VII plaintiffs could exclude back pay awards and
compensatory damages from gross income620 and courts made no distinction
between Title VII disparate treatment and disparate impact cases. After
Burke, however, Title VII disparate treatment plaintiffs could exclude back
pay and compensatory damages from income, but back pay awards in
disparate impact claims were taxable under Burke’s tort or tort-type test,
because the statutory relief for disparate impact plaintiffs did not authorize
compensatory damages or punitive damages.621 Because the ADA
incorporated the remedial scheme of the 1991 amendments, Title VII
plaintiffs who brought race, national origin, sex, religion, and disability
discrimination claims against employers under disparate impact theory were
taxed on back pay awards.622 However, after Burke, ADEA plaintiffs who
successfully prosecuted their discrimination claims, arguably, still had some
chance of excluding their back pay and liquidated damage awards from
taxation.623
In 1995, however, the Supreme Court decided Schleier, holding ADEA
back pay and liquidated damages taxable.624 Arguably, after Schleier only
619. See id.
620. See Burke v. United States, 929 F.2d 1119, 1124 (6th Cir. 1991). But see Sparrow v.
Comm’r, 949 F.2d 434, 437 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (holding Title VII damages taxable).
621. See Rev. Rul. 93-88, 1993-2 C.B. 61. Under the IRS’s analysis of the Burke decision,
because disparate impact plaintiffs were only provided back pay under 42 U.S.C. § 1981(a)(1), the
ruling held that the same discrimination was not tort or tort-type. See 1993-2 C.B. 62-63. However,
because disparate treatment plaintiffs were allowed compensatory and punitive damages under 42
U.S.C. § 1981(b)(3), the Service held under Burke that the awards were excludable because the same
discrimination was a tort or tort-type right. See 1993-2 C.B. at 62-63. See also United States v. Burke,
504 U.S. 229, 242 (1992) (holding pre-1991 Title VII back pay in both disparate impact and disparate
treatment cases taxable).
622. See Rev. Rul. 93-88, 1993-2 C.B. 61.
623. See Schmitz v. Comm’r, 34 F.3d 790, 796 (9th Cir. 1994). But see Downey v. Comm’r, 33
F.3d 836, 840 (7th Cir. 1994).
624. 515 U.S. 323, 336-37 (1995).
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compensatory damages awarded in cases of intentional discrimination
brought under Title VII remained potentially nontaxable under § 104(a)(2).
Shortly thereafter, however, Revenue Ruling 96-65 made back pay and
emotional distress damages received for disparate treatment employment
discrimination claims under Title VII taxable.625 Lastly, in 1996, Congress
completely eliminated the exclusion for damages received for dignitary torts
not involving physical injury or physicial sickness by amending
§ 104(a)(2).626
D. Conclusion of Part IV
The major federal statutes serve as landmarks reflecting an expansive
congressional policy to deter acts which violate a human’s physical person,
equality, dignity, and spirit. The resistance to this civil rights legislation and
symbolic posture of the established social order is expressed in the context of
§ 104(a)(2). Lawmakers and the judiciary— as will be demonstrated in the
Part V— creatively rationalized and legitimized their behavior by resolving
conflicts that marginalized the rights of the powerless minorities and
maintained a position of the privileged.627
V. DECONSTRUCTING THE INJUSTICE OF THE TAXATION OF “DIGNITARY”
TORTS
Since 1922, the courts and the IRS have generally agreed that § 104(a)(2)
excluded from income those damage awards received for physical and
nonphysical personal injuries. However, in 1989 the courts and Congress
began incrementally narrowing the applicable scope of § 104(a)(2).628 In
narrowing the scope of § 104(a)(2), the Supreme Court in Burke sharply
departed from § 104(a)(2) precedent in coming to its decision. Thereafter, the
Supreme Court in Schleier built on the Burke analysis and twisted Burke’s
625. 1996-2 C.B. 6.
626. Pub. L. No. 104-88, § 1605, 110 Stat. 1755, 1838-39 (1996) (codified as amended at 26
U.S.C. § 104(a)(2) (Supp. II 1996)).
627. See Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896) (establishing the doctrine of separate but equal
in upholding segregation in public schools). The federal government also has an inconsistent history in
the area of gaining compliance with civil rights legislation. See ROOGERS & BULLOCK, supra note
472, at 195. Efforts by the federal government have been largely symbolic— recognizing injuries and
providing for remedies that were rarely enforced. See id. The plans each federal agency puts forth do
not reflect the agencies’ actual compliance and have been referred to as merely “paper documents.”
See U.S. COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, FEDERAL TITLE VI ENFORCEMENT TO ENSURE
NONDISCRIMINATION IN FEDERALLY ASSISTED PROGRAMS 99 (1996) (“[M]ost Federal agencies only
are enforcing Title VI ‘on paper.’”).
628. For more information on the incremental narrowing of § 104(a)(2), see infra Part IV.
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holding to come to its unique conclusion. The remedy driven reasoning
devloped by the Supreme Court in Burke and Schleier created an irrational
and scientifically unsupported tort hierarchy which privileged certain
plaintiffs recovering in tort with tax exclusion while denigrating
discrimination victims as unworthy of the tax exclusion. Burke and Schleier
then paved the way for the 1996 amendments to § 104(a)(2). The Conferees
looked to the holding of Schleier to justify their position on and congressinal
amendment to § 104(a)(2), limiting its provision to exclude only damage
awards on account of physical injury and physical sickness.629
A. The Precedent
The seventy-four years of precedent leading to Burke illustrates the extent
to which the Supreme Court deviated from the original analysis of damages
falling within the § 104(a)(2) exclusion. In the 1922 Solicitor’s Opinion
132,630 which the BTA confirmed in the 1927 Hawkins v. Commissioner
opinion,631 damages for nonphysical personal injuries had consistently been
determined to be excludable under § 104(a)(2).632 Courts have since Hawkins
properly recognized the excludability of monetary awards for both physical
and nonphysical aspects of personal injuries.633 Personal injuries invariably
result in both physical and nonphysical harm, regardless of the cause-and-
effect sequence. Thus, any distinction is at best artificial and most likely
sophistic.
The Ninth Circuit’s 1983 decision in Roemer v. Commissioner reaffirmed
that a court must analyze the nature of the claim and not the economic
consequences of a personal injury.634 In examining the “nature of the tort” of
defamation to determine whether the taxpayer claimed a personal injury, the
court reviewed the historical development of the tort of defamation under the
applicable state law of California.635 After reviewing the “unhappy tangle of
illogical rules derived from [the] haphazard historical development of
629. For more information on how Congress misused Schleier to justify the § 104(a)(2)
amendments, see infra Part IV.
630. I-1 C.B. 92, 94 (1922).
631. 6 B.T.A.M. (P-H) 1023, 1024-25 (1927).
632. See, e.g., Threlkeld v. Comm’r, 87 T.C. 1294, 1297 (1986).
633. See Threlkeld v. Comm’r, 87 T.C. 1294, 1297 (1986).
634. 716 F.2d 693 (9th Cir. 1983). In Roemer, the taxpayer and his wife appealed a Tax Court
decision holding his damage award for defamation not excludable under § 104(a)(2). See id. at 695-96.
The Ninth Circuit held the award excludable because defamatory statements attack an individual’s
good name. See id. at 700. The court recognized that nonpersonal consequences of a personal injury,
such as loss of future income, may be the most persuasive means of proving the extent of the injury
suffered, but the nature of an injury should not be defined by its effect. See id. at 699.
635. See id. at 697-700.
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§ 104(a)(2),”636 the court excluded damages “from gross income to the extent
a taxpayer can show that the damages, including amounts for lost income,
were received for an injury to the individual’s personal reputation.”637 In
essence, the court focused on whether the claim and injury that the damages
redressed were personal. The court emphasized that under § 104(a)(2) courts
should only distinguish “between personal and nonpersonal injuries, not
between physical and nonphysical injuries [because] . . . § 104(a)(2) states
that damages received on account of personal injuries are excludable; it says
nothing about physical injuries.”638 The court further expressly rejected an
argument that later became the focus of the Burke analysis:
[I]njury to the person should not be confused with the derivative
consequences of the defamatory attack, i.e., the loss of reputation in
the community and any resulting loss of income. The nonpersonal
consequences of a personal injury, such as loss of future income, are
often the most persuasive means of proving the extent of the injury
that was suffered. The personal nature of an injury should not be
defined by its effect.639
Finding that Roemer’s defamation award remedied a personal injury, the
court held all damages excludable from gross income under § 104(a)(2).640
The Ninth Circuit methodogically focused on the statutory term “personal
injury” to determine whether the taxpayer’s claim and injury were of a
personal nature.
Building on Roemer in 1986, the Tax Court decided Threlkeld v.
Commissioner by examining the nature of the taxpayer’s injury rather than
the nature of the consequences flowing from that injury.641 The court
emphasized that determining whether the injury claimed is personal “more
accurately reflects the inquiry required by the plain meaning of the
636. Id. at 698.
637. Id. at 696.
638. Id. at 697.
639. Id. at 699.
640. See Roemer, 716 F.2d at 700-01 (emphasis added). The court noted that punitive damages are
usually includable as gross income. See id. at 700 (citing Comm’r v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S.
426 (1955)). Accordingly, the court reprimanded “the Commissioner [for his] liberal[] interpret[ation
of] § 104(a)(2) to exclude punitive damages as well as all compensatory damages where there has been
a personal injury.” Id. (citing Rev. Rul. 75-45, 1975-1 C.B. 47). Additionally, the court refused for
§ 104(a)(2) tax purposes to distinguish between damages awarded for injury to professional reputation
and personal reputation. See id. at 698. Once it is determined that the nature of the claim redresses a
personal injury, all damages are excludable under the statute.
641. 87 T.C. 1294, 1299 (1986). In Threlkeld, the petitioner received a settlement in a civil lawsuit
for malicious prosecution. Id. at 1295. The court held that all of the petitioner’s damages were
excludable because they flowed from the personal injury of malicious prosecution. See id. at 1307-08.
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statute.”642 Moreover, it defined personal injuries as “injuries resulting from
invasions of rights that inhere in man as a rational being, that is, rights to
which one is entitled by reason of being a person in the eyes of the law.”643 In
discussing what constitutes a personal injury, the court stated that the concept
has long included nonphysical as well as physical injuries.644
This reasoning went virtually unchallenged until 1992,645 when the D.C.
Circuit decided Sparrow v. Commissioner.646 Clearly conflicting with the
holdings of the Third,647 Fourth,648 Sixth,649 and Ninth Circuit Courts of
642. Id. at 1308 (emphasis added).
643. Id. at 1307 (analyzing personal injury with reference to Brown v. Dunstan, 409 S.W.2d 365,
367 (Tenn. 1966), and quoting Commerce Oil Ref. Corp. v. Miner, 199 A.2d 606, 610 (1964) (holding
action for malicious abuse of process constituted “injuries to the person” under statute of limitations)).
644. Id. at 1297.
645. See, e.g., Horton v. Comm’r, 33 F.3d 625, 630 (6th Cir. 1994) (“At no point do we inquire
into the nature of the damages involved. Rather the narrow scope of our gaze is properly limited to the
‘origin and character of the claim, . . . and not to the consequences that result from the injury.’”)
(quoting Threlkeld, 87 T.C. at 1299 (1986)); Burke v. United States, 929 F.2d. 1119, 1121 (6th Cir.
1990) (“To determine whether the injury complained of is personal, we must look to the origin and
character of the claim . . . , and not to the consequences that result from the injury . . . . Thus, our
inquiry is limited to whether injuries resulting from sex discrimination in violation of Title VII are
‘personal injuries.’”); Pistillo v. Comm’r, 912 F.2d 145, 148 (6th Cir. 1990) (“[r]elying substantially”
on the Tax Court’s decision in Threlkeld and the Third Circuit decision in Rickel); Rickel v. Comm’r,
900 F.2d 655, 658 (3d Cir. 1990) (“The nonpersonal consequences of a personal injury, such as a loss
of future income, are often the most persuasive means of proving the extent of the injury that was
suffered. The personal nature of an injury should not be defined by its effect.”) (quoting Roemer v.
Comm’r, 716 F.2d 693, 699 (9th Cir. 1973)); Threlkeld v. Comm’r, 848 F.2d 81, 84 (6th Cir. 1988)
(agreeing with the Ninth Circuit decision in Roemer and the Third Circuit decision in Bent and holding
that “the nonpersonal consequences of a personal injury, such as a loss of future income are often the
most persuasive means of proving the extent of the injury that was suffered, and that the personal
nature of an injury should not be defined by its effect”); Bent v. Comm’r, 835 F.2d 67, 70 (3d Cir.
1987) (“The nonpersonal consequences of a personal injury, such as a loss of future income, are often
the most persuasive means of proving the extent of the injury that was suffered. The personal nature of
an injury should not be defined by its effect.”) (quoting Roemer v. Comm’r, 716 F.2d 693, 699 (9th
Cir. 1983)); Thompson v. Comm’r, 89 T.C. 632, 648 (1987) (“[W]e must look to the origin and
character of the claim . . . and not to the consequences that result from the injury.”) (quoting Threlkeld
v. Comm’r, 87 T.C. 1294, 1299 (1986)), aff’d, 866 F.2d 709 (4th Cir. 1989); Metzger v. Comm’r, 88
T.C. 834, 857 (1987) (“To determine whether the injury complained of is personal, we must look to
the origin and character of the claim, and not to the consequences that result from the injury.”) (citing
Glynn v. Comm’r, 76 T.C. 116, 121 (1981) (“[I]t should be evident that the consequences of a dispute
are not necessarily commensurate with its origin.”)), aff’d without opinion, 845 F.2d 1013 (3d Cir.
1988); Seay v. Comm’r, 58 T.C. 32, 38 (1972).
646. 949 F.2d 434 (D.C. Cir. 1991). In Sparrow, the taxpayer argued that § 104(a)(2) excluded
from income tax payments of Title VII settlements. See id. at 435. The Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit held that unlike common law personal injury damages, Title VII provides
only equitable remedies such as back pay and gives the plaintiff no right to a jury trial. See id. at 437-
38. Therefore, the damages were taxable under § 104(a)(2). See id. at 438.
647. See Rickel v. Comm’r, 900 F.2d 655, 657-64 (3d Cir. 1990); Bent v. Comm’r, 835 F.2d 67,
70 (3d Cir. 1987).
648. See Thompson v. Comm’r, 866 F.2d 709, 712 (4th Cir. 1989) (excluding liquidated damages
but including back pay in gross income).
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Appeals650 that excluded damages for age discrimination under § 104(a)(2),
the D.C. Circuit found Title VII back pay taxable, holding that the language
excluding from gross income “any damages received . . . on account of
personal injuries”651 under § 104(a)(2) creates a two part conjunctive test for
the taxpayer. The court declared that in order to exclude damages under
§ 104(a)(2), “the amount received must be damages” and “the amount
received as damages must result from personal injury or sickness.”652
The court first defined the meaning of “damages” under § 104(a)(2) to
have the same meaning as “damages” under the original 1918 codification of
§ 213(b)(6).653 Even though the Revenue Act of 1918 and its legislative
history failed to define “damages” under § 213(b)(6), because damages were
a legal remedy in 1918, the court concluded that § 104(a)(2) “damages”
today must comply with the historical definition and conception of the term
as a monetary sum awarded at law.654 According to Sparrow, personal civil
violations involving discriminatory acts must provide for nonequitable
remedies other than back pay or injunctions in order to fall within the
historical definition of damages under § 104(a)(2).655 Having deconstructed
the term damages to a narrow historical definition, the court made a
hegemonic analysis of the remedial provisions of pre-1991 Title VII.656
Equating pre-1991 Title VII back pay remedy to the equitable remedy of
restitution, the court held that the Title VII award fell outside the historical
definition of legal damages.657
The court’s “clear”658 conclusion that damages under § 104(a)(2) must fit
within its historical definition ignores the fact that actions for sex
discrimination did not exist until the latter half of the twentieth century.659
The court’s holding that damages excluded under § 104(a)(2) are confined to
a monetary sum awarded at law, and that back pay under Title VII did not
fall within the court’s narrow definition of damages, lacks any policy
analysis or justification.660 In fact, given the strong congressional and social
649. See Pistillo v. Comm’r, 912 F.2d 145, 149-50 (6th Cir. 1990); Burke v. Comm’r, 929 F.2d
1119, 1121-22 (6th Cir. 1991).
650. See Redfield v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 940 F.2d 542, 547 (9th Cir. 1991).
651. Sparrow, 949 F.2d at 436.
652. Id.
653. See id. at 436-37.
654. See id. at 436-38.
655. Id. at 437.
656. See id. at 437.
657. See Sparrow, 949 F.2d at 438.
658. Id. at 437.
659. See Ronald K.L. Collins, Language, History and the Legal Process: A Profile of the
“Reasonable Man”, 8 RUTGERS-CAM. L.J. 311, 317-18 (1977).
660. The D.C. Circuit repeatedly cited to Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189 (1974), and Albemarle
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policy in favor of eradicating discrimination in all forms, a broad reading of
damages is preferable.661 The Sparrow court marginalized sexual
discrimination claims, constricted legislative prerogatives in formulating
remedies for personal civil wrongs, and denigrated victims a second time
through tax law.
The Sparrow court further stated that because Congress designed Title
VII to place the victim of employment discrimination in exactly the same
position he would have been in absent the discrimination, excluding back pay
from income would violate the purpose of the statute by giving the victim of
discrimination a tax benefit not received by other co-workers not subject to
similar discrimination and success in the court system.662 In short, such tax
benefit would place the victim in a better position— not an equal position—
Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405 (1975), to support its holding that Title VII back pay damages were
not legal damages awarded at law. Sparrow, 949 F.2d at 437-40. In Curtis, the Supreme Court held
that Title VIII provided for the enforcement of legal rights and remedies in an action at law and
therefore, either party to the action was entitled to a jury trial under the Seventh Amendment. Curtis,
415 U.S. at 195. In fact, the Court reasoned that “[t]he statute sounds basically in tort . . . [and] merely
defines a new legal duty . . . authoriz[ing] the courts to compensate a plaintiff for the injury caused by
the defendant’s wrongful breach.” Id. at 195 (emphasis added). Furthermore, the court indicated
skepticism concerning the characterization of back pay damages as an equitable remedy. See id. at 197
(citing Comment, The Seventh Amendment and Civil Rights Statutes: History Adrift in a Maelstrom,
68 Nw. U. L. REV. 503, 524-27 (1973) (“Whatever may be the merit of the ‘equitable’ characterization
in Title VII cases, there is surely no basis for characterizing the award of compensatory and punitive
damages here as equitable relief.”)).
Moreover, in Albemarle Paper Co., Justice Rehnquist characterized the Title VII remedy in a
concurring opinion:
To the extent that an award of back pay is thought to flow as a matter of course from a finding of
wrongdoing, and thereby becomes virtually indistinguishable from an award for damages, the
question (not raised by any of the parties, and therefore quite properly not discussed in the Court’s
opinion), of whether either side may demand a jury trial under the Seventh Amendment becomes
critical.
422 U.S. 405, 442 (1975) (Rehnquist, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
661. The court acknowledges the purpose of Title VII by quoting from Albemarle Paper Co.,
which identified Title VII’s central statutory purposes to “eradicat[e] discrimination throughout the
economy and mak[e] persons whole for injuries suffered through past discrimination.” Sparrow, 949
F.2d at 440 (quoting Albemarle Paper Co., 422 U.S. at 421). The court also found relevant Senator
Williams’ statement in the congressional record that Congress intended the back pay provisions in the
Equal Employment Opportunity Act, currently codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g):
to give the courts wide discretion exercising their equitable powers to fashion the most complete
relief possible. In dealing with the present section 706(g) the courts have stressed that the scope of
relief under that section of the Act is intended to make the victims of unlawful discrimination
whole, and that the attainment of this objective rests not only upon the elimination of the particular
unlawful employment practice complained of [through cease and desist orders], but also requires
that persons aggrieved by the consequences and effects of the unlawful employment practice be,
so far as possible, restored to a position where they would have been were it not for the unlawful
discrimination.
Id. at 440-41 (quoting 118 Cong. Rec. 7168 (1972)) (empahsis added).
662. Sparrow, 949 F.2d at 441 (stating that a tax benefit would “place[e] him in a better position
than had he not allegedly been discriminated against”).
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than where the Title VII plaintiff would have been absent the “alleged”
discrimination.663 While the court recognized that “such a result might seem
fair” under the circumstances, the court ultimately reasoned that such
preferable tax treatment “would be contrary to congressional intent as
evidenced by the explicit provisions of Title VII.”664
This argument assumes that after being the involuntary victim of
insidious racial or sexual discrimination in the workplace and losing career
employment, mere payment of lost incremental back wages places the victim
in the same position as if the discrimination had not occurred. The effects of
discrimination are psychological, physical, social, and economic, as well as
severe and permanent. The court’s use of the word “allegedly”665 in relation
to the taxpayer’s discrimination claim denigrates the seriousness of personal
injuries suffered by victims of discrimination. Finally, the court’s comment
that a tax exclusion would give the taxpayer more than Title VII authorizes
and place him in a “better position”666 than other taxpayers similarly situated
but not victims of discrimination is not legally or scientifically supportable.
The suggestion that money alone sufficiently redresses racial discrimination
and that providing compensatory back pay tax free to a victim of
discrimination will place the victim in a better position than he would have
been absent the discrimination is troubling.
B. The Deviation
Because of a conflict in the courts of appeals with regard to the taxation
of Title VII damages, the Supreme Court in 1992 granted certiorari and
interpreted § 104(a)(2) for the first time in United States v Burke.667
In Burke,668 the Supreme Court examined a Title VII disparate impact sex
discrimination claim and held that the taxpayer’s settlement award did not
fall within the § 104(a)(2) statutory exclusion.669 First, the Court observed
that neither the “text” nor the “legislative history” provided an explanation of
663. Id.
664. Id.
665. For the direct quote, see infra note 630.
666. Sparrow, 949 F.2d at 441.
667. United States v. Burke, 504 U.S. 229, 229 (1992).
668. 504 U.S. 229 (1992).
669. See id. at 230-31, 242. Evidence deduced through early discovery led the district court in
denying defendant Tennessee Valley Authority’s motion for summary judgment to find that the factual
evidence established a prima facie case of disparate treatment. Thereafter serious negotiations
culminated in the settlement of five million dollars. See Brief for Respondent at 4, United States v.
Burke, 504 U.S. 229 (1992) (No. 91-42).
Washington University Open Scholarship
1341 Wolff.doc 04/24/01   5:02 PM
1446 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [VOL. 78:1341
the term “personal injuries.”670 Next, the Court selectively reiterated part of
the 1960 regulation § 1.104-1(c), entitled “Damages received on account of
personal injuries or sickness” which defines “damages received” and
provides guidance on what constitutes “personal injuries or sickness.”671 The
Treasury Regulation defined “damages received” for “personal injuries or
sickness” as an amount received from the prosecution of a legal suit upon a
tort or tort-type right; the latter phrase is only illustrative while the former
circumscribed.672 Thus, in excluding damages redressing tort or tort-type
rights, the regulation does not purport to comprehensively describe the term
personal injury. Consequently, monetary awards from personal injury
violations of tort-type rights are deductible as are legal actions based upon
tort violations.
The Supreme Court also recognized that “tort” had been broadly defined
as a “‘civil wrong, other than breach of contract,’” that provides damages to
redress the “‘violation of . . . legal rights.’”673 At this juncture the Court could
have soundly concluded that discrimination is properly classified as a civil
personal injury and not as a contractual wrong by reasoning that (1) Title VII
provides a cause of action redressing the violation of a “new legal duty”
providing for monetary damages measured by back pay, (2) discrimination is
“an invidious practice that causes grave harm to its victims,”674 (3) there is
“[n]o doubt [that] discrimination . . . constitute[s] a ‘personal injury’ for
purposes of § 104(a)(2) and (4) ‘under the logic of the common law
670. Id. at 234.
671. Treas. Reg. § 1.104-1(c) (1991). This treasury regulation states in full as follows:
Damages received on account of personal injuries or sickness. Section 104(a)(2) excludes from
gross income the amount of any damages received (whether by suit or agreement) on account of
personal injuries or sickness. The term “damages received (whether by suit or agreement)” means
an amount received (other than workmen’s compensation) through prosecution of a legal suit or
action based upon tort or tort type rights, or through a settlement agreement entered into in lieu of
such prosecution.
Id.
672. Id.
673. 504 U.S. at 234-35 (quoting PROSSER & KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS, § 54, at 360 (5th
ed. 1984)). Similar to Title VII, the Supreme Court in Curtis v. Loether, reasoned that “a damages
action under . . . Title VIII is analogous to a number of tort actions recognized at common law
[because] the statute merely defines a new legal duty, and authorizes the courts to compensate a
plaintiff for the injury caused by the defendant’s wrongful breach.” 415 U.S. 189, 195 (1974). In
addition, the Court commented that the lower court analogized Title VIII to the common-law duty of
innkeepers not to refuse lodging without justification. See id. at 195-96 n.10. Then the Supreme Court
stated that a suit to remedy racial discrimination was similar to actions for intentional infliction of
mental distress and defamation. See id. (“Indeed, the contours of the latter tort are still developing, and
it has been suggested that ‘under the logic of the common law development of the law of insult and
indignity, racial discrimination might be treated as a dignitary tort.’”) (quoting C. GREGORY & H.
KALVEN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS 961 (2d ed. 1969)).
674. United States v. Burke, 504 U.S. 229, 238 (1992).
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development of the law of insult and indignity, racial discrimination . . . [is]
treated as a dignitary tort.’”675 Rather, the Court acknowledged the “nature of
the claim,”676 but engaged in the most cursory analysis possible to enthrone a
hegemonic remedy ratiocination as controlling the § 104(a)(2) exclusion.
The Court established that the appropriate test for applying the
§ 104(a)(2) income exclusion is whether the taxpayer can “show that Title
VII, [as] the legal basis for their recovery of back pay, redresses a tort-like
personal injury in accord with the foregoing principles.”677 First, the Court
noted that a Title VII plaintiff, unlike other tort-like personal injury plaintiffs,
is not entitled to a jury trial.678 As a practical matter this fact offers little
insight into the nature of a racial discrimination claim and whether such
injury, if proven, constitutes a personal injury. In fact, the absence of jury
trials from Title VII may have reflected a legislative concern that the jury
system could be used to undermine rather than promote the goals of Title
VII.679 Second, after recognizing in passing that “[i]t is beyond question that
discrimination in employment on the basis of sex, race, or any of the other
classifications protected by Title VII is . . . an invidious practice that causes
grave harm to its victims[,]” the Court stated that the existence of individual
harm “does not automatically imply . . . a tort-like ‘personal injury’ for
purposes of federal income tax law.”680 This statement therefore requires that
a taxpayer must suffer a personal injury and, in addition, that personal injury
must be tort-like for the purposes of federal income tax law.
Arguably, no basis for such a condition exists under the plain meaning of
§ 104(a)(2) itself. The history of the words “tort or tort-type” arise in
regulation § 1.104-1(c) directly relating to the definition of damages, not
personal injury.681 Once the Court constructed this new analytical framework
675. Id. at 239-40.
676. Id. at 237.
677. Id.
678. See id. at 238 (“Title VII plaintiffs, unlike ordinary tort plaintiffs, are not entitled to a jury
trial.”).
679. In discussing the legislative history on the jury trial issue concerning Title VIII, the Supreme
Court observed that “[t]he legislative history on the jury trial question is sparse, and what little is
available is ambiguous.” See, e.g., Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 191 (1974); MISCELLANEOUS
PROPOSALS REGARDING THE CIVIL RIGHTS OF PERSONS WITHIN THE JURISDICTION OF THE UNITED
STATES: HEARING BEFORE SUBCOMM. NO. 5 OF THE HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 89th Cong.,
at 1183 (1966).
680. Burke, 504 U.S. at 238 (citations omitted). Other courts applied a different approach focusing
on the origin and nature of the claim and the legally protected rights being violated. See Roemer v.
Comm’r, 716 F.2d 693, 697 (“[W]e must look to the nature of the tort of defamation to determine
whether the award should have been reported as gross income.”); Threlkeld v. Comm’r, 87 T.C. 1294,
1307 (1986) (citations omitted) (quoting the Tennessee Supreme Court stating that the exclusion
applied to invasions of rights that one possess by virtue of being a person under the law).
681. This inclination of the Court to “graft” onto Section 104(a)(2) new prerequisites for
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and statutory hurdle for evaluating damages received to compensate a
successful plaintiff’s discrimination claim, the back pay award predictably
failed to qualify for excludability.682 The Court continued to reason that
because back pay solely remedied racial discrimination under Title VII,683
unlike other common law torts’ remedial schemes, the legal right protected
by Title VII was not a “tort-like personal injury”684 excludable under
§ 104(a)(2).685
The Supreme Court constructed a contextually indefensible method of
interpretation that denied a tax exclusion to the successful plaintiff in any
disparate impact Title VII discrimination suit.686 The Court’s remedy driven
analysis defined the nature of the claimed injury by reference to the range of
remedies afforded to the Title VII plaintiff.687 Using a legislatively created
statutory remedy to characterize the nature of a claim, instead of examining
the nature of the claim itself by looking at the legal right protected and
resulting injury, the Court denigrated and marginalized discrimination
claims. Indeed, the Court recognized discrimination as being a cognizable
personal injury.688 Congress intended Title VII actions to eradicate
discrimination by employers against individuals in vulnerable minority
groups.689 Therefore, the Court could have as easily reasoned when an
excludability occurred again in Commissioner v. Schleier, 515 U.S. 323, 346 (1995).
682. Burke, 504 U.S. at 237-42.
683. See id. at 238.
684. Id. at 241.
685. See id. at 242.
686. While the court’s decision was handed down on May 26, 1992, after the enactment of the
Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071, the Court stated that it was
“examin[ing] the law as it existed prior to November 21, 1991, the effective date of the 1991 Act [and
that u]nless otherwise indicated, all references are to the ‘unamended’ Title VII.” 504 U.S. 229, 237
n.8 (1992). Interestingly, the amendments under the Civil Rights Act of 1991 provided victims of
intentional discrimination with compensatory damages for future pecuniary losses, emotional pain and
suffering, mental anguish, loss of enjoyment of life, punitive damages, other nonpecuniary losses, and
the right to a jury trial. See Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 102(b)-(c), 105 Stat.
1071, 1073. In responding to the taxpayer’s argument that the 1991 amendments evidenced
congressional intent that Title VII’s remedial scheme was tort-like in nature, the Court stated that it
“believe[d] that Congress’s decision to permit jury trials and compensatory and punitive damages
under the amended Act . . . mark[s a] change in its conception of the injury redressable by Title VII,
and cannot be imported back into analysis of the statute as it existed at the time of this lawsuit.” Burke,
504 U.S. at 241 n.12.
687. Burke, 504 U.S. at 234-35, 237-41.
688. In Burke, the Court labeled discrimination as an “invidious practice” doing “grave harm” to
its “victims.” Id. at 238. The Court was willing to acknowledge the extent of the injury and the
personal nature of the injury but once again utilized the remedial scheme to subvert it in favor of other
common-law torts.
689. In Burke, the Court did recognize that Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 “makes it an
unlawful employment practice for an employer ‘to discriminate against any individual with respect to
his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s race,
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employer discriminates in employment and consequently injures an
individual, Congress selected back pay as the measure to make the aggrieved
personal injury victim whole and thus, did not intend the nature of back pay
to be determinative of the underlying claim or injury suffered.690
The Supreme Court clearly had alternatives available to it that would not
have resulted in marginalizing discrimination claims. The Court’s approach,
however, erected hurdles for a class of discrimination plaintiffs where none
had previously existed. Furthermore, it placed victims of discrimination in an
insular subordinate class requiring them to pay tax on their claims while
other personal injury claimants enjoyed a favorable tax exclusion.
Any hope for a course correction quickly dissipated three years later.
After the Supreme Court decision in Burke, another conflict arose, this time
among the Fifth, Seventh, and Ninth Circuit courts.691 These cases involved
the exclusion of back pay and liquidated damages received in a successful
age discrimination claim under the ADEA by United Airlines (United)
employees.692 Addressing the conflict, the Supreme Court in Commissioner
v. Schleier, further contorted the unsupportable analytical framework of
Burke in its holding that a settlement award based upon an ADEA
discrimination claim was also not excludable from income tax under
§ 104(a)(2).693
The Court began its analysis by purporting to apply the “plain language of
§ 104(a)(2),”694 its implementing regulation,695 and the Court’s “reasoning in
Burke.”696 The Court then concluded that these three factors “convince us
that a recovery under the ADEA is not excludable from gross income.”697
color, religion, sex, or national origin.’” Id. at 237-38.
690. Lower courts have repeatedly recognized that the nature of the injury, not the effect of the
injury, best defines the tort. See, e.g., Roemer v. Comm’r, 716 F.2d 693, 699 (9th Cir. 1983);
Threlkeld v. Comm’r, 87 T.C. 1294, 1299 (1986).
691. See Downey v. Comm’r, 33 F.3d 826 (7th Cir. 1994); Schmitz v. Comm’r, 34 F.3d 790 (9th
Cir. 1994); Schleier v. Comm’r, 26 F.3d 1119 (5th Cir. 1994).
692. Schleier v. Comm’r, 515 U.S. 323, 325 (1995). The ADEA provides for back pay to redress
all successful claims as well as for liquidated damages in willful violation cases. Monroe v. United
Airlines, Inc., 736 F.2d 394, 397-98 (7th Cir. 1984).
693. See id. at 336-37. In this case, the jury found United’s violations willful. Id. at 326 (noting
the case was tried before a jury and the jury held for the plaintiffs, but the case was reversed by the
Seventh Circuit on appeal).
694. Schleier, 515 U.S. at 327. The plain meaning approach to statutory interpretation is grounded
in the principle that the provision being interpreted is unambiguous. See Mary L. Heen, Plain
Meaning, the Tax Code, and Doctrinal Inchoherence, 48 HASTINGS L.J. 771, 774 (1997).
695. See Schleier, 515 U.S. at 327 (referring to Treas. Reg. § 1.104-1(c)).
696. Id. This begs the question: if the Court in Burke applied the plain language of the statute, then
why is its decision acknowledged as nonexhaustive? At least at some unconscious level, the Court may
be recognizing the extent that Burke departed from plain language requirements of § 104(a)(2).
697. Id.
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The Court found that Treasury Regulation § 1.104-1(c), requiring that
damages be received in a tort type action, does not substitute for
§ 104(a)(2)’s requirement that the damage award be received “on account of
personal injuries or sickness.”698 Rather, Treasury Regulation § 1.104-1(c) is
an added requirement.699 “The statutory requirement is only repeated in the
regulation.”700 To address whether ADEA damages are received in a tort-
type like action, the Court noted that in Burke it emphasized that Title VII did
not provide for jury trials and compensatory and punitive damages like other
tort or tort-type rights.701 Here, the petitioner argued that, unlike the Title VII
plaintiff in Burke, the ADEA provides plaintiffs with jury trials and
liquidated damages.702 The Scheier Court retreated from that emphasis in
Burke stating: “We did not, however, indicate that the presence of either or
both of those factors would be sufficient to bring a statutory claim within the
coverage of the regulation.”703
The Court also conducted an analysis of whether awards and liquidated
damages are excludable under the “plain language” of the damage award.704
The Court found that under its previous decision in Trans World Airlines v.
Thurston, “Congress intended for liquidated damages to be punitive in
nature” under the ADEA.705 Even though Congress modeled parts of the
ADEA on FLSA, which the Court had earlier interpreted in Overnight Motor
Transportation Co. v. Missel “might provide [liquidated damages as]
compensation for some ‘obscure’ injuries,” the Court stated that the ADEA’s
liquidated damages provisions significantly departed from FLSA in that
respect.706 The Court held ADEA damages punitive and thus not received
698. Schleier, 515 U.S. at 333.
699. Id.
700. Id.
701. Id. at 334-35.
702. See id. at 335.
703. Id.
704. Schleler, 515 U.S. at 329.
705. Id. at 332 (quoting Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Thurston, 469 U.S. 111, 125 (1985)).
706. Id. at 331 (citing Overnight Motor Trans. Co. v. Missel, 316 U.S. 572 (1942) and Thurston,
469 U.S. at 126). In Thurston, the Court addressed the definition of the term “willful violation” as
required to receive the liquidated damages under section 7(b) of the ADEA, 29 U.S.C. § 626(b). Id. at
125. The Supreme Court noted that § 7(b) of the ADEA provides that those remedies should be
enforced in accordance with FLSA. See id. The Court noted, however, that unlike FLSA, liquidated
damages were only allowed in cases of willful violations. Id. The Court held that this provision made
the ADEA plaintiff’s damages punitive in nature. Id.
The legislative history of the ADEA indicates that Congress intended for liquidated damages to be
punitive in nature. The original bill proposed by the administration incorporated § 16(a) of the
FLSA, which imposes criminal liability for a willful violation. See 113 Cong. Rec. 2199 (1967).
Senator Javits found “certain serious defects” in the administration bill. He stated that “difficult
problems of proof . . . would arise under a criminal provision,” and that the employer’s invocation
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“on account of personal injury or sickness.”707
Legislative history for the ADEA’s 1978 Amendments, however,
supports a very different interpretation of the ADEA’s liquidated damage
provision.708 Because liquidated damages are legal relief, a party is entitled to
have the factual issues underlying such a claim decided by a jury.709 Further,
the ADEA as amended, does not provide remedies of a punitive nature.710
The Conferees therefore agreed to permit a jury trial of the factual issues
underlying a claim for liquidated damages because the Supreme Court made
clear that a liquidated damage award under FLSA is not a penalty but rather
is available in order to provide full compensatory relief for losses that are
“too obscure and difficult of proof for estimate other than by liquidated
damages.”711 An even more reasonable point of view is that without the
personal injury of discrimination, there would be no damage award for back
pay or liquidated damages on account of personal injury.712
Another unusual departure from precedent by the Court was its
observation that “[r]espondent seeks to circumvent the plain language of
§ 104(a)(2) by relying on the Commissioner’s regulation interpreting that
section,”713 when in fact taxpayers, the Commissioner, and courts had
referred to regulation § 1.104-1(c) for nearly four decades.714 Courts
normally give deference to longstanding regulations that have been relied
upon for such an extended period of time.715 The Court went on to note that
of the Fifth Amendment might impede investigation, conciliation, and enforcement Id. [sic] at
7076. Therefore, he proposed that “the [FLSA’s] criminal penalty in cases of willful violation . . .
[be] eliminated and a double damage liability substituted.” Ibid. Senator Javits argued that his
proposed amendment would “furnish an effective deterrent to willful violatioins [of the ADEA],”
ibid., and it was incorporated into the ADEA with only minor modification, S. 788, 90th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1967).
Id. at 125-26. The opinion went on to note that “[t]he record makes clear that TWA officials acted
reasonably and in good faith in attempting to determine whether their plan would violate the ADEA.”
Id. at 129.
707. Schleier, 515 U.S. at 332.
708. See H.R. CONF. REP. NO. 95-950 (1978).
709. Age Discrimination and Employment Act Amendments of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-256, 92 Stat.
189 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 626(c) (1994)).
710. See id.
711. H.R. CONF. REP. NO. 95-950, at 7, 14 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N 504, 528, 535
(quoting Overnight Motor Trans. Co., 316 U.S. at 583-84).
712. Compare Schleier, 515 U.S. at 330 (“In age discrimination, the discrimination causes both
personal injury and loss of wages, but neither is linked to the other. The amount of back wages
recovered is completely independent of the existence or extent of any personal injury.”).
713. Id. at 333.
714. United States v. Burke, 504 U.S. 229, 234 (1992) (stating that “[s]ince 1960 . . . IRS
regulations formally have linked identification of a personal injury for purposes of a § 104(a)(2) to
traditional tort principles”).
715. United States v. Correll, 389 U.S. 299, 305-06 (1967).
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“[w]e have long recognized that considerable weight should be accorded to
an executive department’s construction of a statutory scheme it is entrusted
to administer, and the principle of deference to administrative
interpretations.”716 Furthermore, Chevron, U.S.A. Inc v. Natural Resources
Defense Council717 held that where Congress has not explicitly spoken on the
precise issue the administrative agency regulation should be followed if it is a
permissible interpretation.718 The Court did not even attempt to address or
distinguish Chevron, it rather reconstructs the statute and “graft[s] on. . . [an]
additional requirement.”719
The Schleier Court, referencing its decision in Burke, again applied its
remedy analysis to characterize an ADEA discrimination claim award as
distinguishable from a damage recovery “on account of” personal injury.720
The effect of the Supreme Court’s strained construction of the “plain
language” of the statute indirectly stigmatized and isolated victims of
discrimination and privileged all other individuals receiving damages “on
account of” personal injury.
The Burke-Schleier analysis also assumes that Title VII’s and ADEA’s
remedial schemes fairly restitute all the rights, claims, and injuries at stake,
even given the fact that courts have been traditionally unable to determine the
nature of “liquidated damages,” let alone what right such remedy necessarily
implicates.721 Nevertheless, the Court once again pushed a nonphysical
personal civil injury claim beyond the borders of the § 104(a)(2) exclusion.
O’Connor’s dissent confronts the incongruity of Schleier with the Court’s
former opinion in Burke.722 Justice O’Connor reminded her colleagues that
eight Justices in Burke conceded that discrimination inflicts a personal injury
under § 104(a)(2).723 O’Connor charged that the majority has created a per se
rule that discharge based upon discrimination cannot be fairly described as a
716. Chevron, U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984) (citing
Aluminum Co. of Am. v. Cent. Lincoln Peoples’ Util. Dist., 467 U.S. 380, 389 (1984); Blum v. Bacon,
457 U.S. 132, 141 (1982); Union Elec. Co. v. EPA, 427 U.S. 246, 256 (1976); Inv. Co. Inst. v. Camp,
401 U.S. 617, 626-27 (1971); Unemployment Comp. Comm’n v. Aragon, 329 U.S. 143, 153-54
(1946); NLRB v. Hearst Publ’n, Inc., 322 U.S. 111, 131 (1944); McLaren v. Fleischer, 256 U.S. 477,
480-81 (1921); Webster v. Luther, 163 U.S. 331, 342 (1896); Brown v. United States, 113 U.S. 568,
570-71 (1885); United States v. Moore, 95 U.S. 760, 763 (1878); Edwards’ Lessee v. Darby, 25 U.S.
(12 Wheat.) 206, 210 (1827)).
717. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
718. See id. at 866.
719. Schleier v. Comm’r, 515 U.S. 323, 346 (1995) (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
720. See id. at 334-36.
721. See Downey v. Comm’r, 33 F.3d 836, 839-40 (7th Cir. 1994) (recognizing a split over the
nature of liquidated damages).
722. Schleier, 515 U.S. at 337-41 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
723. See id. at 340 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
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personal injury or sickness.724 O’Connor recognized that this improperly
assumes that personal injuries under § 104(a)(2) include only tangible
injuries.725 Although the majority did not address this assumption, its
reasoning that personal injuries arising from a car accident are
distinguishable from personal injuries arising from discrimination assumes
that a relevant difference between the two exists under the “plain meaning”
of the § 104(a)(2).726
O’Connor then recognized a second suitable analysis within the “plain
meaning” of § 104(a)(2) and Burke. She stated that if “the harms caused by
discrimination constitute personal injury, then amounts received as damages
for such discrimination are received ‘on account of personal injuries’ and
should be excludable.”727 While O’Connor was properly critical of the
majority opinion in Schleier, she also deconstructed the underlying reasoning
in Burke. Instead of focusing on the remedial scheme of the discrimination
statutes, the Court could have looked at the nature of the injury and the right
violated to determine whether the award flows from the personal injury or
sickness.728 O’Connor revealed that Burke and Schleier improperly
privileged a remedial statutory analysis over the effects of discriminatory tax
claims.
In order to understand the Supreme Court’s adherence to this unworkable,
strained construction, one must understand the differences between these
tangible and intangible claims. Besides the Court’s error that Title VII’s and
ADEA’s remedial schemes clearly distinguished between car accident and
discrimination claimants, the Court failed to recognize its own discriminatory
policy produced by labelling these claims as other than “tort or tort-type”
injuries, and as injuries more similar to contract and equity.729 The
antidiscrimination laws protect groups of people from societal denigration
and victimization, but nothing protects these groups from conscious or
unconscious judicial marginalization.
724. See id.
725. See id. at 341 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
726. See id. at 341-42 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
727. Schleier, 515 U.S. at 342 (offering analysis in place of the logic of the majority) (O’Connor,
J., dissenting).
728. See id. (offering similar reasoning while labeling the logic of the majority as hard to follow)
(O’Connor, J., dissenting).
729. See infra Part VII.B.
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VI. EMPIRICAL STUDIES ESTABLISH THE EQUALITY OF PHYSICAL AND
NONPHYSICAL INJURIES
I have heard that Title VII is supposed to make victims “whole” for
the harm they have suffered because of discrimination. Well, I was not
“made whole.” Not only did I have to pay a lot of medical bills and
suffer a great deal of medical harm because of the harassment, but I
was robbed of my dignity. Today, in 1990, several years after leaving
West Bend, I am finding the healing process is far from over. Title VII
did not make me “whole” for the harm I suffered.730
Today, there is no medical question that the effects of racial, ethnic,
gender, age, and disability discrimination can damage an individual.731 The
harms caused by these various forms of discrimination result in negative
psychological, physical, social, economical, and societal consequences.732
Many times the negative psychological effects emanating from the infliction
of discrimination also cause physical harms.733 Discrimination victims’ social
relations often become stressed and break apart.734 With that pain and
suffering also comes economic harm as individuals, who are displaced from
work or not hired because of prejudice, find themselves struggling to make
ends meet.735 Consequently, local, state, and federal governments must
expend valuable resources to help victims of discrimination recover.736 What
seems to begin as a personal injury results into what is truly a societal wound.
A. Racial Discrimination
Race-based stigmatization is “one of the most fruitful causes of human
misery.”737 Individuals victimized by racism may experience negative mental
730. H.R. REP. NO. 102-40, at 67 (1991), reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 549, 605.
731. See generally discussion infra Part IV.
732. See id.
733. See id.
734. See id.
735. See id.
736. See, e.g., Mark McWilliams, The Ticket to Work and Work Incentives Improvement Act: An
“E” Ticket for Adults with Disabilities, 79 MICH. B.J. 1680 (2000).
737. PHILIP MASON, RACE RELATIONS 2-3 (1970). See also James H. Carter, Racism’s Impact on
Mental Health, 86 J. NAT’L MED. ASS’N 543 (1994); Patricia J. Falk, Novel Theories of Criminal
Defense Based upon the Toxicity of the Social Environment: Urban Psychosis, Television Intoxication,
and Black Rage, 74 N.C. L. REV. 731, 774 (1996) (stating that the majority of social scientists agree
that black individuals’ mental and physical health suffer negative effects as a result of racism) (citing
Chester M. Pierce, Psychiatric Problems of the Black Minority, in AMERICAN HANDBOOK OF
PSYCHIATRY 512 (Silvano Arieti ed., 2d ed. 1974)). Although several studies conducted assess the
effects of racism, scientists blame racism as somewhat accountable for a deficiency of research on this
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effects such as “psychotic and neurotic depression, hostility, anger, . . . states
of violence coupled with lowered self-esteem and ego destruction,”
hypertension, aggression, retreat, withdrawal,738 self-hate, distrust, and
resentful anxiety.739 Instances of racial discrimination may even result in the
individual experiencing Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD).740
Furthermore, mental disorders resulting from racism can cause an individual
to turn to drugs and alcohol.741 Discrimination victims may also suffer
physical disease such as heart disease, diabetes, and arterial sclerosis as result
of its traumatic psychological effects.742
topic. See Falk, supra, at 779 (“[R]acism in the research process itself may be partially responsible for
the lack of a better developed body of work on the effects of racism on mental and physical health.”).
Racism is also said to occur in psychiatric treatment. See Jeanne Spurlock, Black Americans, in
CROSS-CULTURAL PSYCHIATRY 163, 168 (Albert Gaw ed., 1982) (warning that the role bias plays in
assessment of psychiatric patients “cannot be overemphasized”); Harold Rosen & Jerome D. Frank,
Negroes In Psychotherapy, 119 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 456, 457 (1962) (stating that psychiatrists must
“be alert to the possibility of unconscious prejudice. This may manifest itself either directly or through
reaction formation . . . [in which the psychiatrist] may, for example, subtly reject Negro patients so
that they stop coming to see him”).
738. Eugene Cash, Jr., Extra-Dimensional Systemic Frustrations That Endanger the Mental
Health of Black People, in KEY MENTAL HEALTH ISSUES IN THE BLACK COMMUNITY 2 (Eugene Cash,
Jr. et al. eds., 1976). For a discussion of the effects of racism on self-esteem, see Judith R. Porter &
Robert E. Washington, Black Identity and Self-Esteem: A Review of Studies of Black Self-Concept,
1968-1978, 5 ANNUAL REV. OF SOCIO. 53, 53-74 (1979).
739. See Rosen & Frank, supra note 737, at 457.
740. See Falk, supra note 737, at 759-61. The effects of racism may become so extreme that
victim suffers from paranoia and becomes schizophrenic. See id. at 775. See also Mary Ann Dutton &
Lisa A. Goodman, Posttraumatic Stress Disorder Among Battered Women: Analysis of Legal
Implications, 12 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 215 (1994); Cultural and Historical Perspectives in Counseling
Blacks, in COUNSELING THE CULTURALLY DIFFERENT: THEORY AND PRACTICE 141, 146 (Derald
Wing Sue ed., 1981) (stating that it was historically reported that “[b]lacks suffered from a high rate of
schizophrenia, a claim that is still made today because of this group’s precarious racial position in the
United States”).
741. See Richard Delgado, Words That Wound: A Tort Action for Racial Insults, Epithets, and
Name-Calling, 17 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 133, 137-38 (1982) (stating that minority communities
experience much higher rates of narcotic use and admissions to psychiatric hospitals than the rest of
society). Research also suggests that in general, overall psychological functioning and the quality of
life are impaired due to racial discrimination. See Falk, supra note 737, at 776; Shawn O. Utsey,
Assessing the Stressful Effects of Racism: A Review of Instrumentation, 24 J. BLACK PSYCHOL. 269,
270 (1998) (“Racism, in one form or another, permeates many aspects of African American life and, as
such, significantly infringes on the quality of life enjoyed by African Americans.”).
742. See CASH, supra note 738, at 2; Delgado, supra note 741, at 137-39. See generally Earnest
Harburg et al., Socio-Ecological Stress, Suppressed Hostility, Skin Color, and Black-White Male Blood
Pressure: Detroit, 35 PSYCHOSOMATIC MED. 276, 276 (1973). Studies have concluded that high blood
pressure and coronary heart disease are more common in blacks than their white counterparts due to
racism. See Falk, supra note 737, at 776-77; Utsey, supra note 741, at 270. For a large, cross-sectional
study conducted on the effects of racism on blood pressure, see Nancy Krieger & Stephen Sidney,
Racial Discrimination and Blood Pressure: The CARDIA Study of Young Black and White Adults, 86
AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1370, 1375 (1996) (studying the blood pressure results of 4,086 black and white
men and women between the ages of twenty-five and thirty over a seven-year period and concluding
that “internalized responses to racial discrimination may be associated with elevated blood pressure”).
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Once discrimination negatively impacts the individual, the effects can
spill over generationally. Family members of the discriminated-against party
may be effected because discrimination can hinder a victim’s ability to act as
a proper parent.743 As a result “[s]elf-conscious, hypersensitive parents,
preoccupied with the ambiguity of their own social position, are unlikely to
raise confident, achievement-oriented, and emotionally stable children.”744
Moreover, “economic exploitation and poverty have been central features
of racial domination— poverty is its long-term result.”745 Workers who are
discharged as a result of racism face short-term and possibly long-term
economic hardships as a result of job loss. In fact, these same individuals
may encounter racism as they attempt to regain employment.
But the struggle of racial minorities to survive economically in the United
States does not begin upon discharge from employment. Racism plays a part
in creating staggering income disparities in existing job markets.746
Therefore, those racial minority members must deal with the economic
effects of being underpaid in their employment.
B. Sexual Discrimination
[W]hen I was pregnant with my second child, the [sexual] harassment
was still going on. My health continued to decline, and I started to lose
weight. My OB-GYN, who was aware of my horrendous working
conditions, told me that for the sake of my health and the health of the
For smaller cross-sectional studies, see Cheryl A. Armstead et al., Relationship of Racial Stressors to
Blood Pressure Responses and Anger Expression in Black College Students, 8 HEALTH PSYCHOLOGY
541, 544, 553 (1989) (studying twelve male and fifteen female black college students, where the
subjects were exposed to neutral, racist, and anger provoking film stimuli, and concluding that “there
may be a heightened sensitization and vigilance for racism that cause greater anger reactivity to racist
stimuli than to anger provoking, nonracist stimuli”); Sherman A. James et al., John Henryism and
Blood Pressure Differences Among Black Men. II. The Role of Occupational Stressors, 7 JOURNAL OF
BEHAVIOR MEDICINE 259, 259-60 (1984); Christopher Sempos et al., Divergence of the Recent Trends
in Coronary Mortality for the Four Major Race-Sex Groups in the United States, 78 AM. J. PUB.
HEALTH 1422, 1423 (1988). In addition to having higher blood pressure levels, “American blacks have
. . . higher morbidity and mortality rates from hypertension, hypertensive disease, and stroke than do
their white counterparts.” Delgado, supra note 741, at 139.
743. See Delgado, supra note 741, at 137-38.
744. Id. at 138-39.
745. Kimberlé Williams Crenshaw, Race, Reform, and Retrenchment: Transformation and
Legitimation in Antidiscrimination Law, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1331, 1352 (1988).
746. See Theodore J. Davis, Jr., Income Inequalities Between Black and White Populations in
Southern Nonmetropolitan Counties, REV. BLACK POLITICAL ECON., Spring 1994, at 155 (concluding
that median family income for black Americans was only sixty percent than that of white Americans
due to structural, institutional, and socio-cultural factors). See also JOHN W. WORK, RACE,
ECONOMICS, AND CORPORATE AMERICA 59-72 (1984) (discussing several theories of why black
workers are underpaid in the job market as opposed to white workers).
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child I was carrying, I had to take a medical leave of absence from
work.747
Sexual harassment is a form of sex discrimination748 that pervades our
society.749 Those who are harassed suffer from psychological effects such as
stress, uncontrolled anger, alienation, helplessness, fright, tension,
nervousness, distress, irritability, depression, persistent sadness, guilt,
lability, anergia, hyperenergia, mood swings, impulsivity, emotional
flooding, anxiety, fear of loss of control, escape fantasies, compulsive
thoughts, rage episodes, obsessional fears, crying spells, vulnerability,
diminished self-confidence, and decreased self-esteem and concentration.750
747. Crenshaw, supra note 745.
748. See U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, SEX DISCRIMINATION:
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION PROHIBITED BY TITLE VII OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964, AS
AMENDED AND THE EQUAL PAY ACT OF 1963 Tab B (1998). The EEOC states that sexual harassment
constitutes “[u]nwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, and other verbal or physical
conduct of a sexual nature . . . when submission to or rejection of this conduct explicitly or implicitly
affects an individual’s employment, unreasonably interferes with an individual’s work performance or
creates an intimidating, hostile or offensive work environment.” Id.
749. A 1987 survey of approximately 13,000 federal employees, of which 8,523 responded,
concluded that in the twenty-four months prior to the survey 0.8% of the female and 0.3% of the male
respondents were the victims of either an actual or attempted rape or assault. See U.S. MERIT SYSTEMS
PROTECTION BOARD, SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT: AN UPDATE 9, 16-17
(1988). Nine percent of the women and three percent of the men surveyed reported that they were
asked to perform sexual favors. See id. at 16-17. Unwanted touching, was experienced by twenty-six
percent of women and eight percent of men surveyed. Twenty-eight percent of women and nine
percent of men described receiving unwanted sexual looks or gestures. See id. Unwanted letters,
telephone calls, or materials of a sexual nature were reported by twelve percent of the women and four
percent of the men. See id. Women reported receiving unwanted pressure for dates fifteen percent of
the time whereas four percent of men reported such unwanted pressure. See id. Finally, thirty-five
percent of the women and twelve percent of the men reported receiving unwanted sexual teasing,
jokes, remarks, or questions. See id.
750. See Sharyn Lenhart, Physical and Mental Health Aspects of Sexual Harassment, in SEXUAL
HARASSMENT IN THE WORKPLACE AND ACADEMIA: PSYCHIATRIC ISSUES 21, 29 (Diane K. Shrier ed.,
1996); VULNERABLE WORKERS: PSYCHOSOCIAL AND LEGAL ISSUES 191-92 (Marilyn J. Davidson &
Jill Earnshaw eds., 1991) [hereinafter VULNERABLE WORKERS]. See also MICHELE A. PALUDI &
RICHARD B. BARICKMAN, ACADEMIC AND WORKPLACE SEXUAL HARASSMENT: A RESOURCE
MANUAL 29 (1991) (listing shock, denial frustration, embarrassment, confusion, shame, and
powerlessness as negative psychological effects resulting from sexual harassment); Peggy Crull, Stress
Effects of Sexual Harassment on the Job: Implications for Counseling, 52 AM J. ORTHOPSYCHIATRY
539, 541 (1982) (conducting a study of 262 women that sought crisis intervention in sexual harassment
situations and finding that ninety percent of all victims suffered from psychological stress, tension,
nervousness, and persistent anger); Mary P. Koss, Changed Lives: The Psychological Impact of Sexual
Harassment, in IVORY POWER: SEXUAL HARASSMENT ON CAMPUS 73, 80-81 (Michele A. Paludi ed.,
1990) (listing the sequence of cognitive reactions that victims of sexual harassment encounter as
confusion and self-blame, fear and anxiety, depression and anger, and disillusionment and describing
the changes in the victim’s beliefs about herself, co-workers, and work in general at each stage). Some
negative psychological effects from sexual harassment have been compared to those experienced by
rape and incest victims. See Vita C. Rabinowitz, Coping with Sexual Harassment, in IVORY POWER:
SEXUAL HARASSMENT ON CAMPUS, supra, 103, 106 (stating that the guilt and self-blame that women
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Psychiatric disorders in the form of “anxiety disorders, (especially . . . post
traumatic stress disorder), somatization disorders, sleep disorders, sexual
dysfunction disorders, psychoactive substance-induced disorders, depressive
disorders, [and] adjustment disorders . . . have been reported in association
with sexual harassment experiences.”751 Negative psychological effects
resulting from harassment have led victims to experience physiological and
health effects such as heart disease, blood vessel disease, kidney disease,
arthritis, “diabetes mellitus, ulcers and stomach disorders, skin disorders,
chest and back pains, headaches and migraines, insomnia, tiredness and loss
of sexual interest.”752 Other physical effects resulting from harassment are
“gastrointestinal disturbances, jaw tightening, teeth grinding, dizziness,
nausea, diarrhea, muscle spasms, pulse changes, . . . weight loss, tiredness,
increased perspiring, loss of appetite, binge eating, decreased libido, delayed
recovery from illness, sleep disruption, . . . increased respiratory and urinary
tract infections; and recurrence of chronic illness.”753
Many of the psychological and physiological effects of sexual harassment
disrupt the victims’ relationships with family, friends, and co-workers.754
Physical relationships with a significant other can deteriorate because of
“[i]rritability, depression, and sexual dysfunction on the part of the
victim.”755 Victims may also experience difficulties in parenting their
children.756 Those who are harassed also suffer negative interpersonal
experience in conjunction with sexual harassment is the same as that experienced in victims of incest
and rape).
751. Lenhart, supra note 750, at 29-30.
752. VULNERABLE WORKERS, supra note 750, at 192.
753. Lenhart, supra note 750, at 29. Victims, who testified in support of amending Title VII to
provide plaintiffs compensatory and punitive damages, complained that they personally suffered from
eating disorders and experienced nausea, diarrhea, cramping, neck pains, and breathing difficulties in
consequence of harassment and discrimination. See H.R. Rep. NO. 102-40, at 66-67 (1991), reprinted
in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 549, 604-05.
754. See VULNERABLE WORKERS, supra note 750, at 193 (“The negative psychological and
emotional effects of sexual harassment, [including] . . . uncontrollable anger, anxiety, irritability, fear
and depression, . . . affect the victims’ relationships . . . outside the workplace. Additionally, the
physiological and medical outcomes experienced by the victims of sexual harassment . . . quite likely
limit the individuals’ desire and ability to interact with others.”) See also STEPHEN J. MOREWITZ,
SEXUAL HARASSMENT AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN AMERICAN SOCIETY 160 (1996) (“As a result of
sexual harassment, the victims may be less willing or able to have social relationships with others.
This process is similar to those who are sexually assaulted or raped.”) (emphasis added).
755. Lenhart, supra note 750, at 32. See also PALUDI & BARICKMAN, supra note 750, at 29
(listing withdrawal, fear of new people and situations, lack of trust, lack of focus, self-preoccupation,
changes in social network patterns, negative attitudes and behavior in sexual relationships, potential
sexual disorders associated with stress and trauma, and changes in dress or in physical appearance as
effects of sexual harassment that lead to negative social, interpersonal, and sexual conflicts);
VULNERABLE WORKERS, supra note 750, at 193 (stating that reports of divorce, marital strain, and
sexual problems resulting from sexual harassment are not uncommon).
756. See VULNERABLE WORKERS, supra note 750, at 193 (“[V]ictims’ relationships with sons,
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outcomes that limit a person’s capability to work and form friendships with
co-workers.757 As a result of the harassment, the victim’s attitude towards
work and productivity are negatively affected.758
Sexual harassment economically strains the victim, the nation, and
corporate America. Incidents of sexual harassment have caused workers to
be discharged, demoted, given low evaluations, paid unfair wages, denied
promotions and training opportunities, not hired, and given poor job
references.759 Such practices may result in severe economic hardships to
sexual harassment victims. The federal government incurs losses as a result
of sexual harassment. The U.S. Merit Systems Protection Board
conservatively estimated that sexual harassment in government employment
cost the U.S. government $267.3 million between May 1985 and May 1987
as a result of low individual productivity ($76.3 million), low work group
productivity ($128.2 million), sick leave ($26.1 million), and employee
turnover expenditures ($36.7 million).760 Similar factors cause private
daughters and mothers have been strained as a result of sexual harassment.”); Lenhart, supra note 750,
at 32 (“Discomfort with the sexualized nature of the harassment and backlash can cause further
discomfort in the parent-daughter relationship.”).
757. See VULNERABLE WORKERS, supra note 750, at 194 (“The emotional and psychological
trauma experienced by the victim of harassment may render that person less willing and able to
interact with others at work . . . . Co-workers’ actions and attitudes also seem to contribute to the
negative social and interpersonal outcomes experienced by the victims of harassment.”).
758. See Donna J. Benson & Gregg E. Thomson, Sexual Harassment on a University Campus:
The Confluence of Authority Relations, Sexual Interest and Gender Stratification, 29 SOCIAL
PROBLEMS 236, 248 (1982) (“The practice of sexual harassment both reflects and reinforces the
devaluation of women’s competence and helps erode their commitment to competitive careers.”). See
also VULNERABLE WORKERS, supra note 750, at 194-95; L. Camille Hébert, The Economic
Implications of Sexual Harassment for Women, 3 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y, Spring 1994, at 47 (“In
fact, the physical and psychological effects of sexual harassment on women may become so
pronounced and so damaging to job performance that employers may acquire ‘legitimate’ reasons to
take adverse job action against the affected employee.”).
759. VULNERABLE WORKERS, supra note 750, at 195-96. See also MOREWITZ, supra note 754, at
162 (stating that workers who are discharged or quit because of sexual harassment incur up front costs
for “themselves and their family members” and consequential costs “including uncompensated sick
leave and the use of health services to cope with the stresses of unwanted sexual overtures on the
job”); David E. Terpstra & Susan E. Cook, Complainant Characteristics and Reported Behaviors and
Consequences Associated with Formal Sexual Harassment Charges, 38 PERSONNEL PSYCHOL. 559,
561-71 (1985) (studying eighty-one sexual harassment charges filed with the Illinois Department of
Human Rights from July 1, 1981, through June 30, 1983, and concluding that of the seventy-six
women in the study, sixty-six percent had been discharged, sixteen percent voluntarily quit, eleven
percent had been demoted, and eight percent had been denied promotions due to sexual harassment).
Many professionals, including scientists, engineers, lawyers, and teachers may be discouraged from
filing claims because of being blacklisted when applying for future positions. See id. at 566-67.
760. U.S. MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD, supra note 749, at 40. The U.S. Merit Systems
Update “defines ‘decline in individual productivity’ to be a loss in the quality or quantity of work
performed by an individual.” Id. at 41. Job turnover costs arose from 36,647 sexual harassment victims
leaving their position in the two-year span of the study. See id. at 40. The cost of employee sick leave
due to sexual harassment was determined somewhat differently. The victims of sexual harassment
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employers to experience reductions in their bottom lines.761
C. Age Discrimination
The sudden cessation of productive work and earning power of an
individual, caused by compulsory retirement, often leads to physical
and emotional illness and premature death.762
Age discrimination differs from “the insidious discrimination based on
race or creed prejudices and bigotry . . . aris[ing instead] . . . because of
assumptions that are made about the effects of age on performance.”763 As a
result of age discrimination, older workers are fired, not hired, forced to
retire, reassigned to undesirable positions, and given poor evaluations to
justify future dismissal.764 Such employment discrimination causes minority
were questioned as to how much, if any, sick leave they took because of sexual harassment. See id. at
41. The U.S. Merit Systems’ Board found that thirteen percent of the victims used sick leave because
of sexual harassment. See id. The Board then plugged that percentage into an equation with the
average government employee salary to the “average cost of reduced productivity was $110.89 per
female victim and $263.69 per male victim.” Id. These averages were then used in determining the
“cost of decline in work group productivity.” Id.
761. See Anita Bernstein, Law, Culture, And Harassment, 142 U. PA. L. REV. 1227, 1261 (1994)
(“An employer who condones sexual harassment— whose main criterion for employees becomes their
willingness to tolerate harassment— will likely end up with workers who have weaker traditional
qualifications and who are, therefore, less productive.”). See also ANDREA P. BARIDON & DAVID R.
EYLER, WORKING TOGETHER: THE NEW RULES AND REALITIES FOR MANAGING MEN AND WOMEN AT
WORK 172 (1994) (stating that an average Fortune 500 company that employs 23,750 individuals
incurs $6.7 million a year in costs associated with absenteeism, reduced productivity, and employee
turnover resulting from sexual harassment); Terpstra & Cook, supra note 759, at 560-61 (stating that
in addition to the costs associated with litigating a sexual harassment action, hidden costs derived from
sexual harassment may materialize as a result of increased stress, decreased work productivity,
absenteeism, and employee turnover). Corporate studies show that workers’ attitudes toward their jobs
are directly related to revenue. See Sue Shellenbarger, Companies Are Finding It Really Pays to Be
Nice to Employees, WALL ST. J., July 22, 1998, at B1. Sears Roebuck conducted a study showing that
if employee attitudes improve by five percent, customer satisfaction rises to cause a one-half percent
rise in revenue. See id. This increase in revenue, therefore, can be traced to a happier work force. See
id. Less turnover cuts training costs and experienced employees who are happy and dedicated to their
jobs are forty percent more efficient than trainees would be in their first six months on the job. See id.
The cost of replacing an employee is estimated from thirty percent of an annual salary for entry level
employees to five times the annual salary for executives. CAROL A. HACKER, THE HIGH COST OF LOW
MORALE . . . . AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT xvi (1997).
762. S. REP. NO. 95-493, at 4 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 504, 507 (based on
information received from the American Medical Association).
763. 113 CONG. REC. 34,718, 34,742 (1967) (“Studies have shown, however, that the job
performance of the older worker at many tasks does not decrease significantly with age. Even after 55,
the older worker is usually able to keep up with the pace set by his younger coworkers.”). See also S.
REP. NO. 103-40, pt. 1, at 82 (1993) (“Two nationwide surveys conducted by Louis Harris &
Associates, in 1975 and in 1981, found nearly identical results: 8 out of 10 Americans believe that
‘most employers discriminate against older people and make it difficult for them to find work.’”).
764. S. REP. NO. 103-40, pt. 1, at 82 (1993).
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group reactions among older workers, including “bitterness, resentment, and
self-hatred.”765
Victims forced into retirement may suffer negative psychological and
emotional effects such as neurotic depression, restlessness, weariness,
dejection, hypochondria, self-depreciation,766 frustration, bitterness, and
general psychological malaise.767 Furthermore, displacement from work may
shorten a victim’s life-span, resulting in premature death.768
Retirement may dramatically affect one’s social relations particularly if
the individual depended on co-workers to satisfy social needs.769 The
reduction in income and loss of interaction patterns accompanied with
employment could lead to feelings of isolation and a loss of personal
identity.770 Moreover, “[t]he more autocratic the family structure of the
retirant, the greater is the deterioration of his status and the more intense is
. . . [the individual’s] morbidity in retirement.”771
Employment-based age discrimination threatens “the welfare of many
older persons who depend on their earnings for their support.”772 Even
though older workers may receive Social Security benefits upon retirement
and may possess pension plans to help fund retirement, statistical evidence
shows that these funding mechanisms do not properly sustain retirants.773
765. MILTON L. BARRON, THE AGING AMERICAN: AN INTRODUCTION TO SOCIAL GERONTOLOGY
AND GERIATRICS 62 (1961).
766. See Norman Cameron, Neuroses of Later Maturity, in MENTAL DISORDERS IN LATER LIFE
201, 219 (Oscar Kaplan ed., 2d ed. 1956). See also W. Ferguson Anderson & R. Davidson,
Concomitant Physical States, in MODERN PERSPECTIVES IN THE PSYCHIATRY OF OLD AGE 84, 85
(John G. Howells ed., 1975) (noting that “depression following retirement is a frequently encountered
condition”).
767. See Gordon F. Streib, Morale of the Retired, 3 SOCIAL PROBLEMS 270, 270 (1956).
768. S. REP. NO. 95-493, at 4 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 504, 507; S. REP. NO. 103-
40, pt. 1, at 83 (1993) (“[M]edical evidence suggests that forced retirement can so adversely affect a
person’s physical, emotional, and psychological health that a lifespan may be shortened.”).
Retirement sufficiently disrupts daily life patterns that it “may disturb . . . [an individual’s] physiology
sufficiently to induce organic illness and premature death.” BARRON, supra note 806, at 85. Moreover,
“expectation[s] of physical and mental morbidity and impending death are so dramatically intensified
by the formality of retirement that . . . [these fears] become ‘self–fulfilling prophecies,’ expressed in
hypochondria and functional symptoms of illness.” Id. Edmund C. Payne, Depression and Suicide, in
MODERN PERSPECTIVES IN THE PSYCHIATRY OF OLD AGE, supra note 766, at 290, 293 (“Increased
suicide rates are positively correlated with situations involving stress, instability, and threatened
deprivation. The elderly are especially vulnerable to stress involving occupational and economic
factors.”).
769. See BARRON, supra note 765, at 84.
770. See id; Cameron, supra note 766, at 219.
771. BARRON, supra note 765, at 84.
772. S. REP. NO. 103-40, pt. 1, at 82 (1993).
773. See id. Increasingly, older persons are receiving maximum Social security benefits; however,
most older people still “receive less than the maximum.” Id. Moreover, the number of persons aged
sixty-five and older earned annually less than $15,000 in 1998. Id. (according to the 1990 edition of
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Therefore, not only must the victim face the physical and psychological
consequences of age discrimination, the victim will also often have to deal
with potential or actual poverty.774
Furthermore, “[s]ociety as a whole suffers from mandatory retirement.”775
As older workers are forced to retire, Social Security and pension plan funds
are drained.776 Moreover, the economy as a whole suffers as the skilled labor
force and the gross national product are reduced from older workers being
forced to retire.777
D. Disability Discrimination
When I was 5 my mother proudly pushed my wheelchair to our local
public school, where I was promptly refused admission because the
principal ruled that I was a fire hazard. . . . When I was 19, the house
mother of my college dormitory refused me admission into the dorm
because I was in a wheelchair and needed assistance. When I was 21
years old, I was denied an elementary school teaching credential
because of “paralysis of both lower extremities sequelae of
poliomyelitis.” . . . In 1981, an attempt was made to forcibly remove
me and another disabled friend from an auction house because we
were “disgusting to look at.” . . . These are only a few examples of
discrimination I have faced in my 40-year life. I successfully fought
all of these attempted actions of discrimination through immediate
aggressive confrontation or litigation. But this stigma scars for life.778
the U.S. Senate Special Committee on Aging’s report entitled “Aging America: Trends and
Projections”). “Most older persons do not have substantial holdings in savings, stocks, insurance
policies, or bonds.” Id. For many, retirement income from public or private sources is unavailable or
inadequate to support a comfortable existence. S. REP. NO. 95-493, at 3 (1978), reprinted in 1978
U.S.C.C.A.N. 504, 507. For some, the opportunity to continue working has become a question of
economic survival. See id. In 1975, 14.6 percent of persons age sixty-five and older had annual
incomes below the poverty level. See id.
774. See Streib, supra note 767, at 273 (“[L]ow morale may be due either to retirement or to low
socio-economic status. When the two factors are found in combination, they result in the most
devastating effect, for over two out of three among those persons who are both poor and retired have
low morale.”).
775. S. REP. NO. 95-493, at 4 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 504, 507.
776. See MARTIN LYON LEVINE, AGE DISCRIMINATION AND THE MANDATORY RETIREMENT
CONTROVERSY 32 (1988).
777. See id. See also S. REP. NO. 95-493, at 4 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 504, 507
(“In hearings before the House Select Committee on Aging, Professor James Schulz of Brandeis
University testified that mandatory retirement of willing and able employees costs the nation three-
tenths of 1 percent of its annual gross national product. This represents 4.5 billion 1976 dollars.”).
778. H.R. REP. NO. 101-485, pt. 2, at 29-30 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 267, 311
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Many studies document “[t]he severity and pervasiveness of
discrimination against people with disabilities.”779 Disabled individuals are
discriminated against in employment, “public accommodations, public
services, transportation, and telecommunications.”780 As a result, the disabled
experience causes feelings of isolation and helplessness as well as low levels
of self-satisfaction.781 Disability discrimination robs victims of their dignity
and self-respect and the everyday horror caused by disability discrimination
often scars victims for life.782
Disability discrimination also shuts the disabled out of mainstream
society, causing social suffering as well.783 For the most part, the disabled do
not attend theaters, movies, musical performances, grocery stores,
restaurants, or places of worship because they are made to feel too
unwelcome and too self-conscious about their disability, not only by the
architectural restrictions of these everyday venues, but also by the words and
actions of the strangers around them.784 In fact, a survey conducted in 1986
by Louis Harris, concluded that close to two-thirds of disabled Americans
did not go to one movie in the past year; three-fourths did not frequent a
single theater or music performance in the past year; two-thirds did not attend
a sporting event in the past year; seventeen percent do not eat in restaurants;
and thirteen percent of disabled Americans never shop at grocery stores.785
As a result of being discriminated against in the job market, individuals
with disabilities must struggle to survive economically in today’s society.786
(citation omitted).
779. H.R. REP. NO. 101-485, pt. 2, at 30 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 267, 311-12
(“Discrimination against people with disabilities . . . includes adverse actions taken against individuals
with histories of a disability, . . . adverse actions taken against those regarded by others as having a
disability, [and] . . . discrimination against persons associated with individuals with disabilities.”).
780. H.R. REP. NO. 101-485, pt. 2, at 29 (1990).
781. Id. at 41. See also National Council on the Handicapped, Report on Employment Issues
Related to Persons with Disabilities (June 10, 1987) (on file with author) (finding that employment for
individuals with disabilities “is critical in determining independence, self-sufficiency and quality of
life”).
782. See H.R. REP. NO. 101-485, pt. 2, at 41 (1990) reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 267, 311,
323.
783. See id.
784. H.R. REP. NO. 101-485, pt. 2, at 34-35.
785. See LOUIS HARRIS AND ASSOCIATES, THE ICD SURVEY OF DISABLED AMERICANS:
BRINGING DISABLED AMERICANS INTO THE MAINSTREAM 37-40 (1986) (on file with author)
[hereinafter LOUIS HARRIS POLL ICD 1] (cited in H.R. REP. NO. 101-485 (1990), reprinted in 1990
U.S.C.C.A.N. 267); Robert L. Burgdorf Jr., The Americans with Disabilities Act: Analysis and
Implications of a Second-Generation Civil Rights Statute, 26 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 413, 423
(1991).
786. See H.R. REP. NO. 101-485, pt. 2, at 32 (“Individuals with disabilities experience staggering
levels of unemployment and poverty. According to a recent Louis Harris poll ‘not working’ is perhaps
the truest definition of what it means to be disabled in America.”).
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In 1984, fifty percent of disabled American adults maintained household
incomes of $15,000 or less.787 Two-thirds of Americans with disabilities
between the ages of 16 and 64, roughly 8.2 million people, do not work even
though an abundant majority of these individuals do want to work.788
E. Conclusion to Part VI
Scientific studies, statistical evidence, and anecdotal accounts document
the harmful effects of particular types of discrimination. Various forms of
discrimination frequently cause the same type of suffering. A victim of age
discrimination may suffer the same psychological effects that a victim of
sexual harassment suffers. Disability discrimination may cause an individual
to suffer the same harmful physical effects that racial discrimination causes
an individual to suffer. Ethnic discrimination victims may experience the
same economic effects that age discrimination victims experience. Gender
discrimination may effect the same social costs that disability discrimination
causes.
In the end, the victim, the family, friends of the victim, and society as a
whole suffer the negative effects of each type of discrimination. With such
cumulative evidence available to Congress and the courts, one would think
that today’s enlightened decision makers would support equal tax treatment
of victims with physical and nonphysical injuries. Yet they do not.
VII. WAS UNCONSCIOUS DISCRIMINATION AT THE HEART OF THE
CHANGE TO § 104(A)(2)?
How is it conceivable that on the one hand Congress has enforced the
policy of ridding the workplace of the societal scourge of invidious
discrimination in all its forms, and on the other hand simultaneously enacted
legislation repealing a seventy-eight-year-old tax exclusion for victims of
discrimination and thus singles out for taxation the very victims of
discrimination for whom Congress intended to provide compensatory
redress? Further, why did the taxing amendment follow on the heels of the
787. See id.
788. See id; LOUIS HARRIS POLL ICD 1, supra note 785, at 47, 50-51. Americans with disabilities
who do work are often undercompensated in comparison to workers that are not disabled. H.R. REP.
NO. 101-485, pt. 2, at 32 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 267, 314. A census taken in 1980
showed that disabled men earned twenty-three percent less than the nondisabled men and disabled
women earned thirty percent less than nondisabled women. See id. By 1988, the disparity had widened
to thirty-six and thirty-eight percent respectively. See id. Of those disabled individuals that do work,
twenty-five percent live in poverty. LOUIS HARRIS POLL ICD 1, supra note 785, at 25.
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1991 Civil Rights Amendment, which expanded the protections and
remedies provided for discrimination victims in order to ensure that they are
made whole?
Certainly it would be difficult, if not impossible, to find a member of
Congress who would publicly advocate enacting tax laws that single out
victims of discrimination for taxation while providing a tax benefit to other
taxpayers. One could not assert with intellectual integrity that a fundamental
tax distinction exists in personal injuries between the physical injury of a
sprained ankle and the severe psychological injury resulting from racial
discrimination.789 Finally, it would be intellectually dishonest to suggest that
some important and overriding tax policy requires a distinction between
physical and nonphysical injuries for taxation.790 Nevertheless, between 1989
and 1996, both the Supreme Court and Congress incrementally constructed
and ultimately eliminated this seventy-eight-year-old tax exclusion for the
victims of dignitary torts.
What is the explanation for the change to § 104(a)(2)? A case can be
made that unconscious discrimination played a part in the 1996 amendments
to § 104(a)(2). In making this case, Part VII uses both psychoanalytic and
cognitive theories of psychology to argue that unconscious judicial and
legislative discrimination influenced the 1996 amendment to § 104(a)(2).
Section A introduces the psychoanalytic and cognitive theories of
unconscious discrimination, while Section B begins with an historic
overview of the law of emotional distress pertinent to the current status of
§ 104(a)(2), and then applies the psychoanalytic and cognitive theories of
unconscious discrimination to the current status of § 104(a)(2). In all of this
Part, I draw on the pioneering work on unconscious racism by Charles R.
Lawrence.
A. The Psychoanalytic (Freudian) and Cognitive Approaches to
Unconscious Discrimination
1. Psychoanalytic Approach
As is broadly recognized, and as Lawrence so powerfully portrays,
racially discriminatory acts are often the product of unconscious bias and
stereotyping.791 Lawrence cites both Freudian and cognitive theories that
789. For more information on the lack of distinction, see infra Part VI.
790. For more information on the lack of such tax policy, see infra Part III.
791. See Charles R. Lawrence, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with
Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317, 322 (1987). Lawrence employs these theories to establish
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offer insights into the unconscious nature of racist beliefs and acts, but his
theory may be expanded here to embrace all discriminatory beliefs and acts
(including those based on gender, age, and physical disability).792
Psychoanalytic theory, as developed originally in Sigmund Freud’s theory
of personality, states that the mind protects itself from anxiety associated
with guilt by refusing to identify “ideas, wishes, and beliefs” conflicting with
socially acceptable behavior.793 In Freud’s theory, this self-protection of the
conscious mind is called “repression.” And it includes both primary and
secondary mental processes. Repression’s primary process occurs in the Id,
deep below conscious awareness.794 The Id comprises the desires of the
human instincts, which seek only gratification; its ultimate end is pleasure.795
Repression’s secondary process occurs in the Ego, which includes both
conscious and unconscious dimensions.796 The Ego articulates what the
a test that would get around the intent requirement of the doctrine of discriminatory purpose
established in Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976). See id. at 319. See also Paul Brest, The
Supreme Court, 1975 Term— Foreword: In Defense of the Antidiscrimination Principle, 90 HARV. L.
REV. 1, 14 (1976) (“Race-dependent decisions need not be race-conscious, but may reflect
unconscious racially selective indifference. Such indifference violates the anti-discrimination principle
when its effect is to deny benefits to minority persons, or impose burdens on them, which would not be
denied or imposed if they were white.”). Lawrence calls this test the Cultural Meaning Test. See
Lawrence, supra, at 356. The Cultural Meaning Test identifies unconscious discrimination through
conduct or symbols containing a cultural meaning that provides evidence for such discrimination. See
id. By looking at the historical and social context of the government action, the court applies
heightened scrutiny if the preponderance of the evidence shows that a significant part of the population
would determine that unconscious discrimination influenced the government action. See id. Courts
would analyze historical and social empirical data surrounding the alleged discrimination to determine
whether unconscious discrimination occurred. See id.
Lawrence also argues that since overt discrimination is unconstitutional, legislation will be drafted
so as to be constitutional. See id. However, unconscious discrimination still may predominate
legislation. See id. As a result, this method of thought, in allowing unconscious discrimination,
becomes the new norm in the legislative process. See id. When opponents of this discrimination
identify it, such legislation is shown to have its own cultural meaning that creates the same stigma as
overt discrimination. See id. Among other things, Lawrence’s theory has been used to make
constitutional challenges against crack cocaine sentencing guidelines. See, e.g., David A. Sklansky,
Cocaine, Race, and Equal Protection, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1283, 1307-11 (1995). Arguably, under the
Cultural Meaning Test, the 1996 amendments to § 104(a)(2) would trigger heightened scrutiny and
result in the statute’s unconstitutionality.
792. See Lawrence, supra note 791, at 322-23.
793. Id. at 322. Lawrence notes that “Freudian theory states that the human mind defends itself
against the discomfort of guilt by denying or refusing to recognize those ideas, wishes, and beliefs that
conflict with what the individual has learned is good or right.” Id. Actually, Freudian theory takes a
wider view of psychic defense: it is not just defense against guilt, but defense against anxiety.”
LEVINE, supra note 776, at 137-38 (discussing Lawrence’s article).
794. SIGMUND FREUD, THE EGO AND THE ID 15 (James Strachey ed. & Joan Riviere trans., 1960)
[hereinafter FREUD]. See also Lawrence, supra note 791, at 331.
795. See FREUD, supra note 794, at 15. See also Lawrence, supra note 791, at 331.
796. See FREUD, supra note 794, at 7. Lawrence states that “[t]he, secondary process, or Ego,
happens under conscious control and is bound by logic.” Lawrence, supra note 791, at 331. This is not
entirely true. The Ego “controls the approaches to motility” and from the Ego “proceed the
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conscious self considers “reason and common sense.”797 Repression occurs at
the level of the Ego when its alleged “reason and common sense” blocks
passions deeply seated in the Id from entering fully into consciousness.798
When this happens, powerful unconscious ideas actually influence
consciousness, but do not themselves become explicitly conscious. At a very
deep level within the self, “certain forces” oppose such an occurrence.799
According to Lawrence, psychoanalytic theory can be used to explain
how racism is the product of unconscious repression. Thus, “racial
antagonism finds its source in the unconscious, since people who are “asked
to explain the basis of their racial antagonism . . . either express an
instinctive, unexplained distaste at the thought of associating with the out-
group as equals or . . . cite reasons that are not based on established facts and
are often contradicted by personal experience.”800 Such behavior reveals
poor “reality-testing.”801 The inadequacy of reality-testing usually preserves a
misguided attitude that remains basic to the “individual’s makeup.”802 In
addition, when threatened by adequate reality-testing, such individuals
avoided the truth by legitimizing the misguided attitude with “socially
acceptable pseudoreasons.”803
repressions, . . . by means of which it is sought to exclude certain trends in the mind not merely from
consciousness but also from other forms of effectiveness and activity.” See FREUD, supra note 794, at
7. These trends “stand in opposition to the ego, and the analysis is faced with the task of removing the
resistances which the ego displays against concerning itself with the repressed.” Id. Freud notes that
patients in analysis have trouble removing the resistance and upon being told that a resistance exists,
patients do not know what the resistance is or how to describe it. Id. This leads Freud to the conclusion
that “[w]e have come upon something in the ego itself which is also unconscious, which behaves
exactly like the repressed— that is, which produces powerful effects without itself being conscious and
which requires special work before it can be made conscious.” Id. A part of the ego is thus
unconscious. See id. at 8.
797. See FREUD, supra note 794, at 15. The ego and the id are not separate. The “ego is that part
of the id which has been modified by the direct influence of the external world.” See id. at 15.
798. See id. at 4, 15. See also Lawrence, supra note 791, at 331-32.
799. See FREUD, supra note 794, at 15. If “certain forces” did not exist to oppose unconscious
ideas, “it would then be apparent how little they differ from other elements which are admittedly
psychical.” Id. Freud calls an idea a psychical element. See id. This psychical element is sometimes
unconscious for an extended period of time. See id. In fact, its conscious state is transitory. See id.
However, the idea can become conscious once again and is then termed latent or unconscious. See id.
Repression is “[t]he state in which the ideas existed before being made conscious . . . [and] the force
which instituted the repression and maintains it is perceived as resistance during the work of analysis.”
Id. To Freud, in the descriptive sense, there are two different types of unconscious. See id. at 5. The
latent unconscious, which he calls preconscious, is capable of becoming conscious. See id. The
repressed unconscious, which he calls unconscious, cannot become conscious. See id. The unconscious
is the “prototype of the unconscious.” Id.
800. Lawrence, supra note 791, at 332 (emphasis added).
801. Id.
802. Id.
803. Id. (emphasis added).
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Unlike the case of explicitly conscious irrational behavior which does not
even try to justify its distaste of an out-group, and which consciously refuses
to allow its prejudice to be contradicted by personal experience, unconscious
racism (and by extension unconscious prejudice in general), claims to be
logical and rational, even when it maintains “rigidly stereotyped thinking”
that projects neurotic conflict.804
For example, Lawrence points to studies that show racists hold out two
general stereotypes: (1) the out-group is “dirty, lazy, oversexed, and without
control of their instincts (a typical accusation against blacks);” and (2) the
outgroup is “pushy, ambitious, conniving, and in control of business, money,
and industry (a typical accusation against Jews).”805 These stereotypes result,
he claims, from neurotic conflict that arises when either instinctive drives
cannot be “master[ed]” under “socially approved patterns of behavior,” or
“when an individual cannot live up to the aspirations and standards of his
[sic] own conscience.”806
Lawrence states that, since overt racism has been socially rejected in
today’s society, then “hidden prejudice [must] . . . become the more prevalent
form of racism.”807 The ego “must adapt” to this new social order and
“repress or disguise racist ideas.”808
2. Cognitive Approach
In contrast to psychoanalytic theorists, cognitive psychologists “do not
embrace the Freudian belief that instinctual drives dominate individuals’
concepts, attitudes, and beliefs. Instead, they view human behavior, including
racial prejudice, as growing out of the individual’s attempt to understand his
(or her) relationship with the world . . . while at the same time preserving his
(or her) personal integrity.”809
Cognitive theorists believe that individuals categorize all things as part of
their attempt to understand the complexities of life.810 Such categorization
produces discriminatory stereotypes, because “[w]hen a category . . .
correlates with a continuous dimension . . . there is a tendency to exaggerate
804. Id. at 333.
805. Id. (citing G. ALLPORT, THE NATURE OF PREJUDICE 196-98 (1954); J. KOVEL, WHITE
RACISM: A PSYCHOHISTORY 51-92 (1970); G. SELZNICK & S. STEINBERG, THE TENACITY OF
PREJUDICE: ANTISEMITISM IN CONTEMPORARY AMERICA 170-71 (1969)).
806. Lawrence, supra note 791, at 333-34.
807. See id. at 335.
808. Id. at 335 (emphasis added).
809. Id. at 336.
810. Lawrence, supra note 791, at 337-38.
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the differences between categories on that dimension and to minimize the
differences within each category.”811 “Individuals learn cultural attitudes and
beliefs about race very early in life, at a time when it is difficult to separate
the perceptions of one’s teacher (usually a parent) from one’s own.” Thus,
people create social categories and assign to each category content
characteristics “generated over a long period of time within a culture and
transmitted to individual members of society by . . . ‘assimilation’ . . .
[which] entails learning and internalizing preferences and evaluations.”812 A
racist category will therefore be formed by associating external features with
certain undesirable or offensive character traits.
When someone with racist categories confronts an individual who for
external reasons falls within a different category than one’s self, that person
then assumes that the other person carries the stereotypical character traits
that correspond to the racist categories. Only after receiving sufficient
information conflicting with the stereotype, can such presumptions about that
particular individual be eliminated.813 However, when the individual deals
with interpreting the behavior of a stereotyped group “en masse,” that
stereotype will almost never be broken down.814 Moreover, the individual,
who experiences events that further illustrate and support the stereotype of a
811. Id. at 337. See also Donald T. Campbell, Enhancement of Contrast as Composite Habit, 53 J.
ABNORMAL & SOC. PSYCHOL. 350, 355 (1956) (conducting a series of experiments with nonsense
syllables and coming to similar conclusions as did Tajfel & Wilkes); Henri Tajfel, Cognitive Aspects
of Prejudice, J. SOC. ISSUES, Autumn 1969, at 83-86 (discussing the 1963 experiments conducted by
Tajfel and Wilkes and their application to aspects of prejudice); Henri Tajfel & A.L. Wilkes,
Classification and Quantitative Judgment, 54 BRIT. J. PSYCHOL. 101, 104 (1963) (conducting a series
of experiments and finding that individuals over- and underestimated the lengths of lines once they
were told that the longer four lines were in “Group A” and the shorter four were in “Group B”). The
cognitive approach includes three claims. See Linda Hamilton Krieger, The Content of Our
Categories: A Cognitive Bias Approach to Discrimination and Equal Employment Opportunity, 47
STAN. L. REV. 1161, 1187-88 (1995). First, stereotyping is a form of categorization used by prejudiced
and nonprejudiced individuals. See id. at 1188. Second, stereotypes “bias a decision maker’s judgment
long before the ‘moment of decision,’ as a decision maker attends to relevant data and interprets,
encodes, stores, and retrieves it from memory. Id. These biases “‘sneak up on’” the decision maker,
distorting bit by bit the data upon which his decision is eventually based.” Id. Third, stereotypes
“operate beyond the reach of decision maker self-awareness. Empirical evidence indicates that
people’s access to their own cognitive processes is in fact poor. Accordingly, cognitive bias may well
be both unintentional and unconscious.” Id.
812. Lawrence, supra note 791, at 337-38. See also Jody David Armour, Hype and Reality in
Affirmative Action, 68 U. COLO. L. REV. 1173, 1181-82 (1997) (“Stereotypes are deeply ingrained in
children’s memories at an early age . . . . For example, Dr. Phyllis Katz reports a chilling case of a
three-year-old child, who upon seeing a black infant said to her mother, ‘Look mom, a baby maid.’”).
Discrimination can also be learned through exposure to the “media and an individual’s parents, peers,
and authority figures.” Lawrence, supra note 791, at 323.
813. See Lawrence, supra note 791, at 339.
814. Id.
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particular group, only strengthens that internal stereotype.815 After the
reinforcement occurs, the individual rejects that he or she ever had a previous
stereotype of the group and, instead, focuses on the actual observed event as
a reason for not preferring a certain group.816
Cognitive theory makes three claims.817 First, stereotyping is a form of
categorization used by both prejudiced and nonprejudiced individuals.818
Second, stereotypes “bias a decision maker’s judgment long before the
‘moment of decision,’ as a decision maker attends to relevant data and
interprets, encodes, stores, and retrieves it from memory. These biases ‘sneak
up on’ the decision maker, distorting bit by bit the data upon which his
decision is eventually based.”819 Third, stereotypes “operate beyond the reach
of decision maker’s self- awareness. Empirical evidence indicates that
people’s access to their own cognitive processes is, in fact, poor.
Accordingly, cognitive bias may well be both unintentional and
unconscious.”820
B. Application of the Psychoanalytic Theory and Cognitive Theory to
§ 104(a)(2)
Psychoanalytic and cognitive theories may be used to explain
unconscious discrimination based on race, sex, age, disability, national
origin, or religion.821 Using both these theories, this section will begin by
revealing the actual historical existence of unconscious discrimination by the
law in the case of emotional distress, which is a nonphysical injury. Then it
will argue that this historical discrimination by the law toward treatment of
emotionally distressed plaintiffs, who have suffered nonphysical injury, is
detrimental to the rights of victims of nonphysical injuries under § 104(a)(2).
815. See id. at 338.
816. See id. at 338-39.
817. See Krieger, supra note 811, at 1187-88.
818. See id. at 1188.
819. Id.
820. Id. See also infra Part VII.A.2.
821. Although Lawrence narrowed the scope of his article to unconscious racism, he noted that
“[i]t has been argued that sexism is even more deeply imbedded in our culture than racism and, thus,
less visible . . . This would indicate that until the dominant ideology wholly rejects sexism, sexist
attitudes may be repressed and held at an unconscious level less often than racist attitudes.” Lawrence,
supra note 791, at 322 n.22 (citations omitted). Martin Lyon Levine, while discussing unconscious
ageism, believes that Lawrence has “the argument backwards” under Freudian theory. LEVINE, supra
note 776, at 138. Levine argues that sexist and ageist attitudes are “more likely to be repressed than
racist attitudes, because . . . the relationship with the other sex . . . [and] the relationship with the older
generation [are] . . . highly conflict-ridden experience[s]” for young children. Id. Levine concludes that
“in a Freudian theory of repression, unlike Lawrence’s theory, commonly held unconscious sexism
and unconscious ageism are hypotheses worth considering.” Id.
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1. History of Gender Bias in the Law of Mental Injury
Male judges and lawyers influenced by early modern Western male
philosophers like Descartes, Rousseau, and Hobbes, laid the foundation for
unconscious but very real discrimination against women in modern Western
legal systems.822
One important example of a standard in the law biased against women
was the allegedly objective “reasonable man” standard, established in the
1837 English tort case of Vaughan v. Menlove: “Negligence is the omission
to do something which a reasonable man . . . would do, or doing something
which a prudent and reasonable man would not do.”823 This standard is
“male–biased” because courts and society in general “view the male
perspective as the objective or normative one.”824
Early common law decisions concerning emotional distress evidenced
this gender bias, perhaps most notably in the 1861 English case of Lynch v.
Knight.825 Lynch concerned a defamation action in which a female plaintiff
claimed that defendant’s slanderous remarks concerning her morality caused
her husband to expel her from the family home, and thus she suffered from
loss of consortium.826 The court dismissed the case, because it found that the
expulsion was not a foreseeable response to the defamatory remark.827
Although the technical holding seems gender neutral, “the opinions of the
judges in Lynch displayed a consciousness of gender difference and used the
dichotomy of physical and emotional harm to marginalize the interests of
women.”828
In reaching his decision, Lord Wensleydale found that a husband suffers
822. See Elizabeth Handsley, Mental Injury Occasioned by Harm to Another: A Feminist Critique,
14 LAW & INEQ. J. 391, 458 (1996). See also Leslie Bender, A Lawyer’s Primer on Feminist Theory
and Tort, 38 J. LEGAL EDUC. 3, 20 (1988) (“Men have and have had the power to set the standards in
law and in our ideology and have used that power to subordinate women.”). See also Anita Bernstein,
Treating Sexual Harassment with Respect, 111 HARV. L. REV. 445, 457 (1997) (“Rousseau denounced
women as incapable of thought and unsuited to education; . . . Hobbes, Locke, and Adam Smith, . . .
presume[d] the absence of women’s thought, consent, and decision making.”).
823. 132 Eng. Rep. 490 (P.C. 1837). Vahghan is noted for establishing the reasonable or prudent
man standard. See id. at 493-94. See also Blyth v. Birmingham Waterworks Co., 156 Eng. Rep. 1047,
1049 (Ex. 1856). But see Warren A. Seavey, Negligence— Subjective or Objective?, 41 HARV. L. REV.
1, 27 (1927) (stating that the reasonable man may not be completely defined by use of objective
standards).
824. Leslie Bender, Teaching Torts As If Gender Matters: Intentional Torts, 2 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y
& L., Fall 1994, at 142.
825. 11 Eng. Rep. 854 (H.L. 1861).
826. See id. at 858.
827. See id. at 863.
828. Martha Chamallas & Linda K. Kerber, Women, Mothers, and the Law of Fright: A History,
88 MICH. L. REV. 814, 816 (1990).
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pecuniary harm as a result of loss of consortium because a wife’s services are
material. He stated, however, that, when a wife suffers from loss of
consortium, her loss is emotional and mental.829 Therefore, he stated, the
wife could not recover damages because “the law cannot value, and does not
pretend to redress, [mental pain or anxiety] when the unlawful act
complained of causes that alone.”830 Lord Wensleydale reasoned that the
husband, who alone has all the property of the married parties, may repair
[his loss] by hiring another servant [to replace the loss of his wife’s services];
but the wife sustains only the loss of the comfort of her husband’s society
and affectionate attention, which the law cannot estimate or remedy.”831
Lord Campbell alternately compared the injuries sustained by a husband
and a wife when their spouse commits adultery. Campbell considered the
injuries sustained by a husband due to his wife’s adultery similar to that of
property loss.832 A wife’s adulterous act completely deprived the husband of
his property permanently, regardless of his subjective response.833 Thus, on
the one hand, the court viewed the husband’s loss as an objective and
complete loss of the value of a wife.834 But, on the other hand, the court
considered the same injury to a wife as not permanent, as dependent on the
wife’s subjective response, and of a class of hurt feelings that could not be
compensated.835 “This legally constructed asymmetry resulted in gender
disadvantage to women.”836
Chamallas and Kerber point out that:
By locating the wife’s injury within her own mind, the court could
dismiss the harm and blame the victim for not mitigating her own
injuries . . . . This subjective/objective dichotomy resembles the
gendered nature of the material/emotional dichotomy in the loss of
consortium: the harm to the woman is conceived of as subjective; the
same harm to the man is viewed as objective.837
Although the opinion is discriminatory, the rule of law established in
Lynch, namely that mental disturbance alone is not actionable, was adopted
by later courts but, without reliance on such discriminatory reasoning.838
829. Lynch, 11 Eng. Rep. at 863.
830. Id. at 863.
831. Id.
832. Id. at 860.
833. See id.
834. See id.
835. See Lynch, 11 Eng. Rep. at 863.
836. Chamallas & Kerber, supra note 828, at 818.
837. Chamallas & Kerber, supra note 828, at 818-19.
838. Martha Chamallas, The Architecture of Bias: Deep Structures in Tort Law, 146 U. PA. L.
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Instead, subsequent decisions dealing with claims for emotional distress
disallowed recovery for various other reasons.839
Prosser and Keeton have noted that these earlier cases denied relief to
plaintiffs because “mental disturbance cannot be measured in terms of
money, and so cannot serve in itself as a basis for the action; . . . its physical
consequences are too remote, and so not ‘proximately caused’; . . . there is a
lack of precedent, and . . . a vast increase in litigation would follow.”840
Though these reasons have also been rejected over time, courts more recently
have been reluctant to allow damages for mental disturbance because of a
belief that these claims are trivial, may be fraudulent, and impose
disproportional financial burdens on defendants whose actions are merely
negligent.841 To alleviate those concerns, the majority of courts today do not
allow recovery in emotional disturbance cases without the presence of
physical illness or consequences.842 The modern trend is to allow relief only
where there is accompanying physical injury.843 Some courts, however, have
allowed recovery where the mental disturbance is caused by witnessing harm
to another.844
Although the law has allowed damages for mental distress resulting from
infliction of physical harm, the same cannot be said for fright-based physical
injury cases resulting in mental distress.845 Courts historically required
plaintiffs who wished to succeed on a fright-based physical injury claim to
REV. 463, 491 (1998).
839. See id. at 491-95.
840. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER & KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS, § 54, at 360 (5th ed.
1984) [hereinafter PROSSER & KEETON]. See also Chittick v. Philadelphia Rapid Transit Co., 73 A. 4
(Pa. 1909); Mitchell v. Rochester Ry. Co., 45 N.E. 354, 354 (N.Y. 1896) (“If it be admitted that no
recovery can be had for fright occasioned by the negligence of another, it is somewhat difficult to
understand how a defendant would be liable for its consequences. . . . [I]t is obvious that no recovery
can be had for injuries resulting therefrom.”); Spade v. Lynn & Boston R.R. Co., 47 N.E. 88, 89
(Mass. 1897) (“The number of actions brought is very great. This should lead courts well to consider
the grounds on which claims for compensation properly rest, and the necessary limitations of the right
to recover. . . . [Otherwise,] this would open a wide door for unjust claims, which could not
successfully be met.”); Lehman v. Brooklyn City R.R. Co., 47 Hun. 355 (1888); Victorian Rys.
Comm’rs v. Coultas, 13 App. Cas. 222 (P.C. 1888).
841. See Dulieu v. White & Sons, 2 K.B. 669 (1901). Note the distinction here and the opposite
principal of law applied in physical injury tort cases; for example, “the tortfeasor takes the plaintiff as
he finds him.” The victim with the eggshell skull is compensated in full even when the tortfeasors
conduct to another would not have resulted in such grave consequences or damages. This principal of
law has long been followed and applies in negligence as well as intentional tort cases. Why should it
not be applied in discrimination cases that result in nonphysical as well as physical harms— is it such a
long reach for the law to develop this consistent application?
842. See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 840, § 54, at 361.
843. See id. § 54, at 363.
844. See, e.g., Dillon v. Legg, 441 P.2d 912 (Cal. 1968).
845. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 840, § 54, at 362-63.
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show “impact.”846 Thus, the plaintiff had to produce evidence showing that
he or she was physically touched in some way during the events that led to
the shock.847
While the impact rule seemed gender neutral, upon historical scrutiny one
realizes that the requirement of “impact” in fright-based physical injury cases
has disparate effects. Prosser and Keeton note that fright-based physical
injury cases frequently involved miscarriages by pregnant women and even
came to typify such claims.848 But fright-based miscarriages often did not
involve impact.849 Therefore, the fright-based physical injury plaintiff who
suffered the traumatic experience of a miscarriage was denied relief, while
the plaintiff who was slightly touched brought a successful action under the
“impact” rule.850
Fortunately, the “impact” rule has been eliminated in almost all
jurisdictions.851 Now, some jurisdictions follow the physical injury rule that
allows recovery upon showing of physical injury without focusing on how
the injury is brought about.852 Other states follow the zone of danger rule that
allows recovery where the plaintiff is physically put in danger by the
defendant’s acts.853 A minority of states follow a more liberal rule that allows
recovery for fright-based physical injury upon a showing of serious mental
distress.854
Gender bias plays an even stronger role in claims where fright results
from witnessing peril or harm to another. In 1968, the California Supreme
Court decided the landmark decision of Dillon v. Legg.855 In this case, the
court allowed a mother who witnessed her child killed by an automobile to
recover damages for her mental distress, despite the fact that the mother
herself was in a completely safe area and in no physical danger at the time of
the accident.856 In order to reach such a result, the court departed from the
zone of danger rule and allowed recovery where the plaintiff could prove that
she was in physical proximity to the scene of the accident, personally
observed the accident, and was closely related to the victim.857 The Dillon
846. See id. § 54, at 363.
847. See Handsley, supra note 822, at 399-400.
848. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 840, § 54, at 363 & n.38.
849. See id.
850. See id. at 363-64.
851. See Chamallas & Kerber, supra note 828, at 820.
852. See id.
853. See Handsley, supra note 822, at 401.
854. See Chamallas & Kerber, supra note 828, at 820-21.
855. 441 P.2d 912 (Cal. 1968).
856. See id. at 914.
857. See id. at 920-21.
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holding, therefore, no longer required plaintiffs to be in actual physical
danger themselves and took a step to redress harms that result from caring for
others and developing relationships.
Although some jurisdictions follow Dillon and have further developed the
forseeability guidelines of that case,858 feminist scholars have proffered that
gender bias has prevented other jurisdictions from accepting the rule of
Dillon.859 In these jurisdictions, causes of action for emotional distress
858. See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 840, § 54, at 366 & n.74. See also D’Amicol v. Alvarez
Shipping Co., 326 A.2d 129, 132 (Conn. 1973) (“Manifestly the shock and anguish of seeing their
child killed in the torturous occurrence in which they all were involved must have been great and not
only foreseeable, . . . but also an understandable and foreseeable direct consequence of the tortious
act.”); Leong v. Takasaki, 520 P.2d 758, 762 (Haw. 1974) (“Because other standards exist to test the
authenticity of plaintiff’s claim for relief, the requirement of resulting physical injury, like the
requirement of physical impact, should not stand as another artificial bar to recovery, but merely be
admissible as evidence of the degree of mental or emotional distress suffered.”); Barnhill v. Davis, 300
N.W.2d 104 (Iowa 1981); Dziokonski v. Babineau, 380 N.E.2d 1295, 1299 (Mass. 1978) (“The threat
of fraudulent claims cannot alone justify the denial of recovery in all cases. Whether a plaintiff’s
injuries were a reasonably foreseeable consequence of the defendant’s negligence and whether the
defendant caused those injuries are best left to determination in the normal manner before the trier of
fact.”); Culbert v. Sampson’s Supermarkets Inc., 444 A.2d 433, 437 (Me. 1982) (“We now reject the
notion that the plaintiff must allege or prove physical injuries or physical manifestations of the
distress, . . . as well as emotional and mental trauma, in order to prevail.”); Miller v. Cook, 273
N.W.2d 567, 569 (Mich. 1978) (“[W]e conclude that in Michigan a cause of action does not exist for
damages for mental anguish sustained upon learning of an intentional tort committed at a non-
contemporaneous time upon an immediate family member.”); Portee v. Jaffee, 417 A.2d 521 (N.J.
1980) (“[N]egligent infliction of emotional distress requires . . . (1) the death or serious physical injury
of another caused by defendant’s negligence; (2) a marital or intimate, familial relationship between
plaintiff and the injured person; (3) observation of the death or injury at the scene of the accident; and
(4) resulting severe emotional distress.”); Sinn v. Burd, 404 A.2d 672, 677, 687 (Pa. 1979) (“The
restrictiveness of the zone of danger test is glaringly apparent where it is allowed to deny recovery to a
parent who has suffered emotional harm from witnessing a tortious assault upon the person of his or
her minor child . . . . [W]e are satisfied that public policy demands that we not permit the application
of the zone of danger concept to deny recovery merely because of the nature of the damage.”);
D’Ambra v. United States, 338 A.2d 524, 531 (R.I. 1975) (holding “that a nonnegligent mother, who
although suffering no physical impact suffers serious mental and emotional . . . from actually
witnessing the death of her nonnegligent minor child as a direct result of the defendant’s negligence,
may maintain an action for negligent infliction of emotional distress”); General Motors Corp. v.
Grizzle, 642 S.W.2d 837, 844 (Tex. 1982) (holding that appellant “could not recover for her mental
injury because she neither saw, heard, or otherwise sensorily perceived the accident”). However, some
courts require physical injuries to sustain a cause of action for mental distress. Compare Corso v.
Merrill, 406 A.2d 300 (N.H. 1979) (“[T]he harm for which plaintiff seeks to recover must be
susceptible to some form of objective medical determination and proved through qualified medical
witnesses.”).
859. See Chamallas & Kerber, supra note 828, at 821-23; Handsley, supra note 822, at 461
(“Requirements tying injury to physical phenomena, such as the impact rule, the zone of danger rule,
the Dillon criteria, and the physical manifestation rule begin to make sense as products of an inability
to come to terms with the relationship among the mind, the body, and the emotions.”); Deborah K.
Hepler, Providing Creative Remedies to Bystander Emotional Distress Victims: A Feminist
Perspective, 14 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 71, 83-84 (1993) (“Tort law from a feminist perspective would
focus on interdependence and collective responsibility rather than individuality, and on safety and help
for the injured party rather than on ‘reasonableness’ and economic efficiency.”).
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resulting from peril or harm to another are not generally accepted because
“[s]ociety’s interest in protecting the parent-child relationship . . . has been
offset by an equal interest in preserving the underlying bias against the rights
of women.”860
Elizabeth Handsley explains the denigrated status of claims for emotional
distress resulting from peril or harm to another from an epistemological
standpoint.861 She proposes that “[t]he law has applied a masculine
epistemology to claims relating to mental injury.”862 As a result, the law has
“insisted on a mind-body split to differentiate mental from other injuries” and
“relied on scientific evidence to prove the reality and/or seriousness of the
injury, rather than paying attention to the common experiences of women
(and men) in this society.”863 Because of this masculine epistemology, Dillon
is not generally accepted because mental harm as a result of injury to another
is an “injury to an interest defined as peculiarly feminine: that of caring and
relationships.”864
2. Psychoanalytic Theory and § 104(a)(2)
Historically, the unconscious has played an integral role in creating
overtly and covertly sexist attitudes in tort law. The reasonable man standard
established in Vaughan, and the opinions regarding emotional stress claims
in Lynch, both exemplify overtly sexist attitudes produced by the
unconscious. The “reasonable man” standard adopted from Vaughan was
decided in nineteenth century England, a society where women were not
equal to men, were regarded as property, and were disenfranchised.865 Given
the fact that women were not treated as equals, traits associated with men
comprised the “reasonable man” standard.866 This trait-association evidences
poor “reality testing” that fulfills the psychological function of preserving
male dominance over females. At that time, male dominance was preserved
by the use of socially accepted pseudo-reasons (i.e. women are not equal to
men and are property) that are themselves overtly sexist and were clearly
established to preserve male dominance. For example, Lord Wensleydale and
Lord Campbell relied on the notion that women are property of their
husbands in order to reach their respective decisions. By so doing, they
860. Hepler, supra note 859, at 97-98.
861. See Handsley, supra note 822, at 460, 486.
862. Id. at 392.
863. Id. at 486-87.
864. Id. at 486.
865. See Collins, supra note 659, at 317-18.
866. See Handsley, supra note 822, at 392.
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accepted the Cartesian subjective/objective dichotomy, which in turn created
the material/emotional dichotomy in tort law.867
The gender-biased “reasonable man” standard established in Vaughan
may have played a role in Lynch. In patriarchal cultures, women have been
considered as emotional beings, while men have not.868 Arguably, since the
“reasonable man” is comprised of male traits, the “reasonable man” would
not be considered an emotional being.869 Injury to emotions, therefore, may
not constitute harm to the “reasonable man.” As a result, any claim brought
for harms to emotions alone would be dismissed because the female plaintiff,
unlike the objectively “reasonable man,” would be seen as someone unique
with an “eggshell psyche,” weak, feeble, and suffering from self-inflicted
harm.870 In that light, the Lynch opinion appears to have been a product of
unconscious sexism associated with the “reasonable man” standard that
demeaned women’s position in society. Despite the more liberated status of
women in today’s society, the rule of law established in Lynch enjoyed such
historical acceptance that its deep impact still affects the tort of emotional
distress.
Because overt sexism has been socially rejected in today’s society, covert
sexism has become the more prevalent form.871 The ego must adjust to new
societal norms, and therefore it must repress or disguise sexist ideas or
feelings seated deeply in the unconscious.
Ego-disguise is arguably evidenced today in renaming the “reasonable
man” standard to the “reasonable person” standard which uses policy-
oriented justifications to deny claims for emotional distress, and which use
judicially crafted rules to limit the type of plaintiffs who can recover for
emotional harm. This judicial wizardry, though purporting to be neutral,
unconsciously preserves what sexist reasoning had previously attempted to
maintain, even though it uses nice language that better conforms to a
changing society. “As our social sensitivity to sexism developed, our legal
institutions did the ‘gentlemanly’ thing and substituted the neutral word
‘person’ for ‘man.’ . . . Although tort law protected itself from allegations of
867. See Chamallas & Kerber, supra note 828, at 818-19.
868. See Michele A. Paludi & Lisa A. Strayer, What’s in an Author’s Name? Differential
Evaluations of Performance as a Function of Author’s Name, 12 SEX ROLES 353, 353 (1985).
869. See Handsley, supra note 822, at 392.
870. Leslie Benton Sandor & Carol Berry, Recovery for Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress
Attendant to Economic Loss: A Reassessment, 37 ARIZ. L. REV. 1247, 1252 (1995).
871. See Tracy Anbinder Baron, Comment, Keeping Women Out of the Executive Suite: The
Courts’ Failure to Apply Title VII Scrutiny to Upper-Level Jobs, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 267, 304 (1994);
Susanne M. Browne, Note, Due Process and Equal Protection Challenges to the Inadequate Response
of the Police in Domestic Violence Situations, 68 S. CAL. L. REV. 1295, 1330-31 (1995).
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sexism, it did not change its content and character.”872
Despite the name change, the “reasonable person” standard, for example,
has been criticized as keeping the same gender as the “reasonable man”
standard. Handsley notes that “the law generally expects and rewards
‘reasonableness’— a trait culturally associated with men— and fails to require
us to be consciously caring and responsible towards each other— traits
culturally associated with women.”873
Nineteenth-century cases following Lynch did not rely on overtly sexist
rationale. Instead, those cases reached similar results with the use of gender
neutral justifications. In the 1940s, gender-neutral justifications were
definitively rejected,874 which revealed the conscious bias of those
nineteenth-century rationales. But, in a society beginning to reject such
discriminatory assumptions, this change may have only produced the
repression of sexist beliefs.
The impact rule prevented fright-based physical injury plaintiffs who
suffered miscarriages (the type of plaintiffs who typified claims for mental
disturbance with resulting physical injury) from recovery, while the
infrequent plaintiff who suffered dust in the eye and smoke inhalation
872. Bender, supra note 824, at 22. See also Lucinda M. Finley, A Break in the Silence: Including
Women’s Issues in a Torts Course, 1 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 41, 57 (1989) (finding that the reasonable
person “standard is an example of a supposedly neutral rule which may actually be suffused with the
male perspective and with notions of the male ideal”).
873. Handsley, supra note 822, at 392.
874. See G. EDWARD WHITE, TORT LAW IN AMERICA: AN INTELLECTUAL HISTORY 105 (1980).
The new line of justifications for denying redress for emotional harm claims are based in beliefs that
such claims are trivial, may be fraudulent, impose disproportional financial burdens on defendants
who’s actions are merely negligent, and inflict great administrative burdens upon the court system. See
Handsley, supra note 822, at 424. These justifications may also be the product of unconscious sexist
attitudes. They have been heavily criticized because the rule does not necessarily address the concerns.
Medical advances have shown that claims for emotional injury are far from trivial. See id. at 425.
Furthermore, insinuations that all physical injuries are more severe than all mental injuries is illogical.
See id. at 425-26. The rule barring all claims based solely upon emotional injury does little or nothing
to prevent trivial claims from reaching the courts. See id. at 427. The contention that emotional injuries
are somehow more easily feigned than physical injuries lacks any sound logical basis, since viable
means such as medical expert testimony, are available to assure genuineness of claims without
resorting to the physical and nonphysical distinction. See id. Moreover, the tort system does not
concentrate on the effects that compensation will have on the wrongdoer, but rather on the need for
compensation itself. See id. at 433. A deserving plaintiff should never be denied recovery simply
because of the burden that recovery may impose upon the tortfeasor. See id. The rule disallowing
mental harms has no bearing on the apprehension evident in courts that too many claims would result
otherwise. See id. at 436-37. The courts fail to realize that “unjust rules which are out of step with
social standards are more likely to give rise to litigation”. Id. at 437. This is due to the fact that society,
and in turn the legal profession, will become dissatisfied and attempt to overturn such rules. See id. It
is argued that “[a] clear rejection of restrictive liability rules . . . may in fact reduce the volume of
litigation . . . because defendants will . . . be more inclined to settle.” Id.
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successfully brought an action.875
Although the impact rule has been rejected in almost all states, a similar
result may be reached under the zone of danger rule.876 Under this rule, a
woman can still suffer a miscarriage from fright and not recover. If she is not
within a zone of physical danger, recovery may be denied.877 Both the impact
rule and the zone of damage rule are suspect because these legal rules do not
“tie recovery to the degree of tortiousness in the defendant’s act, nor to the
extent of harm suffered.”878 Although troubling, results such as these are not
surprising since “in a gendered world, injuries are socially constructed so that
the gender of the person claiming a loss can affect the legal conceptualization
of the harm.”879
Although the law has changed since Lynch and its progeny, the
foundational decisions impeding legal recognition of emotional harms are
deeply entrenched in the law. Even today the majority of courts follow the
material/emotional dichotomy by not allowing recovery in emotional
disturbance cases without physical illness or consequences,880 and regard
individuals who bring claims for emotional distress as weak, feeble,
worthless, and suffering from self-inflicted harm.881
Given this historical background, it is not surprising that the present day
§ 104(a)(2) treats individuals with physical injuries differently from
individuals with nonphysical injuries. In contrast to law’s material/emotional
dichotomy, however, medical research over the past 138 years has
demonstrated that emotional and physical pain are not quantitatively
different.882 So why is there a major discrepancy between the law and
medical research? Perhaps legal lack of knowledge about medical studies in
the field of pain research is not the real reason why § 104(a)(2) still persists
in maintaining its physical versus nonphysical distinction. Perhaps instead
875. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 840, § 54, at 363-64. See also Porter v. Delaware L. & W.R.
Co., 63 A. 860 (Del. 1906) (recovering damages under the impact rule for dust in the eye); Morton v.
Stack, 170 N.E. 869 (Ohio 1930) (recovering for smoke inhalation).
876. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 840, § 54, at 364-65.
877. See, e.g., Bourhill v. Young, 1943 App. Cas. 92 (appeal taken from Second Division of Court
of Session 1941 S.C. 395).
878. Handsley, supra note 822, at 434.
879. Chamallas & Kerber, supra note 828, at 816. See also Carl Tobias, Gender Issues and the
Prosser, Wade, and Schwartz Torts Casebook, 18 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 495, 505-06 (1988)
(stating that “nearly all of the cases included in the notes introducing historical material on the
independent cause of action for mental distress [of the Prosser, Wade, and Schwartz Torts Casebook]
involve[d] females who appear gullible, stupid, or weak, thus reaffirming notions of women’s
inferiority”).
880. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 840, § 54, at 361.
881. See Sandor & Berry, supra note 870, at 1252.
882. See WHITE, supra note 874, at 102-04.
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the real reason is the discriminatory perception that those who bring claims
involving emotional distress are weak and suffer from self-inflicted harms.
Such a perception would be a product of the both overtly and covertly
unconscious sexism flowing from Lynch and its progeny, coupled with other
forms of unconscious discrimination by the courts and the Congress
concerning the current status of § 104(a)(2).
The case law that led up to the 1996 amendments to § 104(a)(2),883 the
legislative attempts in 1989 and 1995 to change § 104(a)(2),884 and the 1996
amendments to § 104(a)(2)885 all exhibit covertly unconscious
discrimination. As we have seen, because our society does not condone race,
sex, age, disability, nationality, or religious discrimination, hidden prejudice
has had to become the more common form of discrimination. The jumps in
logic, grafting on of language, contortion of analytical framework, and de-
evolution of the term damages in § 104(a)(2) case law leading up to the 1996
amendments,886 backdoor judicial and legislative tort reform,887 and the
couching of the discriminatory 1996 amendment in a taxing statute, all
evidence ego-adaptation, repression, and disguise of discriminatory ideas,
through the use of subterfuges that ease the guilt of deeply seeded
unconscious discrimination.
3. Cognitive Theory and § 104(a)(2)
Under the cognitive theory, because society views emotional-distress
plaintiffs as weak, feeble, and suffering from self-inflicted injury, an
individual will learn (through the process of assimilation) early on in life that
people who claim to suffer from emotional harm have a weak psyche.888
Thus victims of dignitary torts such as Title VII, ADEA, and ADA plaintiffs
may be stereotyped in a similar manner, because their various claims all
involve redress for emotional harms.
Black men have been stereotyped as “lazy/undisciplined/always late/ . . .
unqualified but protected by affirmative action/. . . [and] less intelligent than
other racial or ethnic groups.”889 Black women have been categorized as
“incompetent/educationally deficient/aggressive/militant/hostile/lazy/sly and
883. See supra Part II.A-K.
884. See supra Part II.L.
885. See id.
886. See Part II.A-K.
887. See supra Part IV.B-C.
888. See supra Part VII.A.2.
889. FEDERAL GLASS CEILING COMMISSION, GOOD FOR BUSINESS: MAKING FULL USE OF THE
NATION’S HUMAN CAPITAL 71 (1995).
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untrustworthy.”890 Women as a group have been perceived as weak and
emotional.891 The aged have been labeled “unhappy . . . disengage[d] from
society, . . . inflexible and set in their ways, and hav[ing] lessened
intelligence, levels of information and knowledge, and productivity.”892 The
disabled have been looked upon as dependent, childlike,893 “less intelligent,
less able to make the ‘right’ decisions, less ‘realistic,’ less logical, and less
able to determine his own life than a nondisabled person.”894
Under cognitive theory, these stereotypes are learned through assimilation
and may or may not be rebutted, depending on the individual’s experience
with a member of an out-group.895 But when a black man who is seen as
unqualified, a black woman who is looked upon as lazy, a woman who is
stereotyped as emotional and weak, an elderly person who is regarded as
unproductive, and a disabled person who is thought to be less intelligent,
bring claims to redress emotional harms resulting from discrimination, these
stereotypes are resurrected and reinforced by the law that regards emotional
distress claimants as weak, feeble, and suffering from self-inflicted harm.896
Thus, at the same time that racial prejudices are being reinforced, prejudice
towards emotional distress victims as a class is being strengthened.
Individual prejudice toward emotional distress victims as a class is reinforced
as they are categorized into the the stereotyped shortcomings associated with
out-group plaintiffs.897
When a decision maker believes that the § 104(a)(2) exclusion should be
limited to damages awarded on account of physical injuries, probably, that
person views such decisions as unrelated to race, sex, age, disability, national
origin, or religious discrimination, as well as to discrimination against
emotional distress victims.898 The decision maker simply perceives the
victim of physical injury as more deserving of a tax break than the victim of
a nonphysical injury.899 “Moreover, he has probably also learned an explicit
lesson of which he is very much aware: Good, law-abiding people do not
890. Id.
891. See CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN 155-56
(1979).
892. LEVINE, supra note 776, at 125.
893. See Mary D. Romano, Sex and Disability, in DISABLED PERSONS AS SECOND-CLASS
CITIZENS 64, 67 (Myron G. Eisenberg et al. eds., 1982).
894. Constantina Safilios-Rothschild, Disabled Persons’ Self-Definitions and Their Implications
for Rehabilitation, in THE SOCIOLOGY OF PHYSICAL DISABILITY AND REHABILITATION 39, 39 (Gary
L. Albrecht ed., 1976).
895. See supra Part VII.A.2.
896. See id.
897. See id.
898. Compare Lawrence, supra note 791, at 343.
899. See id.
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judge others on the basis of race[,]” gender, age, disability, national origin, or
religion.900 “Even the most thorough investigation of conscious motive will
not uncover the . . . stereotype[s] that has influenced his decision.”901‘ The
decision maker remains unaware of powerful stereotypes including those
embodied in the modern legal tradition that have biased the decision.902
C. Conclusion to Part VII
The conscious and unconscious gender bias examined in this Part
explains the historically disparate treatment of all tort plaintiffs with
nonphysical damages. Gender bias, like racial, age, and disability biases is
deep-seeded in a tort law. It is rooted in allegedly able-bodied, white, male
norms, like the reasonable man/person standard.
Because § 104(a)(2) concerns nonphysical damages, it is directly subject
to this historical bias. Given the fact that § 104(a)(2) excludes plaintiffs who
bring dignitary claims, unconscious sexism, racism, and ageism play a role
(in addition to the discriminatory material/emotional dichotomy). Thus the
currently discriminatory status of § 104(a)(2) is explained.
VIII. CONCLUSION: A CALL FOR CHANGE
The Twentieth Century has witnessed the struggle for equality by many
oppressed groups marginalized by the dominance of a primarily white male
power structure. In the wake of centuries of discrimination against people of
color and women, of sustained prejudice against the aged, and of the daily
hurdles faced by the physically and mentally challenged, the new goal of
equal treatment and access has been articulated for all people by Congress in
various federal legislative enactments during the last half of the Twentieth
Century.903 The inherent dignity and legitimate aspirations of each and every
human being have become a new focal point in society’s collective
900. Id.
901. Id. See also Krieger, supra note 811, at 1216-17. Krieger argues that “[a] substantial body of
empirical and theoretical work supports the proposition that cognitive biases in social judgment
operate automatically and must be controlled, if at all, through subsequent ‘mental correction.’” Id. at
1216. If this is true then the stereotypes we learn through assimilation are projected unconsciously.
Lawrence does not go so far as to say this in his cognitive theory breakdown. See Lawrence, supra
note 791, at 336-39. However, he does allude to this in a hypothetical in the “Unconscious Racism in
Everyday Life” section. See id. at 343. Even though Lawrence does not state whether he is applying
psychoanalytic theory or cognitive theory in the hypothetical, language in the paragraph such as “mass
media,” “portrayed in the stereotyped roles,” and “lesson is not explicit” supports the proposition that
he is applying the cognitive theory. See id.
902. Id.
903. See discussion supra Part IV.4.
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consciousness.
In light of this new and worthy goal, we have reviewed the history of
§ 104(a)(2). In reaching decisions, early administrative opinions misapplied,
confused, and entangled the concepts of human capital and income.904 This
embroilment paved the way for future bewilderment in the adjudication of
damage award exclusion tax litigation. Perplexity continued until the 1955
Supreme Court decision of Glenshaw Glass, which redefined income to
include any “undeniable accession to wealth, clearly realized, and over which
the taxpayer [had] complete dominion and control.”905 After Glenshaw
Glass, taxpayers structured their settlements to come within the statutory
exclusion. As a result, the courts backlashed and crafted tests to filter out
undeserving claims under § 104(a)(2). It was not until the early and mid 80’s,
some thirty years after Glenshaw Glass, that concrete principles were set for
analyzing § 104(a)(2) litigation.
The historical judicial precedents lend support to the argument that the
§ 104(a)(2) exclusion should apply to nonphysical personal injuries. The
Ninth Circuit in Roemer focused on whether the nature of the claim was tort
or tort-like in determining the applicability of the exclusion.906 The court
properly looked to the nature of the claim in interpreting regulation § 1.104-
1(c). This regulation has been consistently analyzed and interpreted by courts
until the Supreme Court reversed the analysis in the Burke case.907
In Threlkeld, the Tax Court further developed Roemer, by examining the
nature of the taxpayer’s injury rather than the nature of the economic
consequences flowing from the injury.908 In analyzing what constitutes a
personal injury, the court stated that the concept has long included
nonphysical as well as physical injuries. The court elucidated the definition
of personal injury as injuries arising from the violation of rights that inhere in
a human being, legally protected by virtue of being a person in the eyes of
the law.909
It was against this background that the courts decided the ADEA cases of
Rickel, Pistillo and Redfield, where the Third, Sixth, and Ninth Circuits
repectively held that the age discrimination personal injury damage awards
were fully excludable under § 104(a)(2).910
Beginning in 1989, however, when all the major § 104(a)(2) cases began
904. See discussion supra Part II.A-B.
905. Comm’r v. Glenshaw Glass, 348 U.S. 426, 431 (1955).
906. See discussion supra Part II.I.
907. See supra notes 299-311 and accompanying text.
908. See supra notes 244-58 and accompanying text.
909. See supra notes 256-57 and accompanying text.
910. See supra notes 282-89 and accompanying text.
Washington University Open Scholarship
1341 Wolff.doc 04/24/01   5:02 PM
1484 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [VOL. 78:1341
to deal with Title VII and ADEA damage awards, previous principles were
abandoned. Facing a perceived flood of federal discrimination litigation, the
courts began contorting the prior § 104(a)(2) analysis. In Sparrow, the D.C.
Circuit changed course and rejected Threlkeld, Roemer, and their progeny
and focused on the nature of Title VII’s damages in order to determine the
applicability of the § 104(a)(2) exclusion.911 It was also in 1989 that
Congress amended § 104(a)(2) to disallow the exclusion of punitive damage
awards from income where the underlying injury was nonphysical.912
Three years later, in Burke, the Supreme Court began its short, yet
detrimental, involvement in § 104(a)(2). In Burke, the Supreme Court
contorted the “tort or tort-like test” from an analysis of the nature of the claim
as inferred from the injury to an analysis of the nature of the claim as inferred
from Title VII’s remedial scheme. The Court’s remedial focus emerged as
the hegemonic sword of domination in its analysis, mortally wounding the
personal nature of a gender discrimination claim.913 Then in 1995, the
Supreme Court further twisted the tort or tort-like test, and grafted on new
independent prerequisites for excludability in Schleier.914
Between its 1992 decision in Burke and its 1995 decision in Schleier, the
Supreme Court manufactured a § 104(a)(2) analytical framework that
denigrated and marginalized victims of dignitary torts. Burke and Schleier
created an irrational and scientifically unsupported tort hierarchy, privileging
certain successful tort plaintiffs with income exclusion over similarly situated
tort-like discrimination plaintiffs. The Court determined that plaintiffs with
successful discrimination claims, unlike certain tort plaintiffs suffering
physical injuries, were unworthy of the tax exclusion, despite the fact that the
effects of discrimination can be as or more severe and permanent than any
physical injuries.
Although the members of today’s society look back on the strides of the
civil rights era with a high degree of social pride, unknown to most is the
reality that the civil rights revolution precipitated the backlash that caused the
double discrimination against civil rights plaintiffs and legally sanctioned
today by § 104(a)(2). In 1996, the Treasury and Congress, influenced by the
Schleier decision, limited the § 104(a)(2) exclusion to damages on account of
physical injury or physical sickness.915 The 1996 amendments to § 104(a)(2)
targeted people who suffered from discrimination by not allowing those
911. See supra notes 290-98 and accompanying text.
912. See supra note 386 and accompanying text.
913. See discussion supra Parts II.K, V.B.
914. See id.
915. See supra note 396 and accompanying text.
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successful claimants’ damage awards to fall under its exclusion. Such
individuals excluded from § 104(a)(2) already have proved that they were
victims of discrimination by prevailing in their dignitary tort claims under
state and federal statutes. Congress’s distinction covering those plaintiffs
with physical personal injuries and excluding those plaintiffs with
nonphysical personal injuries, once again discriminates against the dignitary
tort victim.
Personal injuries resulting from discrimination, even in the mildest form,
are the result of an invasion or violation of a person’s dignity. This personal
injury results in damage to nonappraisable, priceless, and intangible personal
human capital. As Professor Stephan postulates, human capital is valued
based upon a person’s future satisfactions.916 Thus, human capital includes
the expectations and aspirations that a person can command as part of a full
and productive life. Acts of discrimination cause irreparable injury to human
capital, and monetary damages are transfers of property that while
inadequate, attempt to restore human capital and redress the injury. Just as no
amount of money can adequately compensate for an injury to priceless
human capital, money is also inadequate to replace and redress a person’s
severed finger, arm, or leg.917
The scientific studies, statistical evidence, and anecdotal accounts
discussed in Part VI document the harmful effects of age, disability, race, and
gender discrimination. These forms of discrimination frequently cause the
same type of psychological, physical, and economic suffering to victims as
well as the same type of social costs to society-at-large. In the end, the
victim, the family, friends and associates of the victim and society as a whole
suffer the negative effects of each type of discrimination.
With such cumulative evidence available to Congress and the courts, one
would think that today’s enlightened decision makers would support equal
tax treatment of victims with physical and nonphysical injuries. The policy
justifications to support taxing statutes show clearly that victims of
nonphysical injuries deserve the § 104(a)(2) exclusion as much as victims of
physical injuries.918 Yet the double discrimination continues. Unconscious
discrimination likely manifested in back door legislative and judicial tort
reform and influenced the elimination of the § 104(a)(2) exclusion for
victims of discrimination.919 Major federal statutes serve as powerful
landmarks defining an expansive congressional policy to deter acts that
916. See supra note 453 and accompanying text.
917. See discussion supra Part III.H.
918. See discussion supra Part III.
919. See discussion supra Part VII.
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violate the dignity, equality, and spirit of a human person. Yet resistance to
this civil rights legislation covertly appeared in the context of the amendment
to § 104(a)(2). Through a restrictive interpretation of § 104(a)(2), lawmakers
and the judiciary rationalized and legitimized resolving conflicts that
marginalize the rights of minorities and, in a subtle way, reassert their own
position of privilege.920
By recognizing, rather than marginalizing, the severe personal injuries
suffered by victims of discrimination, Congress should amend § 104(a)(2).
Returning the income tax exclusion for victims of discrimination would be
consistent with the overall congressional policy to eliminate
discrimination.921 Moreover, reinstatement of the exclusion for victims of
nonphysical injuries could be made virtually revenue neutral if Congress
were to disallow the income tax deduction for payments made by the
tortfeasor. Disallowing the tax deduction for discrimination payments would
also be consistent with the broader and more pervasive congressional policy
to rid our society of discrimination in all its forms. Providing a tax benefit
through a deduction to tortfeasors who violate federal laws prohibiting
discrimination is inconsistent with the primary congressional policy of
eliminating discrimination. The government and ultimately all taxpayers
collectively should not subsidize payments incurred by those who
discriminate through an income tax deduction. Congress should deny
deductions to those who discriminate in the same manner as it does for those
who traffic in drugs.922 These activities are extremely harmful to society and
should not be economically subsidized by the tax law.
As a matter of policy, taxing statutes should not be inconsistent with other
congressional policies. Legislators and scholars need to examine tax laws
carefully to determine if in application the statute furthers an activity or
enterprise condemned by society. The proposed amendment to § 104(a)(2)
would send an important message, reinforcing in the Twenty-First Century,
Congress’s commitment to eradicating discrimination in America.
920. See discussion supra Part VII.
921. See discussion supra Part IV.A.
922. See I.R.C. §§ 280E, 25A(b)(2)D.
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